NTSB Identification: MIA99FA140
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On April 23, 1999, about 1800 central daylight time, a Beech B95A, N6600, purchased on April 9, 1999, by U.S. Air Salvage, collided with trees during a forced landing near Fountain, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 ferry flight. The airplane was destroyed and the private-rated pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The flight originated at 1734, from the Panama City-Bay County International Airport, Panama City, Florida.
The landing gears were braced down and no radios were installed in the accident airplane when the flight departed. The accident airplane and another airplane (N5720K) planned to depart as a flight of two. The pilot of N5720K, who was the accident pilot's father, planned to communicate to air traffic control for both flights.
According to a transcription of communications with the Panama City-Bay County International Airport Air Traffic Control (ATC) Tower, at 1729.55, the pilot of N5720K contacted the ground controller and reported "yes sir we're a bonanza on the north end of the field and we're operating with november six six zero zero he doesn't have radios." The pilot of N5720K also advised the ground controller that he would like to taxi out in front of the accident airplane, but it would be the first to depart. The controller questioned the pilot about the direction of flight after departure and after responding, the controller cleared the flight to taxi to runway 23. At 1731.46, the controller contacted the pilot of N5720K and asked "bonanza two zero kilo understand the ah travelair is going to be departing prior to you" to which the pilot responded "unable to decipher." Four seconds later the controller contacted the pilot and stated "roger you all got the ah signals worked up for him to depart" to which the pilot responded "yeah when i face him he's ready to go." The controller acknowledged that transmission and at 1733.56, the pilot of N5720K contacted the local controller and reported "tower two zero kilo and six six zero zero are ready to go." The controller cleared the flight to takeoff with a left turn to the north after departure. At 1734.15, the pilot of N5720K reported "two zero kilo ah left turn out." The local controller again cleared the flight to takeoff and at 1734.31, the pilot of N5720K responded "six six hundred is ready to go first." The local controller advised the pilot "roger he's cleared as well." At 1737.10, the controller advised the pilot that a frequency change was approved and suggested that he contact Tyndall tower and provided the appropriate frequency. The pilot acknowledged this and there were no further communications with the pilot of N5720K with the Panama City Air Traffic Control Tower.
According to the accident pilot's father, after departure, the accident pilot motioned to him by visual signals that he needed to land the airplane. He observed that the accident pilot had landed and flew over that area. He noted the crash site, landed in a nearby field, then proceeded to the accident site.
Another witness who was flying in N5720K reported that after takeoff, the accident airplane was flying behind and at a lower altitude than the altitude they were flying at (2,500 feet). He observed that they were flying above a 4-lane highway and about 10-15 minutes into the flight, the accident airplane climbed to the altitude they were flying at and was at their 9 o'clock position. At this time he observed the flashing of the gear lights and "...we knew he was having problems." He observed the accident pilot motioning with his hand that he needed to land the airplane and both occupants in N5720K responded by hand signals that they understood. The pilot of the airplane he was a passenger in began to turn to the right toward an airport that was located approximately 28 miles away but he noticed that the accident airplane was not following. He noticed that the accident pilot continued to flash the lights and use hand signals, which was acknowledged by dipping the wings. The accident airplane then flew under their airplane flying at about their 4 o'clock position, then he noticed that the accident airplane was losing altitude. The airplane continued to lose altitude and he observed that the airplane was just above trees, then below them. He observed a cloud of dust and after flying over the area, they spotted the wreckage.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the accident pilot did not hold an airframe and/or powerplant mechanic certificate. The FAA records also indicate that his airman certificate was suspended for 180 days, effective February 9, 1996. The suspension was due to the fact that the pilot operated a multiengine airplane without holding a multiengine class rating, and for operating an unairworthy airplane on a ferry flight from Laredo, Texas, to Jackson, Mississippi, on or about September 27, 1995. According to FAA personnel, after landing in Jackson, Mississippi, the location of a FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO); a FAA Airworthiness Inspector examined the airplane and noted incorrectly installed propellers, no propeller spinners were installed, the nose gear damper mount flange was cracked half way through, the left steering cable was chafing on loose pulley and bracket, the registration number tape was peeling off, metal pipes, automobile hose clamps and rubber straps were utilized to brace the nose landing gear, a large nick was noted in the right propeller tip, a floor panel was missing behind the pilot's seat, and records were unavailable to prove compliance with Airworthiness Directives.
Review of the pilot's pilot logbook revealed the first entry indicated that his original logbook was lost and all times were approximate. The total flight time carried forward was listed as 150 hours, all of that flight time was in single engine land type airplanes. The first page of the logbook does not indicate any multiengine time carried forward; and the first 4 pages of the logbook do not indicate the year of entry. The fifth page of the logbook which is also the last page with flight time entries, indicates the year to be 1997, with the last entry dated November 19. That entry indicated that he satisfactory passed his multiengine flight test. No determination could be made as to his total flight time since the last logged flight on November 19, 1997. His total logged multiengine flight time was documented to be approximately 41 hours.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
Review of the aircraft maintenance records revealed that on October 16, 1998, the airplane was inspected in accordance with an annual inspection. On October 17, 1998, while being operated by the aircraft owner, the nose and left main landing gears collapsed on landing at the Panama City-Bay County International Airport, Panama City, Florida. As a result, both propellers were damaged, along with damage to the leading edge of the right wing between the fuselage and the inboard section of the engine nacelle. An inspection of the airplane was performed for the insurance adjuster only for a repair estimate following the incident by personnel from a fixed base operator (FBO) located on the airport. The inspection determined that both propellers were damaged as well as the right wing. No repairs or further inspections were performed to the airplane by personnel of the FBO that inspected the airplane. The airplane remained outside on the ramp from the date of recovery to the day of the accident with the exception of an approximate 1 week period that the airplane was inside a hangar for the inspection. A company by the name of U.S. Air Salvage located in Johnson City, Tennessee, purchased the airplane from the insurance company on April 9, 1999.
According to Mark W. Trent, he is a friend of the accident pilot and is not a FAA certificated airframe or powerplant mechanic. On the day of the accident, he was a passenger in another airplane occupied by the accident pilot and the accident pilot's father. They flew to the Panama City Airport and as later determined by Air Traffic Control, landed at 1311 hours. The replacement propellers were in the airplane with them. After arriving, he observed the accident airplane parked on the ramp; the accident pilot's father removed the left propeller which had been previously damaged, and installed a replacement propeller on the left engine, with the help of the accident pilot. Mr. Trent removed the right propeller which also had been previously damaged and installed a replacement propeller on the right engine, also with the help of the accident pilot. The replacement propellers were provided by U.S. Air Salvage. Following the removal and replacement of the propellers on the ramp, Mr. Trent added 3 quarts of oil to the left engine which brought the oil level to the full mark, and the accident pilot added 3 quarts of oil to the right engine. He was not sure if the accident pilot's father further inspected the airplane following the removal and installation of the propeller but did report that the accident pilot inspected the airplane. Additionally, a commercial battery purchased at Wal-mart was installed in the accident airplane before the flight departed.
A Special Flight Permit was issued by an FAA Airworthiness Inspector on April 14, 1999, and sent via facsimile to the accident pilot's attention. The permit which was documented to expire 10 days from the date of issue or upon arrival at destination, whichever occurs first, allowed the accident airplane to be flown from Panama City-Bay County International Airport to Tri-Cities Regional TN/VA Airport. The operating limitations listed in the Special Flight Permit included a statement which indicated "An inspection to determine if the aircraft is safe for the intended flight and an entry in the permanent aircraft records of the results of this inspection must be made by an appropriately certified mechanic or repair station before any flight in connection with this authorization is valid." Review of the permanent maintenance records revealed no such entry. On the day of the accident, the permanent maintenance records were in the custody and control of the insurance adjuster from the October 17, 1998, incident.
The accident pilot's father made a verbal statement to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator, on May 3, 1999, that he inspected the airplane for the flight and made an entry in a booklet that was with the ferry permit paperwork in the wreckage that he inspected the airplane and it was safe for the intended ferry flight. He was advised that the booklet was not located in the wreckage and was asked to duplicate the entry that was made and to send it to the NTSB. He stated that he would provide a duplicate of the entry. On May 10, 1999, he was asked to send a duplicate of the entry that he initially reported he made in the booklet. He offered a nebulous statement that he would be fined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) $250,000.00 whether he did or whether he did not provide to the NTSB a copy of the duplicate entry. He was asked for the entry; he refused to comply, and referred further inquiries regarding the duplicate entry to his attorney. On June 7, 1999, a statement dated June 5, 1999, reportedly signed by the accident pilot's father, Jerry Pressley, A & P certificate number 237587185, was sent via facsimile to the NTSB office located in Miami, Florida. The statement indicated "During our last conversation on the telephone you stated that you needed a written statement from me concerning the ferry permit for N6600. I did not sign any document for the aircraft stating that I had inspected the aircraft and found it airworthy for the ferry flight, nor did I sign any statement that could be interpreted to mean anything similar." No contact was made by the NTSB investigator with the attorney between May 10, 1999, and June 7, 1999. Numerous attempts to obtain a written statement from Jerry Pressley regarding his installation of the left propeller through his attorney, were unsuccessful.
According to personnel from U.S. Air Salvage, no maintenance records were located for the propeller that was installed on the left engine of the airplane.
The airplane recording hour/tenth meter recorded a .5 hour increase from the reading following the incident on October 17, 1998, to the reading after the accident on April 23, 1999.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. Additional information pertaining to weather is contained on page 4 of the Factual Report-Aviation.
COMMUNICATIONS
The accident airplane was not equipped with either fixed or portable Very High Frequency (VHF) transceiver which would allow for communications with any Air Traffic Control (ATC) Facility. The ATC communications for the accident airplane was handled through the accident pilot's father flying in another airplane that was to accompany the accident airplane. A transcript of communications with the accident pilot's father who was flying in another airplane is an attachment to this report.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
Examination of the ramp where the airplane had been parked before the flight revealed oil on the ground when the location was examined 3 days after the accident.
The airplane crashed at N30 degrees 31.53 minutes and W 085 degrees 22.63 minutes. Examination of the area revealed damage to the top of a 30-foot tall tree. Ground scars from all landing gears were noted beginning on dry brush 240 feet past the first impact point with the tree. An approximate 20-foot tall un-marked power line located about 50 feet before the ground scars from the landing gears was noted to be undamaged. The descent angle of the airplane from the tree contact to the ground contact was calculated to be 7 degrees. The ground roll which was measured to be about 300 feet, was on a magnetic heading of 040 degrees; ground scars from all landing gears were noted for the full length of the ground roll. The ground scars made by all landing gears continue to a point just before a ditch beyond which a small tree was noted to be broken about 3 feet above ground level. Beyond that point no ground scars from the landing gear were observed. A large diameter tree was determined to be damaged about 5 feet agl , which was 65 feet beyond the damage to the small tree.
The main wreckage which consisted of the fuselage, and empennage, came to rest on a heading of 050 degrees. Both wings were separated from the fuselage. The left wing was resting with the leading edge towards the ground with the engine/propeller assembly attached. The right wing separated into 2 segments; the inboard section of the wing from the wing root to just outboard of the engine nacelle, was beneath the separated nose and cockpit section of the wreckage. The outboard section of the right wing was beneath the aft fuselage section and about 18 inches inboard from the tip was wrapped around a small diameter tree. The right side of the fuselage about 3 feet forward of the leading edge of the right horizontal stabilizer was noted to be wrapped around a tree and the right flap was also wrapped around that same tree. Both horizontal stabilizers and both elevators were in place as well as the vertical stabilizer and rudder assembly. All components necessary to sustain flight were in the immediate vicinity of the crash site. The nose landing gear was braced down, and the brace for the left main landing gear was not in place but the clamps for the brace were in place. The brace for the right main landing gear punctured a hole in the upper surface skin of the right wing. The instrument panel was separated from the airplane. The external portion of the nose cone was noted to be wrapped with an unknown brand of "duct" tape. The right engine propeller was noted to be in the "feathered" position and the flaps were determined to be retracted. Approximately 4 gallons of 100 LL fuel were drained from the right main fuel tank; no contaminants were noted. The remainder of the tanks did not contain fuel. The left and right fuel selectors were found positioned to the left and right main fuel tanks respectively and were in the detents. Examination of the airspeed indicator revealed that a screw head on the dial face exhibited contact by the bottom side of the needle. When positioned with the needle above the screw head, the needle was pointing to the 85 mph position. The lower limit of the green arc is 81 mph. Examination of the fuel supply system revealed no obstructions from either main fuel tank to each selector valve. No fuel was found in the fuel line at the fuel selector from each main fuel tank. Both auxiliary fuel pumps operationally checked satisfactory. The rudder trim was found positioned 6 degrees nose left as measured at the actuator.
Examination of the fuel tanks vent system for the left wing revealed that the main fuel tank vent line was unobstructed from the inlet to the static hole which is located on the aft side of the line 1.25 inches from the inlet. The line was obstructed downstream of the static hole. There was no damage to the main fuel tank vent line that extended beneath the wing. The inlet portion of the vent line for the left auxiliary fuel tank was not located; no obstructions were noted in the remaining section of the line to the fuel tank. An insect resembling a wasp was observed in the left main fuel tank vent system downstream of the inlet. Each opening at the anti icing fuel vent were blocked; blockage was also noted downstream of the inlet of the anti icing fuel vent for the auxiliary fuel tank. The blockage at that location was tan in color. The flush fuel vent located outboard of the auxiliary fuel tank was noted to be blocked approximately 2.5 inches downstream of the inlet; the inlet was not obstructed.
Examination of the fuel tanks vent system for the right wing revealed that the main fuel tank vent line was blocked within the first 1.25 inches of the line. The portion that was extended beneath the bottom skin of the wing exhibited no evidence of damage. The right wing auxiliary fuel tank vent line was found to be blocked within the first 1.5 inches of the line. Again, the portion that extended beneath the bottom portion of the wing exhibited no evidence of damage. Each opening at the anti icing fuel vent were blocked; blockage was also noted downstream of the inlet of the anti icing fuel vent for the right auxiliary fuel tank. The flush fuel vent located outboard of the auxiliary fuel tank was noted to be blocked approximately 1 inch downstream of the inlet; the inlet also was not obstructed.
Examination of the left engine revealed that the top spark plug for the No.1 cylinder was not in place; the threads in the cylinder were not damaged. Oil residue was noted clinging to the interior portion of the engine cowling above that location. Also, all the remaining top ignition leads were loose. Crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity was confirmed and thumb compression was noted from each cylinder. Impact damage to the left magneto precluded determination of magneto to engine timing. The right magneto was determined to be properly timed to the engine. The top spark plug in the No. 3 cylinder was noted to be only finger tight. No evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction was noted from the engine or accessories. The fuel line from the engine driven fuel pump to the servo fuel injector was removed at the servo fuel injector and only residual fuel was found. The fuel line from the servo fuel injector (servo) to the manifold valve was disconnected at the servo fuel injector and no fuel was found. The left propeller was retained for further examination.
Examination of the left propeller revealed markings in the propeller hub which indicates that it was manufactured by Hartzell Propeller, Inc., and the model number was recorded to be HC-A2VK-2, serial number H1326. The No. 1 propeller blade was noted to be model 8433-10. Both propeller blades were bent towards the blade face with a gouge noted on the leading edge of the No. 1 propeller blade about 1.5 inches from the blade tip. Chordwise scratches were noted on the blade back of the No. 1 propeller blade about 1 inch and 2.5 inches from the blade tip. Chordwise gouges were noted in the No. 2 propeller blade back about 7.5 inches and 10 inches from the blade tip. One gouge on the blade face of the No. 2 propeller blade was noted 3.5 inches from the blade tip and 1 inch from the trailing edge of the blade. The centrifugal latches and the latch plates for the two propeller blades were not broken but the piston was broken adjacent to the No. 1 propeller blade. Additionally, the outer spring was noted to be broken with evidence of a preexisting crack. There was no evidence of repositioning of the propeller blades to adjust the low pitch propeller blade angle.
Examination of the right engine revealed crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity. Thumb compression was noted from each cylinder. All ignition leads and plugs were tightly installed and both magnetos were determined to be properly timed to the engine. The fuel inlet screen at the servo was noted to be clean. No evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction was noted from the engine or accessories. The fuel line from the engine driven fuel pump to the servo was removed at the servo and residual fuel was noted. The fuel line from the servo to the manifold valve was removed at the servo and no fuel was found. Only residual fuel was found at the servo, the engine driven fuel pump, and at the auxiliary fuel pump. The right engine propeller was retained for further examination.
Examination of the right propeller revealed markings in the propeller hub which indicates that it was manufactured by Hartzell Propeller, Inc., and the model number was recorded to be HC92ZK-2B, serial number 176F. The propeller blades were determined to be model 8447-12A. Both propeller latch plates were intact and the No. 2 propeller blade was noted to be bent aft approximately 1/4 inch as measured at the blade tip. The propeller was cycled from low pitch to the feather position with no discrepancies noted.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
A postmortem examination of the pilot was performed by Marie A. Herrmann, M.D., Chief Medical Examiner, District Fourteen, Panama City, Florida. The cause of death was listed as complete aortic laceration due to blunt force trauma. Toxicological testing was performed by the FAA Accident and Research Laboratory (CAMI) and the University of Florida Diagnostic Referral Laboratories (U. of F.). The results of analysis by CAMI was negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, volatiles, and tested drugs. The results of analysis by the U. of F. Laboratory was negative in the blood and urine for ethanol and for the comprehensive drug screen.
ADDITIONAL DATA/INFORMATION
Review of FAA records revealed that the accident pilot's father who was the holder of an airframe and powerplant mechanic certificate, had his mechanic certificate revoked by the Federal Aviation Administrator effective July 15, 1987, for a period of one year. The order of revocation also indicated that "No application for a new mechanic certificate shall be made by or accepted from you, nor shall any mechanic certificate be issued to you for a period of one (1) year from the date you surrender your certificate to the Federal Aviation Administration as ordered herein...." Review of the true copy of Mr. Pressley's airman file revealed that in 1993, he wrote a letter to the FAA in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and requested a duplicate of his airframe and powerplant certificate. The request was complied with in error by the FAA. According to FAA personnel, after revocation of a certificate, the person must take any required written tests, oral, and practical tests before any certificate can be issued. There was no record that he had prepared an application for a airframe or powerplant mechanic certificate after July 15, 1988.
Review of the airplane type certificate data sheet revealed that the propeller model installed on the left engine at the time of the accident (HC-A2VK-2) was not listed as an approved propeller. According to Hartzell Propeller Application Guide, the propeller model installed on the left engine at the time of the accident is designed for either a Piper PA-23-235 or a Piper PA-23-250. According to the type certificate data sheets for those airplanes, each engine is rated at 235 or 250 horsepower at 2,575 rpm, respectively. The accident airplane type certificate data sheet indicates that each engine is rated at 180 horsepower at 2,700 rpm.
According to personnel from Hartzell Propeller, Inc., the differences of the propeller blades from the installed propeller vs. for the propeller approved for the accident airplane are blade width and thickness, edge and face alignment, and pitch distribution. A graph was prepared that listed the power required by the engine to rotate the propeller/propeller blades installed on the left engine position. The graph is predicated that the engine is producing 95 percent of 180 horsepower, the propeller blades were fixed at 15.5 degrees, and a standard sea level day. The graph indicates that at 25 knots (29 mph), the propeller could only rotate at 2,375 rpm. The graph also indicates that the propeller would only be capable of operating at 2,700 rpm (the designed rpm limit for the accident airplane per the type certificate data sheet), when the airplane accelerated to approximately 79 knots (91 mph).
According to the line service employee of an FBO located on the airport, he filled all four fuel tanks before the flight departed. He also stated that since the time he has been employed by the FBO, the accident airplane has been on the ramp. He also stated that while fueling the airplane, he could observe lines and tubing in the area between the fuselage and inboard side of the engine nacelle on the right side of the airplane. He did not hear the engines being started but the airplane taxied past his position towards the runway. He did not witness maintenance being performed to the airplane the day of the accident.
The wreckage was released to Billy F. Smith of the Calhoun County Sheriff Department on April 25, 1999. The pilot's pilot logbook, aircraft logbooks #1 and 2, left engine logbook (2 logs), right engine logbook (2 logs), and a yellow envelope that contained documents, was retained by the NTSB on June 21, 1999. The retained logbooks and documents were released to Mrs. Jacky Pressley, of U.S. Air Salvage, on June 23, 1999. The retained left propeller model HC-A2VK-2 serial number H1326, with propeller spinner and right propeller model HC92ZK-2B serial number 176F, were released to Ms. C. Anderson, Secretary for U.S. Air Salvage, on October 25, 1999.
