On February 3, 1988, American Airlines flight 132, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-83, departed Dallas/Fort Worth Internationat Airport, Texas, for Nashville Mettopolitan Airport, Tennessee. In addition to the passenger luggage in the midcargo compattment, flight 132 was loaded with a 104 pound fiber drum of textile treatment chemicals. Undeclared and impropetty packaged hazardous materials inside the fiber drum included 5 gattons of hydrogen peroxide sotution and 25 pounds of a sodium orthositicate-based mixture. While in flight, a flight attendant and a deadheading first officer notified the cockpit crew of smoke in the passenger cabin. The passenger cabin floor above the midcargo compartment was hot and soft, and the flight attendants had to move passengers from the affected area. The captain, who was aware of a mechanicat discrepancy with the auxitiary power unit on an earlier flight which resulted in in-flight fumes, was skeptical about the flight attendant's report of smoke. No in-flight emergency was declared. After landing, the captain notified Nashville Ground Controi about the possibility of fire in the cargo compartment, and he requested fire equipment. The flight attendants then initiated procedures to evacuate the airplane on the taxiway. Shortly thereafter, the 120 passengers and 6 crewmembers evacuated the airplane. After the plane was evacuated. crash/fire/rescue personnel extinguished the fire in the cargo compartment.
We determined the probable cause of the in-flight fire to be a chemical reaction resulting from a hydrogen peroxide solution, in concentration prohibited for air transportation, which leaked and combined with the sodium inosilicate-based mixture from an undeclared and improperly prepared container. The probable cause of the unauthorized transportation was the shipper's lack of knowledge about restrictions and requirements for hazardous materials and inadequate procedures for detecting undeclared hazardous materials shipments. Contributing to the delay in detecting the in-flight fire and the captain's decision not to declare an in-flight emergency was the lack of heat or srnoke detection equipment in the cargo compartment and insufficient flight crew communication. Contributing to the threat to the airworthiness of the airplane was the lack of a fire extinguishment system for the cargo compartment and the inadequate design of the cargo compartment ceilirg.
We made safety recommendations to the Textile Treatments Internationals, Inc, American Airlines, the Research and Special Programs Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration.
