​​On April 22, 1992, about 1533 Hawaiian Standard Tirne, Scenic Air Tours flight 22, a Beech Model E18S, N342E, collided with mountainous terrain on the Island of Maui, Hawaii, while on an air tour flight from Hilo. Hawaii, to Honolulu, Hawaii. The flight was conducted under the provisions of on-demand air taxi operations contained in 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part I 35 and under visual flight rules. The pilot and the eight passengers aboard sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. 

We deterrnined that the probable cause of this accident was the captain's decision to continue visual flight into instrument meteorological conditions that obscured rising mountainous terrain and his failure to properly use available navigational information to remain clear of the Island of Maui.  

​Contributing to the accident was the failure of Scenic Air Tours to conduct substantive pilot preemployment background screening, and the failure of the Federal Aviation Administration to require commercial operators to conduct substantive pilot preernploymcnt screening. 

​​As a result of this investigation, we made the following new safety recommendations​. ​

To the Federal Aviation Administration:

• ​Revise the Federal Aviation Regulations as needed to create a specific classification for, and operating rules goveming commercial air tour operators based on the complexity of flight operations, aircraft flown, flight frequency, number of passengers carried, air traffic densities in the areas of operation, and other relevant factors. (A-93-8) 
• Establish comprehensive Operations Specifications and Operations for final requirements for the certification of commercial air tour operators under a new or revised regulatory category. (A-93-9)
• Identify airspace which warrants special protection due to the presence of commercial tour operations. Create special operating rules for such airspace to reduce the potential for midair collisions and other accidents commensurate with meteorological and terrain considerations. (A-93-10)
• ​​Ensure that the regulatory basis and surveiliance resources are in place to oversee the operations, equipment, airmen, and airspace associated with any selective attention directed toward commercial air tour operations. (A-93-1 1 )
•  Devise a method for collecting data from air tour operators regarding flight hours, flight segments, and passengers carried that can be included in civil aviation exposure information for aviation industry comparisons. (A-93-12) ​
• Issue an Air Carrier Operations Bulletin instructing all Principal Operations Inspectors to aggressively encourage all commercial operators to incorporate comprehensive Aeronautical Decision ​Making (ADM) training in their pilot training programs. (A-93-13) 
  
• Require commercial operators to conduct substantive background checks of pilot applicants, which include verification of personal flight records and examination of training, performance, and disciplinary and other records of previous employers, the FAA safety and enforcement records, and the National Driver Register. (A-93-14) 
  
  

Previously Issued Recommendations Reiterated in This Report