On September 11, 1992, about 1457 central daylight time a Mitsubishi MU-2B-60 (MU-2), N74FB, and a Piper PA-32-301 Saratoga (PA-32), N82419, collided at 2,100 feet mean sea level, approximately 2 miles northeast of the Greenwood Municipal Airport, Greenwood, Indiana. The PA-32 was descending from 2,500 feet en route to Greenwood Municipal Airport in accordance with visual flight rules. The MU-2, also operating under visual flight rules, was climbing out of the Greenwood Municipal Airport en route to Columbus Ohio. The pilots of both airplanes and the four passengers aboard the MU-2 were fatally injured. The two other occupants of the PA-32 were seriously injured. Both airplanes were destroyed. The accident occurred in daylight visual meterotological conditions.
Prior to the collision, the PA-32 had been receiving air traffic control radar services from the Indianapolis Departure East/Satellite Controller. When the airplane was 3 miles north of the Greenwood Airport, radar services were terminated. Approximately 44 seconds later, the pilot of the MU-2 reported to the radar controller that he was "off Greenwoood" in anticipation of receiving an instrument flight rules clearance. The radar controller issued a discrete beacon code, but the flight had not been identified on radar at the time of the collision.
We determined that the probable cause of trhe accident was the inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept of separation of aircraft operating under visual flight rules that precluded the pilots of the MU-2 and the PA-32 from recognizing a collision hazard and taking actions to avoid the midair collision. Contribution to the cause of the accident was the failure of the MU-2 pilot to use all the air traffic control services available by not activating his instument flight rules flight plan before takeoff. Also contibuting to the cause of the accident was the failure of both pilots to follow recommended traffic pattern procedures, as recommended in the Airman's Information Manual for airport arrivals and departures.
As a result of this investigation, we made recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Business Aircraft Association, the Natinoal Association of Flight Instructors, the Experimental Aircraft Association, and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association.
