General Aviation Manufacturers Association Air Safety Investigator Workshop

​​Remarks as prepared for delivery.


​​Thank you, Pete, for that warm introduction, and especially for your safety leadership. I also want to thank each of you for your safety leadership. 

Because of your efforts, our skies have never been safer! 

The number of U.S. aviation deaths decreased by about a third between 2009 and 2021; the fatal accident rate per 100,000 flight hours has also dropped by about a third since its highpoint in 2005. For all these reasons and more, the U.S. is considered the global “gold standard” for aviation safety. 

A safety record like that is the result of decades of intentional effort.

But we still have work to do. 

The 376 aviation deaths in 2021 were preventable. More than 90% of those deaths were in general aviation: 344 people — THAT’S too many. 

One death is too many. 

Before I go any further, I want to introduce Team NTSB, my colleagues who show up for aviation safety every day: Kristi Dunks, our new Deputy Director for Regional Operations, who you heard from yesterday; Doug Brazy, who spoke this morning; as well as Kristyn Blocher; Adam Gerhart; Millicent Hill; Scott Johnson; Josh Lindberg; Eleazar Nepomuceno; Andrew Swick; Amanda Taylor; and Mark Ward. 

I’m honored to be here with my colleagues and to have the opportunity to address the air safety investigator workshop again. Last time, I told you a little bit about me. This time I have a safety agenda.

There’s a lot to talk about. Runway safety is still in the headlines. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and NTSB reauthorization bills are working their way through the House and Senate. And we’re standing on the verge of a possible government shutdown that will affect every one of us in this room. A government shutdown certainly would impact safety and that’s something we should all be talking about.

Today, I want to focus on something I hope the FAA bill covers: the safety of Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying operations.

In 2018, five tourists — two of whom were from right here in Dallas — boarded a helicopter in New Jersey. They booked a 30-minute flight that would take them over the East River to see New York’s famous landmarks: the Statue of Liberty, the Brooklyn Bridge, and Central Park. 

The flight obviously was a sightseeing tour for the passengers but portrayed by the operator as an aerial photography flight — all to avoid regulation and FAA oversight.

FlyNYON allowed passengers to take photos while extending their legs outside the helicopter. To make this happen, the operator removed three of the helicopter’s doors; the fourth door was locked in the open position. 

Each passenger was provided with a home improvement store-type harness and tether to prevent them from falling out of the helicopter. The pilot used the FAA-approved restraint that came installed on the helicopter. 

As the tour approached Roosevelt Island, it lost engine power; the pilot performed an autorotation and ditched in the river. 

Often, we don’t know what causes loss of engine power but, in this case, we do — because there was a video recorder on-board. 

The onboard video showed that the front passenger’s tether hung down loosely near the helicopter’s floor-mounted controls. At one point during the flight, his tether caught on the helicopter’s fuel shutoff lever, resulting in the loss of engine power.

Our investigation found that the landing was survivable. After ditching in the East River, the pilot was able to escape. 

But the five passengers — who, again, were in jerry-rigged restraints — couldn’t get out. They would’ve had to unscrew a carabiner located behind their shoulder blades or use a cutting tool provided by the tour operator, similar to car seatbelt cutters, to free themselves.

We also found that the rear passengers were essentially blocking each other from reaching their own tethers. 

The passengers had just 11 seconds to escape before the helicopter rolled to the right, became fully inverted, and sank in 40-degree water. All five passengers drowned. 

Mokuleia, Hawaii, 2019. Ten passengers boarded a sunset parachute jump flight. After the airplane lifted off, it banked to the left, rolled inverted, and descended to the ground. 

There wasn’t enough time for anyone to escape before the plane was consumed by a post-crash fire and destroyed. 

Our investigators found that the aircraft had a twisted left wing from a 2016 accident that was never properly repaired…and that the operator failed to properly maintain the aircraft overall. 

I was the Member on duty and launched to the scene of this accident. I inspected the debris field and the burnt wreckage with our investigators; the memory has stayed with me. 

The 11 people on board should still be with their families today. 

One last investigation to share with you — one that took place in my home state of Connecticut.Once again, I was the Board Member on scene. 

October 2019: a B-17 took off from Bradley International Airport, just outside of Hartford. 

The flight was billed as a “living history flight experience,” which meant that it was exempt from typical safety rules and regulations. This FAA exemption allows people who own historic military planes to sell tickets to the public for rides. 

Soon after takeoff, the pilot radioed that they were experiencing engine problems and needed to return to the airport. 

On the return approach, the plane hit the ground about 500 feet short of the runway. Seven people — five passengers and two crewmembers — were killed. Five others were seriously injured. The plane was almost entirely consumed by fire.

In this case, the pilot was also the director of maintenance for the Collings Foundation, which owned and operated the airplane. The necessary checks and balances for safety were not present. 

In fact, investigators said the partial loss of power in two of the four engines was due to the pilot's inadequate maintenance, which contributed to the cause of the accident. 

Moreover, there was little oversight of the Collings Foundation’s operations. The FAA inspector assigned to the operator died two years before the accident and hadn’t been replaced. 

Revenue passenger-carrying operations conducted under Part 91 — which carry thousands of paying passengers each year — aren’t held to the same maintenance, airworthiness, and operational standards as other commercial aviation operations.

But the public doesn’t know that. 

When a passenger parachutes out of a plane, that passenger is assuming the risk of jumping out of that plane, not thinking about the pilot’s training or qualifications, or the last time the plane was maintained, or whether it was maintained properly. They’re led to believe these flights are safe and heavily regulated with significant oversight. 

Learning to fly has helped me view NTSB findings and recommendations from a different vantage point — the left seat — adding to all I’ve seen from launching to accident scenes on the ground. It helps put our investigations into context, to really feel the impact of our findings and recommendations. 

My limited experience flying contributes to my passion about the safety of sightseeing flights, helicopter air tours, hot air balloon rides, and similar experiences that are operated under Part 91.

In March 2021, we adopted a report to address the safety of these operations. We also included this issue on our Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements for 2021–2023. This is our way of saying the recommendations are a really big deal. 

These recommendations urge the FAA to apply greater safety requirements and more comprehensive oversight to revenue passenger-carrying operations and address four areas.

First, there should be one level of safety for ALL commercial operators. Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying operators are not required to have initial and recurrent pilot training programs, so there’s no way to tell if their pilots are adequately prepared. That’s one of our recommendations to the FAA. We also recommend that they develop national safety standards, or equivalent regulations, for these Part 91 flights. We believe these regulations must include, at a minimum, requirements for initial and recurrent training and maintenance and management policies and procedures.

Two: The need to address loopholes. Some Part 91 operators exploit their exemptions and carry passengers for purposes other than the exceptions intended. They do this to get around more stringent safety requirements. 

In fact, in our report also highlighted a “flight school” operating with the knowledge of the local Flight Standards District Office under the student-instruction exemption that’s responsible for four crashes, two of which were fatal. 

Sky Combat Ace, operating in Las Vegas, Tahoe, and San Diego, offers several experiences, like “The Afterburner,” where you can fly your own air show routine. Then there’s “Sky Combat,” which allows you to engage with another airplane in air-to-air combat, not in a simulator. Their “The Top Gun Experience” includes advanced multi-ship air-to-air combat, as well as the option to add advanced aerobatics or a low-level bombing run. According to their website:

“Participants will engage in the most challenging of missions, Air Combat Maneuvering, where there are no breaks between engagements, rather the winner stays and the loser pays in a ‘King of the Mountain’ type of scenario. Just like the Sky Combat Experience, YOU FLY THE PLANE as your instructor pilot guides you to the merge! Don’t worry, you don’t need any flight experience, just a need for speed!” 

They shouldn’t be allowed to operate as a flight school.

Three: The need for increased FAA oversight. 

The FAA’s limited oversight and surveillance is not sufficient to ensure these operators are properly maintaining their aircraft and safely conducting operations. 

The FAA needs to provide its inspectors with guidance to pursue more comprehensive oversight of Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying operators.

Finally, we see time and time again the need for all operators to implement a comprehensive safety management system (SMS). 

Operators need to establish SMS because it is an effective way to manage and mitigate risks in their operations. 

SMS deficiencies played a role in the New York, Hawaii, and Connecticut crashes I discussed earlier. And these deficiencies have a played a role in countless more deaths and serious injuries. 

​One is too many. Now is the time to act. 

In January, the FAA proposed extending the SMS requirements to charter, commuter, air tour operators, and aircraft manufacturers — all of which are longstanding NTSB recommendations. That’s a great first step! 

But the proposed rule doesn’t apply to all Part 91 operations, as we recommended. We hope this is remedied going forward, possibly in the FAA reauthorization bill, if not in the rulemaking process. 

In closing, I want each of you to know how much the NTSB values our safety partnership…and it is a partnership. 

It’s the dedication, commitment, and safety leadership of everyone in this room, and of those that came before us, that has made — and continues to make — aviation what it is today.

On behalf of everyone at the NTSB, I thank you all. 


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