About 6:05 p.m. central daylight time on Wednesday, August 1, 2007, the eight-lane, 1,907-foot-long I-35W highway bridge over the Mississippi River in Minneapolis, Minnesota, experienced a catastrophic failure in the main span of the deck truss. As a result, 1,000 feet of the deck truss collapsed, with about 456 feet of the main span falling 108 feet into the 15-foot-deep river. A total of 111 vehicles were on the portion of the bridge that collapsed. Of these, 17 were recovered from the water. As a result of the bridge collapse, 13 people died, and 145 people were injured.
On the day of the collapse, roadway work was underway on the I-35W bridge, and four of the eight travel lanes (two outside lanes northbound and two inside lanes southbound) were closed to traffic. In the early afternoon, construction equipment and construction aggregates (sand and gravel for making concrete) were delivered and positioned in the two closed inside southbound lanes. The equipment and aggregates, which were being staged for a concrete pour of the southbound lanes that was to begin about 7:00 p.m., were positioned toward the south end of the center section of the deck truss portion of the bridge and were in place by about 2:30 p.m.
About 6:05 p.m., a motion-activated surveillance video camera at the Lower St. Anthony Falls Lock and Dam, just west of the I-35W bridge, recorded a portion of the collapse sequence. The video showed the bridge center span separating from the rest of the bridge and falling into the river.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the collapse of the I-35W bridge in Minneapolis, Minnesota, was the inadequate load capacity, due to a design error by Sverdrup & Parcel and Associates, Inc., of the gusset plates at the U10 nodes, which failed under a combination of (1) substantial increases in the weight of the bridge, which resulted from previous bridge modifications, and (2) the traffic and concentrated construction loads on the bridge on the day of the collapse. Contributing to the design error was the failure of Sverdrup & Parcel's quality control procedures to ensure that the appropriate main truss gusset plate calculations were performed for the I-35W bridge and the inadequate design review by Federal and State transportation officials. Contributing to the accident was the generally accepted practice among Federal and State transportation officials of giving inadequate attention to gusset plates during inspections for conditions of distortion, such as bowing, and of excluding gusset plates in load rating analyses.
Before determining that the collapse of the I-35W bridge initiated with failure of the gusset plates at the U10 nodes, the Safety Board considered a number of potential explanations. The following factors were considered, but excluded, as being causal to the collapse: corrosion damage in gusset plates at the L11 nodes, fracture of a floor truss, preexisting cracking, temperature effects, and pier movement.
The following safety issues were identified in this investigation:
- Insufficient bridge design firm quality control procedures for designing bridges, and insufficient Federal and State procedures for reviewing and approving bridge design plans and calculations.
- Lack of guidance for bridge owners with regard to the placement of construction loads on bridges during repair or maintenance activities.
- Exclusion of gusset plates in bridge load rating guidance.
- Lack of inspection guidance for conditions of gusset plate distortion.
- Inadequate use of technologies for accurately assessing the condition of gusset plates on deck truss bridges.
As a result of this accident investigation, the Safety Board makes recommendations to the Federal Highway Administration and the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials. One safety recommendation resulting from this investigation was issued to the Federal Highway Administration in January 2008.
As a result of its investigation of the collapse of the I-35W bridge in Minneapolis, Minnesota, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following safety recommendations:
To the Federal Highway Administration:
Develop and implement, in conjunction with the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, a bridge design quality assurance/quality control program, to be used by the States and other bridge owners, that includes procedures to detect and correct bridge design errors before the design plans are made final; and, at a minimum, provides a means for verifying that the appropriate design calculations have been performed, that the calculations are accurate, and that the specifications for the load-carrying members are adequate with regard to the expected service loads of the structure. (H-08-17)
Require that bridge owners assess the truss bridges in their inventories to identify locations where visual inspections may not detect gusset plate corrosion and where, therefore, appropriate nondestructive evaluation technologies should be used to assess gusset plate condition. (H-08-18)
Modify the approved bridge inspector training as follows: (1) update the National Highway Institute training courses to address inspection techniques and conditions specific to gusset plates, emphasizing issues associated with gusset plate distortion as well as the use of nondestructive evaluation at locations where visual inspections may be inadequate to assess and quantify such conditions as section loss due to corrosion; and, (2) at a minimum, include revisions to reference material, such as the Bridge Inspector's Reference Manual, and address any newly developed gusset plate condition ratings in the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials commonly recognized (CoRe) structural elements. (H-08-19)
To the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials:
Work with the Federal Highway Administration to develop and implement a bridge design quality assurance/quality control program, to be used by the States and other bridge owners, that includes procedures to detect and correct bridge design errors before the design plans are made final; and, at a minimum, provides a means for verifying that the appropriate design calculations have been performed, that the calculations are accurate, and that the specifications for the load-carrying members are adequate with regard to the expected service loads of the structure. (H-08-20)
Revise your Manual for Bridge Evaluation to include guidance for conducting load ratings on new bridges before they are placed in service. (H-08-21)
Modify the guidance and procedures in your Manual for Bridge Evaluation to include evaluating the capacity of gusset plates as part of the load rating calculations performed for non-load-pathredundant steel truss bridges. (H-08-22)
When the findings of the Federal Highway Administrationâ€“American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials joint study on gusset plates become available, update the Manual for Bridge Evaluation accordingly. (H-08-23)
Develop specifications and guidelines for use by bridge owners to ensure that construction loads and stockpiled raw materials placed on a structure during construction or maintenance projects do not overload the structural members or their connections. (H-08-24)
Include gusset plates as a commonly recognized (CoRe) structural element and develop guidance for bridge owners in tracking and responding to potentially damaging conditions in gusset plates, such as corrosion and distortion; and revise the AASHTO Guide for Commonly Recognized (CoRe) Structural Elements to incorporate this new information. (H-08-25)
Previously Issued Recommendation Resulting From This Accident Investigation
As result of its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board issued the following safety recommendation to the Federal Highway Administration on January 15, 2008:
For all non-load-path-redundant steel truss bridges within the National Bridge Inventory, require that bridge owners conduct load capacity calculations to verify that the stress levels in all structural elements, including gusset plates, remain within applicable requirements whenever planned modifications or operational changes may significantly increase stresses. (H-08-1)