Remarks as prepared for delivery
Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our investigation of the midair collision that occurred just over a year ago near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.
As we discuss NTSB’s thorough fact-finding, extensive analysis, and comprehensive safety recommendations stemming from our investigation, I want to make one thing abundantly clear: We should not have to be here today.
In this room, sitting with us or watching online, are family members of the 67 people who died on January 29th. We are so sorry for your loss. You should not have to be here because this was 100% preventable.
In fact, now that our investigation has concluded, I can say without a shadow of a doubt that we’ve seen this before. We’ve investigated eerily similar midair collisions, going back decades.
And we’ve issued safety recommendations like ADS-B In over and over and over again aimed at preventing just these kinds of collisions — recommendations that, for decades, have been rejected, sidelined, or just plain ignored.
That’s unacceptable.
As Chairman Cruz and Congressman Onder recently wrote, “Last year’s crash was not an isolated incident — it was the fatal result of years of unheeded warnings.” Years.
Fifty-seven years ago — in 1969 — we investigated a midair collision between Allegheny Airlines flight 853 and a small Piper Cherokee outside Shelbyville, Indiana; 83 people died. To this day, it remains Indiana’s worst aviation disaster.
Soon after, the Board held a hearing and issued 14 recommendations aimed at preventing future midair collisions — including our first recommendation for FAA to, quote: “expeditiously develop and implement a collision avoidance system in all civil aircraft.”
For perspective, that same year, we put a man on the moon. And yet it took another two decades and a Congressional mandate for FAA to finally implement TCAS.
TCAS didn’t prevent this accident but there are technologies that are readily available that could have.
With ADS-B In, the helicopter pilots would have gotten an audible alert (if it was in their headset) at 48 seconds prior to collision over Hains Point; they got nothing. The CRJ, 59 seconds; instead, they had just 19.5. What we’re talking about here is lifesaving information for pilots.
In 2008, we again called on the FAA to implement ADS-B In. We stated, “The Safety Board believes that the benefits of ADS-B technology warrant rapid adoption” and that, “the equipage of aircraft with ADS-B In capability will provide an immediate and substantial contribution to safety, especially in and around airports.”
What if the FAA had acted?
I want to be clear: What happened at DCA could happen anywhere in our airspace. The NTSB has ... for years ... long before the tragedy at DCA ... been sounding the alarm about the safety risks of see-and-avoid.
Yet we continue to rely on see-and-avoid to separate traffic throughout the National Airspace System when technology is readily available to provide pilots with the situational awareness they need and deserve to ensure safety.
See-and-avoid is exactly what it sounds like: A pilot has to visually acquire an approaching aircraft, recognize a collision course, decide on action, execute the control movement, and allow the aircraft to respond in a matter of seconds.
Since 2008, we’ve investigated 211 aviation accidents and incidents resulting from a midair collision or loss of separation, which killed 281 people and injured 112 others. In almost half, we raised concerns with see-and-avoid. These include many in your home states:
- 16 in Texas.
- 1 in Kansas.
- 15 in Alaska — including the 2019 tragedy in Ketchikan, where 6 people died and 10 were injured. I was the Board Member on scene. We discussed at length “the lack of an ADS-B In requirement for Part 135.”
- 2 in North Carolina.
- 1 in Missouri.
- 2 in Utah.
- 1 in Ohio.
- 1 in Wyoming.
- 1 in Michigan.
- 2 in Wisconsin.
- 1 in Illinois.
- 12 in Nevada.
- 7 in Colorado.
- 2 in Pennsylvania.
- 4 in New Jersey.
- And now 1 in the District of Columbia.
The fact is, our aviation system is the safest in the world for a reason: thanks to your work here in Congress, our work at NTSB, and the work of the FAA, redundancy has been built into the system to prevent catastrophe.
But that doesn’t mean system flaws don’t exist.
Our aviation system is complex; the National Airspace System is complex; but it’s generally safe, which means many things need to go wrong for a tragedy to occur.
We have an obligation to fix those vulnerabilities.
The question before us is: How many more people need to die before we act?
I've heard others say it can’t be done. It’s too expensive. The technology isn’t available. The risk was only at DCA.
None of that is accurate.
The technology is available. With a phone or an iPad and a headset and a few hundred dollars for a receiver, even the oldest general aviation Part 91 and Part 135 planes can be outfitted with ADS-B In.
In commercial aviation, American Airlines has equipped its entire fleet of more than 300 Airbus A321 aircraft with ADS-B In.
It is possible. The technology is available. We can solve this problem and save lives. And for those concerned about privacy protections or airport fees, that can be addressed by Congress.
We should not have to be here. And we wouldn’t be if the NTSB’s warnings had been heeded.
Exactly 17 years ago today, Colgan Air flight 3407 crashed into a residence on approach to Buffalo-Niagara International Airport in New York. Fifty people died. In response to that accident, we issued 25 new safety recommendations to the FAA; 10 were closed with unacceptable action. One is still open unacceptable.
We cannot allow this to happen again. Every single one of the 50 safety recommendations we issued in response to the DCA catastrophe must be acted on immediately.
The FAA has had multiple opportunities to implement NTSB recommendations and time after time has declined.
Now we need action — whether that’s through the FAA, Army, Department of War, or an Act of Congress. We cannot accept having to be here five years from now lamenting yet more inaction.
Not only must we do this for the 67 people who died on January 29th; we must do this for all those who lost their lives in accidents we’ve investigated. We must do this for their families. We must do this for future generations ... lives we can still save.
Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, I am immensely grateful to you and the members of this committee for your robust advocacy via the bipartisan ROTOR Act.
Thank you for your leadership.
Thank you for your willingness to stand up and do what’s right for safety.
I look forward to working with you to create a future where no family ever has to endure such tremendous loss.
Thank you again, and I look forward to your questions.
