This information is preliminary and subject to change.
On July 18, 2025, about 5:44 p.m. local time, eastbound Norfolk Southern Railway (NS) mixed freight train NS-167, as it passed over a spring switch at milepost 139.90W, derailed 24 railcars.[1] The derailed cars then collided with stationary westbound mixed freight train NS-33K on the NS Midwest Division, Southern West District, near Browns, Illinois, which was holding in a siding adjacent to the derailment site. [2] The derailed equipment from train NS-167 included 3 tank cars carrying hazardous materials, 2 tank cars containing molten sulfur that were breached and released product, and 1 tank car carrying denatured fuel ethanol, which released about 15 gallons of product.[3] Two NS crewmembers from train NS-33K were injured. Visibility conditions at the time of the accident were clear with no precipitation; the temperature was 88°F.
Train NS-167 was composed of 2 locomotives and 44 railcars (26 loaded railcars and 18 empty railcars). The crew of train NS-167 consisted of one engineer and one conductor. Shortly before the accident, a signal maintainer had conducted work on the spring switch.[4] About 40 minutes later, train NS-167 proceeded through the spring switch, the first train to do so after the maintenance was completed. As the train traversed through this switch, 24 of its railcars derailed.
Train NS-33K was composed of 2 locomotives and 44 railcars (37 loaded railcars and 7 empty railcars). The crew of train NS-33K consisted of one engineer, one conductor, and one engineer trainee. At the time of the accident, train NS-33K was stopped in a siding adjacent to the switch at milepost 139.90W.
As the head end of train NS-167 traversed the spring switch at 47 mph, the railcars derailed. [5 As a result, the train NS-33K engineer sustained a leg injury and ]was treated at a local hospital. The engineer trainee was injured when molten sulfur splashed onto him. The engineer trainee was treated on scene and later airlifted to a trauma center.
While on scene, National Transportation Safety Board investigators inspected the railcars involved in the accident, examined conditions of the track and signals, reviewed event recorder data from the lead locomotive and the video from inward- and outward-facing image recorders, conducted a reenactment of the accident, tested the spring switch cylinder from the accident switch, and conducted interviews.
The investigation is ongoing. Future investigative activity will focus on testing and maintenance protocols of spring switches, and review of interdepartmental collaboration between the railroad’s Signals and Communications and Maintenance-of-Way departments, with emphasis on communication, joint procedures, training programs, and overall maintenance practices related to spring switch inspection and maintenance.
Parties to the investigation include:
- the Federal Railroad Administration;
- the Illinois Commerce Commission;
- Norfolk Southern Railway;
- the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers;
- the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen;
- the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen; and
- the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division.[6]
[1] (a) All times in this report are local. (b) A
spring switch is a track switch with a spring mechanism
that automatically returns the switch points to normal positions after they have been displaced by the
passage of railcars.
[2] (a) The Southern West District consisted of single main track territory with passing sidings. (b) A
siding is a track auxiliary to the main track for meeting or passing trains. (c) In the vicinity of the
derailment area, NS authorized train movements with an automatic block signal system, where the use
of each block is governed by an automatic block signal, cab signal, or both. Train movements were
coordinated by a train dispatcher located at the NS Network Operations Center in Atlanta, Georgia.
Train movements on the Southern West District were governed by operating rules, special instructions,
timetable instructions, and signal indications of an automatic block signal system.
[3] (a) Molten sulfur is classified as a flammable solid (Hazard Class 4.1). (b) Denatured fuel ethanol,
Alcohols (Not Otherwise Specified), is a flammable liquid (Hazard Class 3). (c) A breach is when a
railcar is punctured by impact from other railcars or rail components.
[4] A signal maintainer is an employee who is qualified to work on switch components that are
integrated into a signal system
[5] The maximum authorized timetable speed on the Southern West District was 60 mph. In the
vicinity of the derailment, the maximum authorized speed on the main track was 50 mph because of the track geometry.
[6] The Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division spells employees with one final e.
