postaccident examination of accident location and damaged third rail feeder cable (inset)

​​Figure. Postaccident examination of accident location and damaged third rail feeder cable

(inset). 

Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation Third Rail Feeder Cable Fire

What Happened

​On May 8, 2025, about 7:34 a.m. local time, a third rail feeder cable caught fire on Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (PATH). The fire occurred on track G in a railroad tunnel near Grove Street Station in Jersey City, New Jersey, and resulted in service disruption and, later, smoke-related injuries to five PATH employees.​

What We Found

​We determined that the probable cause of the May 8, 2025, third rail feeder cable fire on track G near Grove Street Station in Jersey City, New Jersey, was PATH’s inability to identify the degraded condition of electrical cabling, which led to a reduction in current-carrying capacity, excessive heating, and eventual ignition of the cable under normal operating loads. The inability to identify the degraded condition was due to ineffective or nonexistent inspection, maintenance, and personnel qualification processes.

Lessons Learned

​This accident highlights the importance of preemptive maintenance. Compromised third rail feeder cable can become corroded, reducing its ability to carry the electrical current for which it was designed. In this accident, as the compromised area of cable degraded, the loss of material caused it to become overloaded and ignite. Thorough and well-defined third rail inspections should provide the opportunity to identify compromised conditions in these systems and subsequent investigations and remediations. Further, the use of thermal imagery inspection tools can help identify compromised cables that may be experiencing electrical overloading.​

The NTSB released a safety alert​ in March 2026 encouraging railroads to review and address deficiencies in traction power ele​ctrical system procedures and maintenance and to incorporate electrical hazards into system safety programs.

After the accident, PATH developed new procedures for third rail inspections and maintenance and implemented new training and qualification processes for employees engaged in this work. PATH also implemented a new thermal imaging inspection process that, before the publication of this report, identified multiple areas of compromised third rail and power cable, allowing these areas to be remediated before a critical failure.


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