​​This information is preliminary and subject to change.

​On April 4, 2025, about 9:17 a.m. local time, an American Auto Works (AAW) ConGlobal-3 (CG-3) conductor was killed during switching operations as part of yard job switching crew at the BNSF Automotive Distribution Facility, located on the BNSF Stockton Subdivision in Richmond, California. [1] The CG-3 switching crew was performing a shoving movement with two locomotives and five railcars on yard track 405, when the conductor became pinned between two railcars that the switching crew was attempting to couple. (See figure.) Visibility conditions at the time of the accident were clear with no precipitation; the temperature was 57°F.

The CG-3 switching crew consisted of a conductor, a brakeman, and an engineer. Shortly before the accident, the switching crew shoved eight railcars onto track 406 and were planning to shove the remaining five railcars onto track 405. At the time of the accident, the engineer was operating the lead locomotive shoving north on track 405 and the brakeman was positioned on the ground at the switch to enter track 405. The conductor was located on the ground between tracks 405 and 406. The conductor was directing the movement on track 405 and communicating by radio with the engineer. After a short period transpired without radio communication from the conductor, the engineer stopped the train while the brakeman searched for the conductor. The brakeman found the conductor between the fifth (last) railcar being shoved and the railcar they were attempting to couple to the fifth car.

​The couplers were bypassed (not aligned to permit a coupling to occur – also known as mismatched couplers) and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigators’ preliminary review of radio communications indicated that at no time during the sequence of events were there any announcements by the conductor to go in between equipment or separate 50 feet to fix mismatched couplers.[2] 

While on scene, NTSB investigators inspected the railcars involved in the accident; examined conditions of track 405; reviewed surveillance video footage and radio communications; retrieved the event recorder of lead locomotive 515; conducted a reenactment of the accident; reviewed crew training history and AAW training programs; company policies and procedures; and conducted interviews. 

The investigation is ongoing. Future investigative activity will focus on crew communications; human performance; rules compliance; internal and external safety oversight; and operating procedures.

Parties to the investigation include:

• ​the Federal Railroad Administration; 
• California Public Utilities Commission; and 
• ConGlobal.