What Happened
What Happened
On January 4, 2024, about 2:59 p.m., northbound New York City Transit (NYCT) non-revenue train 1345 (striking train) collided with northbound passenger train 1427 (struck train) during a shoving movement on the underground Number 1 Line north of 96th Street Station in Manhattan, New York. The struck train was crossing over from express track 3 to local track 4 when the striking train overran a red signal at the north end of the station platform, entered the crossover, and collided with the fifth railcar of the struck train. (See figure 1.) Two railcars on the striking train derailed and three railcars on the struck train derailed. The collision resulted in minor injuries to 18 passengers and 6 NYCT employees. NYCT estimated the damages to be about $12,975,187.
What We Found
What We Found
We determined that the probable cause of the collision between New York City Transit (NYCT) train 1345 and NYCT train 1427 was NYCT’s inadequate procedures for operating sectionalized trains from positions other than the head end, leading to the crew’s failure to stop non-revenue train 1345 at a red signal at 96th Street station and collide with revenue train 1427. Contributing factors included the mechanically cut-out brakes on the first five railcars, which disabled the automatic emergency braking system, and NYCT’s outdated communications network, which hindered reliable transmission of critical train movement information.
What We Recommended
The accident revealed deficiencies in NYCT’s operational protocols for the movement of sectionalized trains with deactivated braking systems, particularly when operated from a position other than the lead cab. Although procedures existed at the time, the incident exposed gaps in safety assurance and communication reliability.
In direct response to the accident, NYCT issued Service Delivery Bulletin No. 32-24 on February 23, 2024, establishing comprehensive and permanent operating procedures for “Other Than Front End Operation on the Mainline with Sectionalized Revenue Cars.” This directive mandates the deployment of a specified number of qualified personnel, clearly delineates individual responsibilities, and requires pre-movement face-to-face briefings to reinforce situational awareness and coordination. It further prescribes detailed train movement protocols, with an emphasis on maintaining continuous, positive verbal communication. The bulletin stipulates that any interruption or loss of communication must result in the immediate cessation of train movement, without exception.
On June 10, 2024, NYCT issued Rail Control Center Directive No. 11-24, establishing clear protocols for OCC personnel, including desk superintendents and console dispatchers when managing movements of trains being operated from locations other than the front cab. The directive mandates that no other train will be allowed to operate within the same segment or block of track at the same time, neither in front of nor behind, the train that is operating from other than the front.16 Further, trains operating from other than the front cab will only be allowed to move at the direction of the desk superintendent. The desk superintendent will issue all movement instructions conveying each segment of the move one segment or interlocking at a time until the train clears the mainline. Additionally, strict radio silence is required during movement, except in emergencies, to prevent interference and ensure compliance with Bulletin 32-24.
