Aerial view of the accident scene.

​Aerial view of the derailment scene.​​ (Photograph courtesy of Pike County Office of Emergency Management with overlay annotations by the National Transportation Safety Board.)​

CSX Transportation Derailment with Hazardous Materials Release and Fire

What Happened

​​On February 13, 2020, a high hazard flammable train carrying denatured ethanol derailed on a CSX Transportation (CSX) railroad track that runs between a hillside and the Russell Fork River near Draffin, Kentucky. In the 2 weeks before the derailment, the area where the derailment occurred received more than 300 percent of its normal amount of rainfall, which prompted the mudslide that covered the track with mud and debris immediately before the derailment. Three leading locomotives, a buffer car, and four tank cars located at the front of the train derailed. Two of the derailed tank cars breached and released 38,400 gallons of denatured ethanol, which combined with diesel fuel from the locomotives and ignited. The locomotives were destroyed by the ensuing fire, and the train crew was able to evacuate through the river and sustained minor injuries.

What We Found

We determined that the probable cause of the February 13, 2020, derailment of CSX Transportation train K42911 was loose mud, vegetation, sand, soil, and rock from a mudslide that obstructed the track following excessive rain accumulation over several weeks. Contributing to the derailment was CSX Transportation’s use of a weather alert system in which notifications were developed and implemented that did not account for the impact of the unusual increases and accumulation of precipitation. Contributing to the severity of the derailment was a fire resulting from the release of hazardous materials from breached US Department of Transportation-111 tank cars damaged in the derailment. Also contributing to the severity of the derailment was the failure of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to withdraw regulatory interpretation 06-0278 that pertains to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 174.85, which allowed the use of a single buffer railcar between the locomotives and the first tank car containing hazardous materials if no other nonhazardous materials cars are available in the consist.​​​

What We Recommended

We made recommendations to the Class I Railroads and Amtrak, ​​American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association and the American Public Transportation Association. We reiterated recommendations to  the Association of American Railroads, the American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association, and the Renewable Fuels Association, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, and to the Federal Railroad Administration​.

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