On January 24, 2024, about 8:14 a.m. local time, natural gas leaked from a compression coupling into a home on Bristol Boulevard in Jackson, Mississippi, causing an explosion and fire that resulted in one fatality, one injury, and a destroyed home. Three days later, on January 27, 2024, about 4:34 a.m., natural gas leaked from a compression coupling into a home on Shalimar Drive, about 0.7 miles from the first explosion, causing an explosion and fire that destroyed two homes. (A compression coupling is a pipeline component that joins and seals two pipes together. It is typically belowground and connects a service-line pipe to a main-line pipe.)
We determined that the probable cause of the two explosions at two separate homes in Jackson, Mississippi, was Atmos Energy Corporation’s inadequate leak management program, which allowed for known natural gas leaks, from service-line pipes that had partially pulled out of compression couplings due to soil movement, to be left unrepaired for at least 8 weeks, resulting in gas leaking from the compression couplings and then migrating to the nearby homes and igniting. Contributing to the explosions was Atmos Energy Corporation’s inadequate integrity management program, which did not appropriately assess and address risk in its pipeline system. Also contributing was an ineffective public awareness program, which did not adequately educate the public or emergency response officials on how to respond to a suspected natural gas leak.
As a result of this investigation, we made the following new safety recommendations:
To the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General: Audit the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s ongoing joint assessment of Atmos Energy Corporation (with the eight state partners that regulate Atmos Energy Corporation’s facilities), including a review of Atmos Energy Corporation’s approach to the safety management of its pipeline and how it applies lessons learned across all its operating divisions. (P-26-1)
To the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration: Issue an advisory bulletin urging operators to adopt probabilistic risk models for distribution integrity management where appropriate. (P-26-2)
To Atmos Energy Corporation:
- Develop and implement a program to locate and replace all mechanical couplings and mechanical joints located in expansive soils that are not resistant to pipe pullout with couplings and joints developed specifically for those conditions. The program should establish and make public the project milestones and timeline. (P-26-3)
- Update your companywide leak management program procedures to require weekly monitoring of nonhazardous (grade 2 or grade 3) belowground leaks identified in locations with adverse-soil conditions (such as water-saturated soil, flooding, drought, frozen ground, or settlement). (P-26-4)
- After completing the action described in P-26-4, implement a training program to maintain employee and contractor proficiency on the updated procedures. (P-26-5)
- Develop and implement a program to provide more frequent training to emergency response officials in all the distribution areas that you serve, including training on how to respond to natural gas-leak calls, and monitor the program for effectiveness. (P-26-6)
- Require your technicians who identify but do not repair a belowground natural gas leak to immediately notify people near the unrepaired leak that (1) the hazard potential of a leak can change over time, and (2) they should evacuate and then call 9-1-1 and Atmos Energy Corporation every time they smell natural gas odorant. (P-26-7)
- Develop and implement a program to proactively identify and collect missing service-line information for all your operating divisions. The program should (1) identify one or more methods for gaining additional system data and (2) establish and make public the milestones and timeline for acquiring the unknown system data. (P-26-8)
- Transition from a relative-risk model to a probabilistic distribution integrity management risk model. (P-26-9)
- Develop and implement a program that makes natural gas alarms available to members of the public who reside in your distribution areas. (P-26-10)
We reiterate the following safety recommendations.
To the Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration:
- Evaluate industry’s implementation of the gas distribution pipeline integrity management requirements and develop updated guidance for improving their effectiveness. The evaluation should specifically consider factors that may increase the likelihood of failure such as age, increase the overall risk (including factors that simultaneously increase the likelihood and consequence of failure), and limit the effectiveness of leak management programs. (P-21-2)
- Identify effective means for natural gas distribution pipeline operators to communicate with people who live, work, or congregate within the coverage area of a natural gas distribution pipeline system and implement a plan to help operators drive continuous improvement in public awareness of natural gas safety. (P-25-3)
To 50 States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia: Require the installation of natural gas alarms that meet the specifications of National Fire Protection Association 715 in businesses, residences, and other buildings where people congregate that could be affected by a natural gas leak. (P-25-5)
