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On June 13, 2005, about 1500 mountain standard time, a Beech King Air C90, N49LL, collided with terrain while maneuvering near Marble Canyon, Arizona. The pilot/owner was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The private pilot and one passenger sustained serious injuries; the airplane sustained substantial damage. The cross-country personal flight departed Bermuda Dunes, California, at an unknown time with a planned destination of Marble Canyon. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed.
The pilot and friends from Colorado were planning to meet at Page, Arizona. They learned that the Page airport was closed for maintenance, so they decided to meet at Marble Canyon. The friend's pilot read the airport data to the accident pilot; neither one of them had ever been to Marble Canyon.
The friends and their pilot arrived first, and were at the departure end of runway 03. They reported that they talked to the pilot via a handheld radio. The airplane approached on a straight in to runway 03. They stopped talking to the pilot about 4 miles out. They thought that everything looked good on the approach. Due to a hump in the runway, they lost sight of the airplane just before touchdown. They then saw the airplane climbing back up.
As the airplane became abeam their position, they observed the aft end of the airplane as it was in a left turn. They noted that the gear was still down. They estimated that the altitude was 200 feet above the ground, and the airplane was in a 60- to 80-degree angle of bank.
The witnesses reported that the airplane quickly descended into the terrain as the nose dropped. The airplane was upright as they lost sight of it just prior to impact. When they arrived at the scene, the airplane had nosed over.
A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman records revealed that the pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. The pilot held a second-class medical certificate issued on December 1, 2003. It had the limitations that the pilot must possess glasses for near and intermediate vision. The FAA reported that the pilot had a total flight time of 2,025 hours.
The airplane was a Beech C90, serial number LJ-1316. The engines were both Pratt and Whitney PT6-21A's.
The Airport/ Facility Directory, Southwest U. S., indicated that Marble Canyon runway 03 was 3,605 feet long and 35 feet wide. The runway surface was asphalt.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
The FAA, Pratt and Whitney, and Beech were parties to the investigation. Investigators examined the wreckage at Air Transport, Phoenix, Arizona, on June 21, 2004, under the supervision of the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge (IIC).
The Pratt & Whitney investigator pointed out buckling on the exhaust casing in a twisting direction that was opposite propeller rotation. All four propeller blades were in a corkscrew position. He removed one of the fuel nozzles, and investigators observed sand on the nozzle. The power section was intact. A borescope examination showed that all compressor turbine blades were intact. The fuel control was in about the 80 per cent power position. The fuel control device was bent. The propeller governor was in the governing position. The fire bottle had not been discharged.
The Pratt & Whitney investigator pointed out buckling on the exhaust casing in a twisting direction that was opposite of propeller rotation. All four propeller blades were in a corkscrew position. The turbine wheel and power section were undamaged. He removed one of the fuel nozzles, and investigators observed sand on the nozzle. A borescope examination showed that all compressor turbine blades and squealer tips were undamaged. The fuel control was in about the 80 per cent power position. The fuel control device was bent. The propeller governor was in the governing position. The fire bottle had been discharged.
The left and right power levers were in a high midrange position.
Both propeller controls were in the full forward position.
The left fuel condition lever indicated a midrange, high idle position. The right fuel condition lever indicated a full forward, high idle position.
All of the circuit breakers, except for the power warning enunciator, were in the operating position.
The airframe manufacturer's representative reported that the landing gear control lever was in the up position, and the outer surface of the landing gear doors exhibited sanding that continued onto the lower aft portion of the wing. He determined that this was consistent with the landing gear being in the retracted position. The representative measured the inboard flap actuators at 4.5 inches and the outboard flap actuators at 3.8 inches. He reported that this corresponded to the full up position. Visual examination indicated that both of the inboard and outboard wing flaps were in the up position. The elevator trim wheel indicated 4 degrees tab up. Visual examination indicated that the elevator tab was in the 0-degree position. The rudder trim wheel indicated a 0-degree position. The rudder tab visually appeared to be in the 5-degree position. Aileron trim wheel indicated 3/4-degree right wing down. The aileron tab visually appeared to be in the 10-degree down position.
Investigators established flight control continuity for the ailerons, elevators, rudder, aileron trim, elevator trim, and rudder trim systems.
The representative from Beech examined the emergency exit door. He reported that the row of rivets, which connect the door to the airplane, had been pried out. Pry marks were also on the upper left-hand portion of the door. Investigators tested the door's emergency exit handle, and the emergency exit door latch hooks exhibited movement in relation with the handle. The door exhibited continuity.
Investigators examined the airplane's entrance door. The representative from Beech was unable to open the door from the outside. He pointed out that the outer door handle had been sheared off at the rotary torque shaft location as a result of a prying force. The door also exhibited pry marks on the upper and lower right-hand corners. The door could only be opened from the inside with the use of the cabin entrance door operating handle.
Examination of the pilot and copilot seats revealed that both of the seats separated at the bench portion. The front halves of both seats separated, and were hanging down at the support tubes on both sides of the bench portion of the seat.
The pilot operator did not submit a Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB Form 6120.1/2).