

National Transportation Safety Board

Departure From Controlled Flight

Trans-Pacific Air Charter Learjet 35A, N452DA Teterboro, New Jersey May 15, 2017

Human Performance presentation



Overview

- Adequacy of Part 135 crew resource management (CRM) training guidance
- Lack of leadership training for upgrading captains
- Lack of Part 135 safety management system (SMS) requirement



FAA Risk Management Handbook: CRM

- Situational awareness
- Communication skills
- Teamwork
- Task allocation
- Decision-making
- Standard operating procedures (SOPs)



Flight Crew's Ineffective CRM

- Disregard for SOPs
- Poor planning and communication
- High workload and degraded situational awareness



Trans-Pacific CRM Training

- Referenced all required topics
- Did not explicitly state importance of following SOPs for effective teamwork
- Did not discuss impact of planning, briefing, and decision-making on workload and time management
- Required use of crew briefings, which did not occur



CRM Training Guidance

- FAA does not provide adequate guidance to Part 135 operators for developing and implementing effective CRM training
- FAA research could be used to develop such guidance



Captain's Ineffective Leadership

- Captain did not reinforce compliance with SOPs
- Captain demonstrated poor leadership
- Trans-Pacific CRM training did not adequately address role of captain as crew leader



Leadership

- Captain had no previous Part 135
 pilot-in-command experience
- Captain did not receive formal leadership training before upgrading
- NTSB has found deficiencies in captains' leadership during previous investigations



Safety Management

 Trans-Pacific had no SMS or formal safety program

 SMS could have identified and mitigated hazards found during investigation

• FAA does not require Part 135 SMS



Summary

Safety could be improved by requiring
CRM training guidance for Part 135 operators
Leadership training for upgrading captains
SMS for Part 135 operators





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