National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

Safety Recommendation

Date: August 14, 2013

In reply refer to: R-13-18 through -23
R-10-1 and -2 (Reiteration)
R-02-24 through -26 (Reclassification)

The Honorable Joseph C. Szabo
Administrator
Federal Railroad Administration
Washington, DC 20590

On June 18, 2013, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) adopted its report concerning the June 24, 2012, accident in which two Union Pacific Railroad (UP) freight trains collided head-on near Goodwell, Oklahoma. Additional information about this accident and the resulting recommendations may be found in the report of the investigation, which can be accessed at our website, http://www.ntsb.gov, under report number NTSB/RAR-13/02.

As a result of this investigation, the NTSB reiterated 1 safety recommendation to the Association of American Railroads and issued 16 new recommendations, including 1 to the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, 1 to the United Transportation Union, 1 to all Class I railroads, 1 to all railroads subject to the positive train control provisions of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, 6 to the UP, and the following 6 recommendations to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA):

R-13-18

Determine what constitutes a reliable, valid, and comparable field test procedure for assessing the color discrimination capabilities of employees in safety-sensitive positions.

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1 For more information, see Head-On Collision of Two Union Pacific Railroad Freight Trains Near Goodwell, Oklahoma, June 24, 2012, NTSB/RAR-13/02 (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board, 2013), available online at http://www.ntsb.gov.
R-13-19

When you have made the determination in Safety Recommendation R-13-18, require railroads to use a reliable, valid, and comparable field test procedure for assessing the color discrimination capabilities of employees in safety-sensitive positions.

R-13-20

Require more frequent medical certification exams for employees in safety-sensitive positions who have chronic conditions with the potential to deteriorate sufficiently to impair safe job performance.

R-13-21

Develop medical certification regulations for employees in safety-sensitive positions that include, at a minimum, (1) a complete medical history that includes specific screening for sleep disorders, a review of current medications, and a thorough physical examination, (2) standardization of testing protocols across the industry, and (3) centralized oversight of certification decisions for employees who fail initial testing; and consider requiring that medical examinations be performed by those with specific training and certification in evaluating medication use and health issues related to occupational safety on railroads. [This recommendation supersedes Safety Recommendations R-02-24 through -26.]

R-13-22

Require all information captured by any required recorder to also be recorded in another location remote from the lead locomotive(s), to minimize the likelihood of the information’s being unrecoverable as a result of an accident.

R-13-23

Publish the positive train control implementation update reports submitted by all railroads subject to the positive train control provisions of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 and make the reports available on your website within 30 days of report receipt.

The NTSB also reiterated two previously issued recommendations to the FRA:

R-10-1

Require the installation, in all controlling locomotive cabs and cab car operating compartments, of crash- and fire-protected inward- and outward-facing audio and image recorders capable of providing recordings to verify that train crew actions are in accordance with rules and procedures that are essential to safety as well as
train operating conditions. The devices should have a minimum 12-hour continuous recording capability with recordings that are easily accessible for review, with appropriate limitations on public release, for the investigation of accidents or for use by management in carrying out efficiency testing and systemwide performance monitoring programs.

R-10-2

Require that railroads regularly review and use in-cab audio and image recordings (with appropriate limitations on public release), in conjunction with other performance data, to verify that train crew actions are in accordance with rules and procedures that are essential to safety.

In addition, the NTSB reclassified the following three recommendations to the FRA from “Open—Acceptable Response” to “Closed—Unacceptable Action/Superseded,” by Safety Recommendation R-13-21.

R-02-24

Develop a standard medical examination form that includes questions regarding sleep problems and require that the form be used, pursuant to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 240, to determine the medical fitness of locomotive engineers; the form should also be available for use to determine the medical fitness of other employees in safety-sensitive positions.

R-02-25

Require that any medical condition that could incapacitate, or seriously impair the performance of, an employee in a safety-sensitive position be reported to the railroad in a timely manner.

R-02-26

Require that, when a railroad becomes aware that an employee in a safety-sensitive position has a potentially incapacitating or performance-impairing medical condition, the railroad prohibit that employee from performing any safety-sensitive duties until the railroad’s designated physician determines that the employee can continue to work safely in a safety-sensitive position.
These safety recommendations are derived from the NTSB’s investigation and are consistent with the evidence we found and the analysis we performed. Acting Chairman HERSMAN, and Members SUMWALT, HART, ROSEKIND, and WEENER concurred in these recommendations.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement them. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number. We encourage you to submit your response electronically to correspondence@ntsb.gov.

Original Signed
By: Deborah A.P. Hersman,
Chairman
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