



Log P-311D

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C. 20594

Safety Recommendation

Date: MAY 30 1995

In Reply Refer To: P-95-35

Mr. James A. Pasternak
Manager
Central Florida Pipeline Corporation
100 GATX Drive
Tampa, FL 33605

On November 30, 1993, a 184-foot-long vehicle operated by Rountree Transport and Rigging (Rountree), Inc., was en route to deliver an 82-ton turbine to a Kissimmee Utility Authority (KUA) electricity generating plant under construction near Intercession City, Florida. The private access road to the plant facility crosses over a single railroad track owned by CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT). Because of the configuration of the truck and the profile of the roadway, the cargo deck of the vehicle began to bottom out on the roadway surface as it moved across the tracks. The Rountree crew proceeded to adjust the height of cargo deck to gain greater clearance while the vehicle straddled the tracks. They had finished raising the cargo deck and were preparing to move the vehicle when the lights and bells at the grade crossing activated. Seconds later, National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) train number 88, the Silver Meteor, carrying 89 passengers, struck the side of the cargo deck and the turbine. The locomotive and the first four cars of the eight-car consist derailed, carrying the turbine and parts of the Rountree vehicle with them.¹

No deaths resulted from this accident. Six persons sustained serious injuries and 53 persons suffered minor injuries, and had to be evacuated to area hospitals. The Rountree vehicle and the turbine were destroyed, and the locomotive and the first three railcars were damaged extensively. Total damage from the accident exceeded \$14 million.

¹ For additional information, read Highway Accident Report--Collision of Amtrak Train No. 88 with Rountree Transport and Rigging, Inc., Vehicle on CSX Transportation, Inc., Railroad near Intercession City, Florida, November 30, 1993 (NTSB/HAR-95/01).

From its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board identified several safety issues, including hazard identification and avoidance and timely pipeline operator notification. When the train derailed, the locomotive and several other cars came to rest above and/or near two high-pressure hazardous liquid pipelines owned by Central Florida Pipeline Corporation (CFPL). Within minutes of the derailment, an Amtrak employee notified the CSXT dispatcher, who in turn, alerted the appropriate county and CSXT officials indicated on his emergency notification telephone list. The dispatcher did not notify CFPL. In addition, none of the responders to the scene noted the pipeline markers and reported the presence of the pipelines to the incident commander. The earliest notification that CFPL received was at 1:50 p.m. from an off-duty CFPL employee who happened to see a news broadcast about the accident. By the time that the CFPL employees arrived at the accident site, CSXT had contacted clean-up contractors who were bringing in bulldozers, cranes, and other heavy equipment that could damage the pipelines.

The Safety Board determined that the lack of cooperative action plan between CSXT and CFPL contributed to a break-down in communications. The Board found that had the CSXT Operations Center had emergency notification procedures regarding pipeline hazards, its personnel could have notified not only CFPL, but also the incident commander while he was en route to the site, thus ensuring that responders received prompt information about the location of pipelines, the materials involved, and the need to notify affected utilities.

The Safety Board is concerned about efforts by both members of the pipeline and the railroad industries to maintain the safety of people and property following a train or pipeline incident. A breach in a pipeline located in a railroad right-of-way would result in the release of a flammable product, which, if ignited would not only endanger those nearby, but also those traveling on trains moving through the affected area. Even if not ignited, a release would affect both railroad and pipeline operations in the area for days or even weeks while the environment is restored.

The Safety Board notes that after the Intercession City accident, the Office of Pipeline Safety issued an advisory in March 1994, in which it identified the need for all pipelines and railroads to actively coordinate their emergency response activities.

The National Transportation Safety Board therefore recommends that the Central Florida Pipeline Corporation:


Cooperate with the CSXT and any other railroads in your operational areas to develop a program to notify the railroad when pipeline accidents endanger railroad operations. (Class II, Priority Action) (P-95-35)

Also, the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendations H-95-7 to the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, H-95-8 and -9 to the Specialized Carriers and Rigging Association, H-95-10 to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, H-95-11 to the National Sheriffs' Association, H-95-12 to the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, P-95-31 to the American Gas Association, P-95-32 to the

Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, P-95-33 to the American Public Gas Association, P-95-34 to the American Petroleum Institute, P-95-36 to the State of Florida Division of Emergency Management, R-95-24 and -25 to the Association of American Railroads, R-95-26 and -27 to the American Short Line Railroad Association, R-95-28 to the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, R-95-29 to the Osceola County (Florida) Emergency Management Division, and R-95-30 through -32 to the CSX Transportation Corporation.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency with the statutory responsibility "to promote transportation safety by conducting independent accident investigations and by formulating safety improvement recommendations" (Public Law 93-633). The Safety Board is interested in any action taken as a result of its safety recommendations. Therefore, it would appreciate a response from you regarding action taken or contemplated with respect to the recommendation in this letter. Please refer to Safety Recommendation P-95-35.

Chairman HALL, Vice Chairman FRANCIS, and Member HAMMERSCHMIDT concurred in this recommendation.

By: 
James E. Hall
Chairman