

R. M. HOSE



National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594

Safety Recommendation

Date: APR 10 1997

In reply refer to: M-97-19 and -20

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International Electrotechnical Commission—TC80
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On June 10, 1995, the Panamanian passenger ship *Royal Majesty* grounded on Rose and Crown Shoal about 10 miles east of Nantucket Island, Massachusetts, and about 17 miles from where the watch officers thought the vessel was. The vessel, with 1,509 persons on board, was en route from St. George's, Bermuda, to Boston, Massachusetts. There were no deaths or injuries as a result of this accident. Damage to the vessel and lost revenue, however, were estimated at about \$7 million.¹

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the grounding of the *Royal Majesty* was the watch officers' overreliance on the automated features of the integrated bridge system, Majesty Cruise Line's failure to ensure that its officers were adequately trained in the automated features of the integrated bridge system and in the implications of this automation for bridge resource management, the deficiencies in the design and implementation of the integrated bridge system and in the procedures for its operation, and the second officer's failure to take corrective action after several cues indicated the vessel was off course.

Contributing factors were the inadequacy of international training standards for watchstanders aboard vessels equipped with electronic navigation systems and integrated bridge systems and the inadequacy of international standards for the design, installation, and testing of integrated bridge systems aboard vessels.

The deficiencies in the design and implementation of the *Royal Majesty's* integrated bridge system was linked to several deficiencies in the electronic interfacing of the integrated bridge system components. For example, although the National Marine Electronics Association

¹ For more information, read Marine Accident Report—*Grounding of the Panamanian Passenger Ship Royal Majesty on Rose and Crown Shoal near Nantucket, Massachusetts, June 10, 1995* (NTSB/MAR-97/01).

(NMEA) 0183 output data from the *Royal Majesty's* Raytheon 920 global positioning system (GPS) receiver should have been programmed to identify the receiver as an integrated instrument (II) talker with a system mode (*SYS*) sentence to indicate GPS or dead-reckoning (DR) mode, the industry standard NMEA 0183 data protocol did not provide a *SYS* identifier for the DR mode. In short, the NMEA did not consider that hybrid mode receivers could use DR as one of their modes of determining position. Consequently, the Raytheon designers chose to use the GPS *GP* identifier in the NMEA 0183 output, regardless of whether the 920 GPS device was transmitting valid GPS data or DR-derived position data.

To account for this, however, Raytheon also programmed the 920 GPS to automatically set the NMEA 0183 *valid/invalid* position data bits to the invalid state when the GPS was operating in the solution (SOL) and/or DR mode. In doing so, Raytheon assumed that a listener device, such as the navigation and command system (NACOS) 25, using position data from a GP talker would recognize when the data were flagged *invalid*.

Once the desired position receiver was selected by the *Royal Majesty's* crew, the NACOS 25 took position data from the chosen position receiver based on the "talker" identifier code in the NMEA 0183 data stream; in this case, *GP* in the data stream from the Raytheon 920 GPS. STN Atlas, the manufacturer of the NACOS 25, did not expect a device identifying itself as *GP* to send position data based on anything other than GPS data, particularly not on DR-derived position data. Further, STN Atlas expected inaccurate or failed GPS position data to be recognizable by nulled position data fields or by no change in the position latitude/longitude, the latter of which would trigger the NACOS 25 position-fix alarm. STN Atlas therefore chose not to program the NACOS 25 to check the *valid/invalid* bits in the NMEA 0183 data stream as a means of detecting invalid GPS data. Consequently, when the GPS defaulted to the DR mode, the NACOS 25 was unable to recognize the status change; and thus its subsequent navigation did not correct for the effect of wind, current, or sea. The Safety Board concludes that because the industry standard NMEA 0183 data protocol did not provide a documented or standardized means of communicating or recognizing that a DR positioning mode was in use by a hybrid DR-capable position receiver, Raytheon and STN Atlas adopted different design philosophies about the communication of position receiver mode changes for the 920 GPS and the NACOS.

Nevertheless, STN Atlas was aware of and claimed compatibility with the NMEA 0183 protocol containing the *valid/invalid* status bits used by Raytheon and was capable of making the NACOS 25 NMEA 0183 interface fully compatible with those specifications if it wanted to do so (including the recommended minimum GPS data sentence, *RMC*). Therefore, the Safety Board further concludes that STN Atlas should have, in order to help ensure safety and compatibility with different NMEA 0183 position receivers, programmed the *Royal Majesty's* NACOS 25 to recognize the *valid/invalid* status bits in the NMEA 0183 data, including those specified in the NMEA 0183 v1.5 *RMC* recommended minimum GPS data sentence. The Safety Board is aware that since the accident, STN Atlas has taken steps to program its integrated navigation system NMEA 0183 interfaces to meet a newer, more comprehensive NMEA 0183 version and to ensure that no DR-capable position receivers are used with its NACOS-integrated navigation system. The Safety Board believes that the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) should revise its electronic interface standards to provide an explicit means of indicating when hybrid position receivers are transmitting DR-derived position data. Finally, the Board believes that the

NMEA and the IEC should advise their members to (1) immediately inform the NMEA and the IEC of perceived inadequacies in electronic interface standards and (2) if applicable, design their hybrid positioning systems to identify themselves ("talk") as integrated instruments (II) with an appropriate system mode identifier (SYS).

Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the International Electrotechnical Commission:

Advise its members to (1) immediately inform the National Marine Electronics Association and the International Electrotechnical Commission of perceived inadequacies in electronic interface standards and (2) if applicable, design their hybrid positioning systems to identify themselves ("talk") as integrated instruments (II) with an appropriate system mode identifier (SYS). (M-97-19)

Revise the 1162 electronic interface standard to provide an explicit means of indicating when hybrid position receivers are transmitting dead reckoning-derived position data. (M-97-20)

The Safety Board also issued Safety Recommendations M-97-1 through -4 to Majesty Cruise Line; M-97-5 through -11 to the U.S. Coast Guard; M-97-12 and -13 to STN Atlas Elektronik GmbH; M-97-14 and -15 to Raytheon Marine; M-97-16 through -18 to the National Marine Electronics Association; M-97-21 through -26 to the International Council of Cruise Lines; and M-97-27 and -28 to the International Chamber of Shipping and to the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners. The Safety Board also reiterated Safety Recommendations M-93-18 and -19 to the U.S. Coast Guard.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency with the statutory responsibility "to promote transportation safety by conducting independent accident investigations and by formulating safety improvement recommendations" (Public Law 93-633). The Safety Board is interested in any action taken as a result of its safety recommendations. Therefore, it would appreciate a response from you regarding action taken or contemplated with respect to the recommendations in this letter. Please refer to Safety Recommendations M-97-19 and -20. If you need additional information, you may call (202) 314-6450.

Chairman HALL, Vice Chairman FRANCIS, and Members HAMMERSCHMIDT, GOGLIA, and BLACK concurred in these recommendations.

By:


Jim Hall
Chairman

