

National Transportation Safety Board

Office of the Chairwoman

Washington, DC 20594



April 14, 2026

The Honorable Sean Duffy
Secretary of Transportation
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE
Washington, DC 20590

Dear Secretary Duffy:

This letter provides information about the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) March 31, 2026, report *Fatal Crashes Between Vehicles Operating in Hands-Free Partial Automation Mode and Stationary Vehicles in San Antonio, Texas, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania*, NTSB/HIR-26-02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at <http://www.nts.gov>.

As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:

- Alcohol-impaired driving
- Limitations and insufficient federal oversight of partial driving automation systems, including:
 - Lack of federal requirements for data recording and inadequate manufacturer awareness of National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Standing General Order-applicable crash events
 - Driver monitoring system limitations
 - Deficiencies in the Ford Motor Company's implementation of its partial vehicle automation system, and overall lack of federal guidelines for SAE International Level 2 implementation and advanced driver assistance systems integration

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT). Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report.

- Issue comprehensive guidelines for vehicle manufacturers implementing partial vehicle automation systems that address known system limitations, including:

- integration and concurrent engagement of other safety-critical technologies (such as automatic emergency braking, active intelligent speed assistance, and driver monitoring system);
- promoting driver engagement by design
- reducing the safety risks associated with automation complacency and misuse; and
- setting maximum operational speeds for automation systems based on overall system capabilities. (H-26-1) (See section 2.3.3.2.)

In the same report, we also classify one previously issued safety recommendation to the USDOT:

- Define the data parameters needed to understand the automated vehicle control systems involved in a crash. The parameters must reflect the vehicle's control status and the frequency and duration of control actions to adequately characterize driver and vehicle performance before and during a crash. (H-17-37, classified Closed–Unacceptable Action/Superseded in section 2.3.1.3.)

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement the new recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (Safety Recommendation H-26-1). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Sincerely,

[Original Signed]

Jennifer L. Homendy
Chairwoman
On behalf of the entire Board

Enclosure

National Transportation Safety Board

Office of the Chairwoman

Washington, DC 20594



April 14, 2026

The Honorable Jonathan Morrison
Administrator
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE
Washington, DC 20590

Dear Administrator Morrison:

This letter provides information about the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) March 31, 2026, report *Fatal Crashes Between Vehicles Operating in Hands-Free Partial Automation Mode and Stationary Vehicles in San Antonio, Texas, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania*, NTSB/HIR-26-02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at <http://www.nts.gov>.

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 - Deficiencies in the Ford Motor Company's implementation of its partial vehicle automation system, and overall lack of federal guidelines for SAE International Level 2 implementation and advanced driver assistance systems integration

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendations to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Additional information regarding these recommendations can be found in the noted sections of the report.

- Require manufacturers to equip new SAE International Level 2-capable passenger vehicles with a telematic system that notifies the manufacturer of crashes meeting your reporting requirements in Standing General Order 2021-01. (H-26-2) (See section 2.3.1.2.)

- Amend 49 *Code of Federal Regulations* Part 563, “Event Data Recorders,” to require that all new SAE International Level 2-capable passenger vehicles record data elements related to these systems, including at a minimum:
 - system availability;
 - engagement and activation denial;
 - driver alerts; and
 - system faults for automatic emergency braking, forward collision warning, driver monitoring system, lane departure prevention, lane centering, partial automation system operation, and any other systems deemed necessary. (H-26-3) (See section 2.3.1.3.)
- Require that all new SAE International Level 2-capable passenger vehicles be equipped with driver monitoring systems capable of minimizing driver disengagement, automation complacency, and misuse of vehicle automation by, at a minimum:
 - providing warnings about accumulated short glances over a prolonged period of time;
 - differentiating genuine on-road glances from attention directed to objects, such as cell phones, located in the driver’s forward line of sight; and
 - issuing initial and subsequent multi-modal alerts at intervals that minimize eyes-off-road duration. (H-26-4) (See section 2.3.2.2.)

In addition, the NTSB reiterates the following recommendation to NHTSA:

- Require that all new vehicles be equipped with passive vehicle-integrated alcohol impairment detection systems, advanced driver monitoring systems, or a combination thereof; the systems must be capable of preventing or limiting vehicle operation if driver impairment by alcohol is detected. (H-22-22) (See section 2.2.3.)

In the same report, we also classify four previously issued safety recommendations to NHTSA:

- Use the data parameters defined by the US Department of Transportation in response to Safety Recommendation H-17-37 as a benchmark for new vehicles equipped with automated vehicle control systems so that they capture data that reflect the vehicle’s control status and the frequency and duration of control actions

needed to adequately characterize driver and vehicle performance before and during a crash; the captured data should be readily available to, at a minimum, National Transportation Safety Board investigators and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration regulators. (H-17-39, classified Closed–Unacceptable Action/Superseded in section 2.3.1.3.)

- Define a standard format for reporting automated vehicle control systems data, and require manufacturers of vehicles equipped with automated vehicle control systems to report incidents, crashes, and vehicle miles operated with such systems enabled. (H-17-40, classified Closed–Unacceptable Action/Superseded in section 2.3.1.3.)
- For vehicles equipped with Level 2 automation, work with SAE International to develop performance standards for driver monitoring systems that will minimize driver disengagement, prevent automation complacency, and account for foreseeable misuse of the automation. (H-20-3, classified Closed–Acceptable Action/Superseded in section 2.3.2.2.)
- After developing the performance standards for driver monitoring systems recommended in Safety Recommendation H-20-3, require that all new passenger vehicles with Level 2 automation be equipped with a driver monitoring system that meets these standards. (H-20-4, classified Closed–Acceptable Action/Superseded in section 2.3.2.2.)

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement the new recommendations and the reiterated recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (Safety Recommendations H-26-2 through -4 and H-22-22). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Sincerely,

[Original Signed]

Jennifer L. Homendy
Chairwoman
On behalf of the entire Board

Enclosure

National Transportation Safety Board

Office of the Chairwoman

Washington, DC 20594



April 14, 2026

Mr. Jim Farley
President and CEO
Ford Motor Company World Headquarters
1 American Road
Dearborn, MI 48126

Dear Mr. Farley:

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant events in the other modes of transportation—railroad, transit, highway, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We determine the probable causes of the accidents and events we investigate and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences. In addition, we conduct transportation safety research studies and offer information and other assistance to family members and survivors for each accident or event we investigate. We also serve as the appellate authority for enforcement actions involving aviation and mariner certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and US Coast Guard, and we adjudicate appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.

We are providing the following information to urge the Ford Motor Company to act on the safety recommendations in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents.

This letter also includes information about our March 31, 2026, report *Fatal Crashes Between Vehicles Operating in Hands-Free Partial Automation Mode and Stationary Vehicles in San Antonio, Texas, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania*, NTSB/HIR-26-02. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at <http://www.nts.gov>.

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- Driver monitoring system limitations
- Deficiencies in the Ford Motor Company's implementation of its partial vehicle automation system, and overall lack of federal guidelines for SAE International Level 2 implementation and advanced driver assistance systems integration

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendations to the Ford Motor Company. Additional information regarding these recommendations can be found in the noted sections of the report.

- Revise the driver monitoring systems in your new vehicles to detect and provide warnings about accumulated short distractions over a prolonged period of time; differentiate genuine driver on-road glances from attention directed to objects, such as cell phones, located in the driver's forward line of sight; and issue initial and subsequent multi-modal alerts at intervals that minimize eyes-off-road duration. (H-26-5) (See section 2.3.2.2.)
- Modify your BlueCruise system for new vehicles to require that the automatic emergency braking system is engaged and that the Intelligent Adaptive Cruise Control system uses appropriate speed tolerances to mitigate excessive speeding, taking into consideration the system's operational capabilities as well as traffic and highway complexity. (H-26-6) (See section 2.3.3.1.)

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (Safety Recommendations H-26-5 and -6). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. For your convenience, please refer to additional [guidance on responding to our safety recommendations](#) on our website.

If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

All communications regarding safety recommendations are stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to these recommendations. Responses marked as

confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. In the likely event that your company uses auto-generated and/or preformatted confidentiality statements on letterhead or outgoing e-mails, please include a statement in your letter indicating that the information can be publicly released. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.

Sincerely,

[Original Signed]

Jennifer L. Homendy
Chairwoman
On behalf of the entire Board

cc: Mr. Tom Single
Global Deputy Director, Ford Motor Company

Enclosure