National Transportation Safety Board

Office of the Chairwoman

Washington, DC 20594

January 7, 2026

Mr. Ronald Draper, Chief Executive Officer
Textron Aviation Inc.
1 Cessna Boulevard
Wichita, Kansas 67215

Dear Mr. Draper:

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant events in the other modes of transportation—railroad, transit, highway, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We determine the probable causes of the accidents and events we investigate and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences. In addition, we conduct transportation safety research studies and offer information and other assistance to family members and survivors for each accident or event we investigate. We also serve as the appellate authority for enforcement actions involving aviation and mariner certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and US Coast Guard, and we adjudicate appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.

We are providing the following information to urge Textron Aviation Inc. to act on the safety recommendations in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents.

This letter also includes information about our January 2, 2026, Urgent Aviation Investigation Report, *Establish Pilot Training and Experience Qualification Criteria and Stall Test Plan for Postmaintenance Stall Test Flights in Certain Hawker Airplane Models,* AIR-26-01. The details of the relevant completed and ongoing accident investigations and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

As a result of these investigations, we identified the following safety issues:

- Need for stall test pilot training and experience qualification criteria
- Need for a stall test plan that describes unacceptable stall characteristics, recovery procedures, and safety considerations

- Inadequate FAA review of the clarity and accuracy of a temporary revision document containing instructions for adding stall test flight information to the airplane manuals
- Need for pilot manual descriptions that even light wing ice accretion or visually imperceptible wing component anomalies can result in a stall occurring without stall identification and warning system activation and adverse stall behavior
- Need for pilot manual procedures for responding to an inadvertent encounter with adverse stall behavior
- Need for owners, operators, and pilots to be aware that the pilot training and experience needed to safely perform stall test flights exceeds that which is typically provided to operational line pilots

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendations to Textron Aviation Inc. Additional information regarding these recommendations can be found in the report.

- Define manufacturer-authorized pilot training and experience qualification criteria for pilots who perform postmaintenance stall test flights in Hawker 700, 800, 800XP, 850XP, and 900XP airplanes to ensure that they are prepared with the competencies needed to safely respond to an encounter with unacceptable stall characteristics. (A-26-1) (Urgent)
- Develop a stall test plan that describes unacceptable stall characteristics, recovery procedures, and safety considerations needed to prepare manufacturer-authorized flight crewmembers to safely perform postmaintenance stall test flights in Hawker 750, 800, 800XP, 850XP, and 900XP airplanes. (A-26-2) (Urgent)
- Review all other airplane models (besides the Hawker 750, 800, 800XP, 850XP, and 900XP) listed on type certificate A3EU, and, for each model that is subject to postmaintenance stall test flights, define stall test flight pilot training and experience qualification criteria and develop a stall test plan, as specified in Safety Recommendations A-26-1 and -2. (A-26-3) (Urgent)
- Review the Pilot's Operating Manual and Airplane Flight Manual for the airplanes on type certificate A3EU and revise them, as necessary, to provide a description of the adverse effects of certain wing surface anomalies, such as visually imperceptible defects or light ice accretion, on the airplane's stall behavior, including:
    - the possibility of stall before stick shaker or stick pusher activation;
    - a description of unacceptable stall characteristics; and

- procedures for recovering the airplane from an inadvertent encounter with a stall and adverse stall behavior. (A-26-4) (Urgent)

- Inform owners and operators of the airplane models on type certificate A3EU that are subject to postmaintenance stall flight tests of the circumstances of these accidents to increase their awareness of the possibility of unacceptable stall behavior, such as an uncommanded roll through 360° and entry into a spin, and that the flight crew training and experience needed to ensure the safety of these flights exceeds that which is typically provided to operational line pilots. (A-26-5) (Urgent)

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 30 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number (Safety Recommendations A-26-1 through -5). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. For your convenience, please refer to additional guidance on responding to our safety recommendations on our website.

If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

All communications regarding safety recommendations are stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to these recommendations. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. In the likely event that your company uses auto-generated and/or preformatted confidentiality statements on letterhead or outgoing e-mails, please include a statement in your letter indicating that the information can be publicly released. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.

Sincerely,

[Original Signed]

Jennifer L. Homendy
Chairwoman
On behalf of the entire Board

cc: Mr. Henry Soderlund, Manager, Air Safety Investigations & Chief Air Safety Investigator
Mr. Ricardo Asensio, Sr. Air Safety Investigator
Ms. Jennifer Barclay, Sr. Air Safety Investigator

Enclosure

National Transportation Safety Board

Office of the Chairwoman

Washington, DC 20594

January 7, 2026

The Honorable Bryan Bedford, Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20591

Dear Administrator Bedford:

This letter provides information about the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) January 2, 2026, Urgent Aviation Investigation Report, *Establish Pilot Training and Experience Qualification Criteria and Stall Test Plan for Postmaintenance Stall Test Flights in Certain Hawker Airplane Models,* AIR-26-01. The details of the relevant completed and ongoing accident investigations and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:

- Need for stall test pilot training and experience qualification criteria
- Need for a stall test plan that describes unacceptable stall characteristics, recovery procedures, and safety considerations
- Inadequate FAA review of the clarity and accuracy of a temporary revision document containing instructions for adding stall test flight information to the airplane manuals
- Need for pilot manual descriptions that even light wing ice accretion or visually imperceptible wing component anomalies can result in a stall occurring without stall identification and warning system activation and adverse stall behavior
- Need for pilot manual procedures for responding to an inadvertent encounter with adverse stall behavior
- Need for owners, operators, and pilots to be aware that the pilot training and experience needed to safely perform stall test flights exceeds that which is typically provided to operational line pilots

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the FAA. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the report.

- Require Textron Aviation Inc. to complete the actions specified in Safety Recommendations A-26-1 through -3, and ensure that the information is accurate and correctly incorporated into the appropriate Federal Aviation Administration-approved manual or document for each airplane. (A-26-6) (Urgent)

For context, Safety Recommendations A-26-1 through -3, asked Textron Aviation Inc. to do the following:

- Define manufacturer-authorized pilot training and experience qualification criteria for pilots who perform postmaintenance stall test flights in Hawker 700, 800, 800XP, 850XP, and 900XP airplanes to ensure that they are prepared with the competencies needed to safely respond to an encounter with unacceptable stall characteristics. (A-26-1) (Urgent)
- Develop a stall test plan that describes unacceptable stall characteristics, recovery procedures, and safety considerations needed to prepare manufacturer-authorized flight crewmembers to safely perform postmaintenance stall test flights in Hawker 750, 800, 800XP, 850XP, and 900XP airplanes. (A-26-2) (Urgent)
- Review all other airplane models (besides the Hawker 750, 800, 800XP, 850XP, and 900XP) listed on type certificate A3EU, and, for each model that is subject to postmaintenance stall test flights, define stall test flight pilot training and experience qualification criteria and develop a stall test plan, as specified in Safety Recommendations A-26-1 and -2. (A-26-3) (Urgent)

The NTSB is vitally interested in the recommendation we issued to you because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 30 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (Safety Recommendation A-26-6). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

Sincerely,

[Original Signed]

Jennifer L. Homendy
Chairwoman
On behalf of the entire Board

cc: Mr. Patrick Lusch, Sr. Air & Space Accident Investigator
Mr. Jason Baird, Air Safety Investigator
Mr. Todd Gentry, Air Safety Investigator

Enclosure

National Transportation Safety Board

Office of the Chairwoman

Washington, DC 20594

January 7, 2026

Mr. Ed Bolen, President and Chief Executive Officer
National Business Aviation Association
1200 G St NW, Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005

Dear Mr. Bolen:

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant events in the other modes of transportation—railroad, transit, highway, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We determine the probable causes of the accidents and events we investigate and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences. In addition, we conduct transportation safety research studies and offer information and other assistance to family members and survivors for each accident or event we investigate. We also serve as the appellate authority for enforcement actions involving aviation and mariner certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and US Coast Guard, and we adjudicate appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.

We are providing the following information to urge the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA) to act on the safety recommendation in this letter because we believe your organization can help reduce the risk of future accidents.

This letter also includes information about our January 2, 2026, Urgent Aviation Investigation Report, *Establish Pilot Training and Experience Qualification Criteria and Stall Test Plan for Postmaintenance Stall Test Flights in Certain Hawker Airplane Models,* AIR-26-01. The details of the relevant accident investigations and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at http://www.ntsb.gov.

As a result of this investigation, we identified the following safety issues:

- Need for stall test pilot training and experience qualification criteria
- Need for a stall test plan that describes unacceptable stall characteristics, recovery procedures, and safety considerations

- Inadequate FAA review of the clarity and accuracy of a temporary revision document containing instructions for adding stall test flight information to the airplane manuals
- Need for pilot manual descriptions that even light wing ice accretion or visually imperceptible wing component anomalies can result in a stall occurring without stall identification and warning system activation and adverse stall behavior
- Need for pilot manual procedures for responding to an inadvertent encounter with adverse stall behavior
- Need for owners, operators, and pilots to be aware that
    - The pilot training and experience needed to safely perform stall test flights exceeds that which is typically provided to operational line pilots
    - Even light wing ice accretion or visually imperceptible wing component anomalies can result in a stall occurring without stall identification and warning system activation and adverse stall behavior

Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to the NBAA. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the report.

- Inform your members about the recent accidents that occurred during postmaintenance stall flight tests required for certain Hawker airplanes, including the Hawker 750, 800, 800XP, 850XP, 900XP, and others on type certificate A3EU, to increase owner, operator, and pilot awareness that unacceptable stall behavior may occur and that the flight crew training and experience needed to ensure the safety of these flights exceeds that which is typically provided to operational line pilots. (A-26-7) (Urgent)

The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 30 days of the date of this letter, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement this recommendation. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number (Safety Recommendation A-26-7). We encourage you to submit your response to ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov. For your convenience, please refer to additional guidance on responding to our safety recommendations on our website.

Because this recommendation asks you to inform your members of the circumstances of the referenced accidents, we have included a drop-in article you may use, either in its entirety or modified to fit the length and style considerations of

your publication and/or website. We ask that you publish it, or similar content, in the next issue of your newsletter and/or website, and that you send us a copy of the newsletter or a link to the website article once it has been published.

If your reply, including attachments, exceeds 20 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions on how to send larger documents. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

All communications regarding safety recommendations are stored by the NTSB and viewable by the public. Please do not send privileged or confidential communications in response to this recommendation. Responses marked as confidential or privileged (or similar designations) will be considered nonresponsive. In the likely event that your company uses auto-generated and/or preformatted confidentiality statements on letterhead or outgoing e-mails, please include a statement in your letter indicating that the information can be publicly released. If you have concerns about this protocol, please contact us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov.

Sincerely,

[Original Signed]

Jennifer L. Homendy
Chairwoman
On behalf of the entire Board

cc: Mr. Doug Carr, Senior Vice President, Safety, Security, Sustainability & International Operations
Ms. Kristie Greco Johnson, Senior Vice President, Government Affairs, Public Policy & Advocacy
Mr. Mark Larsen, Director, Safety & Flight Operations

Enclosure

January 2, 2026

Postmaintenance Stall Test Flight Safety Concerns for Certain Hawker Airplanes

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recently issued urgent safety recommendations to Textron Aviation Inc. (the type certificate holder) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to address safety issues the NTSB identified in its recent investigations of two fatal accidents that occurred during manufacturer-required postmaintenance stall test flights of Hawker 800XP and 900XP airplanes. The accidents resulted in five fatalities.

Textron requires that stall test flights must be performed for Hawker 750, 800, 800XP, 850XP, 900XP, and other airplanes on the same type certificate (A3EU) after certain maintenance tasks. This is because these airplanes feature a wing design that is sensitive to minor installation or condition defects that may be introduced inadvertently during maintenance activities. For example, the range of acceptable tolerances for some wing component installations must be achieved within a few hundredths of an inch to avoid introducing unacceptable stall behavior, such as a stall occurring before stick shaker or stick pusher activation, an uncommanded roll through 360°, spin entry, or a combination of these behaviors.

In both stall test flight accidents, the flight crews were line pilots for the respective operators, and each crew was unprepared to successfully remediate the adverse stall behavior they encountered during the flight.

The NTSB is concerned that flight crews and airplane owners and operators may not understand that the training and experience needed to safely perform a stall test flight in certain Hawker airplanes exceeds that which is typically provided to operational line pilots.

The NTSB is also concerned that flight crews may not fully understand that the wing design is sensitive visually imperceptible wing component installation or condition defects or light wing ice or frost accretion, any of which can result in adverse stall behavior and a loss of airplane control.

<u>Encounters with Adverse Stall Behavior</u>

The most recent accident involved a Hawker 800XP airplane, XA-JMR, that crashed on October 16, 2025, near Bath Township, Michigan. The other involved a Hawker 900XP airplane, N900VA, that crashed near Westwater, Utah, on February 7, 2024.

In both of these accidents, each flight crew lost control of the airplane after it exhibited adverse stall behavior. In the case of the Hawker 900XP, this included stalling concurrent with the stick shaker and rolling through 360° multiple times in a near-vertical descent

profile consistent with a flat spin. Although the NTSB found that the Hawker 900XP flight crew did not properly ensure that the airplane's wings were free of ice before conducting the stall test, the circumstances of the accident highlight the airplane control challenges that flight crews performing stall tests may face when adverse stall behavior is encountered, regardless of the reason for the behavior.

Although the NTSB's investigation of the Hawker 800XP accident is ongoing, the descent profile of that airplane was similar, and a preliminary review of the weather in the area does not suggest a structural icing scenario.

The NTSB's report also discusses a stall test flight incident involving a Corporate Jets Limited BAE 125-800A, a training flight accident involving a Hawker Siddeley HS-125-700A, and two stall test flight events involving a Raytheon Corporate Jets Hawker 800XP and a Hawker 125-800. The incident airplane had frost near the wing root, and the event airplanes had some bent vortex generators that resulted in adverse stall behavior.

Flight Crew Selection and Wing Surface Condition Considerations

In its report, the NTSB raises concerns about the need for manufacturer-authorized pilot training and experience qualification criteria and stall test plans for performing postmaintenance stall test flights. Currently, neither are clearly defined.

Further, the NTSB raises concerns about the adequacy of the available information about the adverse effects of certain visually imperceptible wing component installation or condition defects or light wing ice or frost contamination on airplane stall behavior.

The NTSB has issued urgent safety recommendations to Textron Aviation Inc. and the FAA to address these issues. However, the NTSB believes that, until those actions are completed, increased owner, operator, and pilot awareness of the following can help prevent future accidents:

- The flight crews tasked to perform manufacturer-required postmaintenance stall test flights in certain Hawker airplanes may encounter adverse stall behavior or unacceptable stall characteristics, such as a stall occurring before stick shaker or stick pusher activation, an uncommanded roll through 360°, spin entry, or a combination of these behaviors.

- The flight crew training and experience needed to safely perform a stall test flight in certain Hawker airplanes exceeds that which is typically provided to operational line pilots.

- Due to the wing design of certain Hawker airplanes, certain visually imperceptible wing component installation or condition defects or light wing ice or frost accretion can result in adverse stall behavior, such as a stall occurring before stick shaker or stick pusher activation, an uncommanded roll through 360°, spin entry, or a combination of these behaviors.

As a result, the NTSB has issued an urgent safety recommendation to the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), Safety Recommendation A-26-7, asking the NBAA to inform its members about the circumstances of these accidents and the safety issues identified.

NTSB Reports

NTSB report AIR-26-01, which contains the urgent safety recommendations, and its public docket, case DCA26SR003, can be found at ntsb.gov. The reports and public dockets for the stall test flight accidents and incident, cases ANC26FA002, WPR24FA083, and CHI06IA127, respectively, and the training flight accident, DEN03FA155, can be found using the NTSB's CAROL Query search tool.