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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation P-80-059
Details
Synopsis: ON OCTOBER 30, 1979, A NATURAL GAS EXPLOSION AND FIRE DEMOLISHED A TOWNHOUSE AT 215 THIRD STREET SE., IN WASHINGTON, D.C., AND DAMAGED NEARBY BUILDINGS AND CARS. NO ONE WAS INSIDE THE TOWNHOUSE AT THE TIME, BUT THREE PERSONS IN A STOPPED CAR WERE INJURED WHEN DEBRIS FROM THE EXPLOSION SHATTERED A CAR WINDOW.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: AMEND 49 CFR 192.617 TO REQUIRE THAT OPERATORS PRESERVE TO THE EXTENT PRACTICABLE THE ACCIDENT SITE AND ITS AFFECTED GAS FACILITIES UNTIL ON-SCENE INVESTIGATIONS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Mode: Pipeline
Location: Washington, DC, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: 80286
Accident Reports:
Washington Gas and Light Company Natural Gas Explosion
Report #: PAR-80-04
Accident Date: 10/30/1979
Issue Date: 7/15/1980
Date Closed: 9/29/1988
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: RSPA (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: RSPA
Date: 9/29/1988
Response:

From: RSPA
To: NTSB
Date: 3/21/1983
Response: SECTION 192.617 REQUIRES THAT EACH OPERATOR: ESTABLISH PROCEDURES FOR ANALYZING ACCIDENTS AND FAILURES, INCLUDING THE SELECTION OF SAMPLES OF THE FAILED FACILITY OR EQUIPMENT FOR LABORATORY EXAMINATION, WHERE APPROPRIATE, FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE CAUSES OF THE FAILURE AND MINIMIZING THE POSSIBILITY OF A RECURRENCE. THESE REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN FURTHER STRENGTHENED AND REINFORCED BY SECTION 192.615, EMERGENCY PLANS (AMENDED, MARCH 1976, 41 FR 13587) WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, STATES THAT: BEGINNING ACTION UNDER SECTION 192.617, IF APPLICABLE, AS SOON AFTER THE END OF THE EMERGENCY AS POSSIBLE, EACH OPERATOR SHALL ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH APPROPRIATE FIRE, POLICE, AND OTHER PUBLIC OFFICIALS TO LEARN THE RESPONSIBILITY AND RESOURCES OF EACH GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION THAT MAY RESPOND TO AN EMERGENCY (THIS INCLUDES THE NTSB AND ITS INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES). CONSEQUENTLY, THE ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENTS AND FAILURES, INCLUDING THE SELECTION OF SAMPLES OF THE FAILED FACILITY OR EQUIPMENT FOR LABORATORY EXAMINATION, MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED IN LIAISON WITH APPROPRIATE FIRE, POLICE AND OTHER PUBLIC OFFICIALS WHO RESPOND TO THE EMERGENCY. THE MTB DOES NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE WHO, AMONG RESPONDING INVESTIGATIVE PUBLIC OFFICIALS, RECEIVES PRIORITY TREATMENT WITH RESPECT TO THEIR INVESTIGATIVE NEEDS. IT MAY, THEREFORE, BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE NTSB TO EXERCISE ITS INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY SUCH THAT IT WOULD HAVE SOLE OR PRIORITY INVESTIGATIVE ACCESS TO AND/OR CONTROL OVER ALL OR CERTAIN TYPES OF PIPELINE ACCIDENTS.