Safety Recommendation H-16-015
Details
Synopsis: On Tuesday, February 24, 2015, in the predawn hours, Metrolink commuter train 102, operated by Amtrak, was en route from Oxnard, in Ventura County, California, to Los Angeles. As the train approached the South Rice Avenue grade crossing about 5:44 a.m., it collided with a 2005 Ford F450 service truck towing a 2000 Wells Cargo two-axle utility trailer. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the Oxnard crash was the truck driver mistakenly turning onto the railroad right-of-way due to acute fatigue and unfamiliarity with the area.
Recommendation: TO GOOGLE, APPLE, GARMIN LTD., HERE, TOMTOM NV, INRIX, MAPQUEST, MICROSOFT CORPORATION, OMNITRACS LLC, OPENSTREETMAP US, SENSYS NETWORKS, STREETLIGHT DATA INC., TELETRAC, INC., AND UNITED PARCEL SERVICE OF AMERICA: Incorporate grade crossing-related geographic data, such as those currently being prepared by the Federal Railroad Administration, into your navigation applications to provide road users with additional safety cues and to reduce the likelihood of crashes at or near public or private grade crossings.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Open - Await Response
Mode: Highway
Location: Oxnard, CA, USA
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: HWY15MH006
Accident Reports:
Report #: HAB-16-07
Accident Date: 2/24/2015
Issue Date: 12/19/2016
Date Closed:
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: Apple, Inc. (Open - Await Response)
Garmin International, Inc. (Closed - Reconsidered)
Google, Inc. (Open - Acceptable Response)
HERE Global BV (formerly Nokia HERE) (Open - Await Response)
INRIX (Open - Await Response)
MapQuest, Inc. (Open - Await Response)
Microsoft (Open - Await Response)
Omnitracs, LLC (Closed - Acceptable Action)
OpenStreetMap Foundation (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Sensys Networks, Inc. (Open - Await Response)
StreetLight Data, Inc. (Open - Await Response)
Teletrac, Inc. (Open - Await Response)
TomTom NV (Closed - Reconsidered)
United Parcel Service (Open - Await Response)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: Google, Inc.
Date: 6/13/2022
Response: We have not received a letter from you regarding this recommendation since the March 16, 2017, letter, signed by Ms. Susan Molinari, then Vice President, Public Policy and Government Relations, Americas, Google, Inc., which stated that you were working with the Federal Railroad Administration to find a method to best incorporate grade-crossing data into your products. On May 11, 2017, we responded that we looked forward to receiving an update on your progress toward incorporating grade crossing-related geographic data into your products. Pending an incorporation of grade crossing-related geographic data into your products, Safety Recommendation H-16-15 remains classified OPEN-- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.
From: NTSB
To: Google, Inc.
Date: 5/11/2017
Response: We note that you are working with the FRA to find a method to best incorporate grade crossing data into your products. We look forward to receiving periodic updates on your progress toward implementing Safety Recommendation H-16-15, which is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. We would also be happy to meet with your staff, as requested by Ms. Molinari. A member of my staff from the Office of Safety Recommendations and Communications has already contacted Mr. Andrew Kim, Public Policy and Government Affairs, to set up a meeting.
From: Google, Inc.
To: NTSB
Date: 3/16/2017
Response: -From Susan Molinari, Vice President, Public Policy and Government Relations, Americas, Google, Inc.: Thank you for your letter of December 19, 2016 to Sundar Pichai informing Google of the important mission of the National Transportation Safety Board and referencing a specific incident involving a truck driver mistakenly turning onto railroad tracks and the resulting collision. We have reviewed the NTSB accident brief and the resulting recommendations. As a general matter, we are interested in relevant and scalable data or studies concerning transportation safety and navigational issues that the Board may issue. Google’s mission is to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful. As part of this mission, Google has invested in products and services designed to help users better navigate the world around them. Examples of these efforts include navigation applications such as Google Maps and Waze, and also Android Auto, which tailors the Android experience for use in vehicles, setting safety conscious design features for a broader set of applications. The real world changes every second and our products change with it. Live reports of accidents, construction, road closures, and more from Waze users, combined with live traffic data from Google Maps, help drivers navigate quickly and easily. The various types of data found in Google Maps come from a wide range of sources. Our basemap data things like place names, borders, and road networks is built from more than 1,000 authoritative sources including public and commercial mapping data, imagery from every level (satellite, aerial and street level), and user contributions. Through our Waze Connected Citizens program , we are also working with 250+ cities and DOTs to exchange data, including real time incident information and information about road closures to help make cities’ roads safer and to help inform Waze users about real time road conditions. We constantly seek to improve our mapping and navigation products. For example, we are heavily invested in empowering our users to contribute their local knowledge to the map to make the product better for themselves and other users. Highlighting necessary information on the map and in our navigation services without overcrowding it and distracting users is a balancing act. We want to ensure our products are easy and safe to use. Google is continually experimenting and looking for new ways to bring drivers useful features that help them get around safely. For example, we have started piloting speed limit alerts in both Google Maps and Android Auto in select cities. We also provide lane and turn guidance in Google Maps to reduce last minute lane changes and to minimize distractions. On Waze, we alert users to speed limits and just last year launched a new difficult intersections feature to help drivers avoid these turns when a safer, less stressful alternate route is available. Android Auto has also introduced safety-conscious design by pushing forward simpler interfaces, larger touch targets, and voice controls. Google is committed to continuing to explore useful, safety-conscious features for drivers. On the specific issue of railroad grade crossings, we have begun working with the Federal Railroad Administration on exploring ways to validate and incorporate grade crossing data into our products and would be happy to discuss this work with the NTSB. Our product teams carefully consider new safety features in the context of the holistic product experience and, in that way, seek to avoid evaluating individual features in isolation that could lead to overcrowding and create a sub-optimal experience for users. We look forward to continuing to work with the NTSB to improve transportation safety. Please feel free to reach out to my office with any further questions.
From: NTSB
To: Apple, Inc.
Date: 6/13/2022
Response: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over 5 years since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any information regarding your actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that you have completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation H-16-15 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.
From: NTSB
To: Apple, Inc.
Date: 12/19/2016
Response: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. The NTSB determines the probable cause of the accidents and issues safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge Apple Inc. to take action on the safety recommendation being issued in this letter. On February 24, 2015, in the predawn hours, Metrolink commuter train 102, operated by Amtrak, was en route from Oxnard, California, to Los Angeles. As the train approached the South Rice Avenue grade crossing in Oxnard, it collided with a 2005 Ford F450 service truck towing a utility trailer.1 The truck driver had inadvertently turned from South Rice Avenue onto the Union Pacific Railroad track, and the truck became lodged on the track. The train was occupied by three crew members and 51 passengers. After striking the truck and trailer, the train continued through the grade crossing, where all four coach cars subsequently derailed. The truck was pushed along the track and came to rest about 130 feet east of the grade crossing. A postcrash fire consumed the trailer. As a result of the crash, the train engineer died, and 32 passengers and crew members were injured. The truck driver sustained minor injuries. Additional information about this crash and the resulting recommendations may be found at our website, www.ntsb.gov, under report number NTSB/HAB-16/07. The truck driver used an application on his cell phone to navigate to his intended destination in Oxnard, in addition to handwritten directions provided by his employer. The crash occurred at 5:44 a.m., and the driver was fatigued and unfamiliar with the area. It is possible that he relied on the application to find his destination and subsequently misinterpreted the visual and audible cues available to him. At the time of the crash, the application did not include grade crossing data; thus, it provided no specific information on the grade crossing located parallel to, and just 57 feet from, East Fifth Street, the driver’s intended route. We concluded that had the driver’s navigation application included information on the upcoming grade crossing, he would have been less likely to misinterpret the visual cues and mistakenly turn onto the railroad tracks on his approach to the East Fifth Street intersection. As a result of this investigation, we issued two new recommendations, including one to the North American Cartographic Information Society and the following recommendation to Apple Inc. and 13 other companies: H-16-15 Incorporate grade crossing-related geographic data, such as those currently being prepared by the Federal Railroad Administration, into your navigation applications to provide road users with additional safety cues and to reduce the likelihood of crashes at or near public or private grade crossings. This safety recommendation is derived from the NTSB’s investigation and is consistent with the evidence we found and the analysis we performed. Chairman HART, Vice Chairman DINH-ZARR, and Members SUMWALT and WEENER concurred in this recommendation. The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement it. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number. We encourage you to submit your response electronically to correspondence@ntsb.gov.
From: NTSB
To: Garmin International, Inc.
Date: 2/27/2017
Response: We are pleased to learn that you began incorporating grade crossing-related data with driver alerts into your Drive series products as of January 2016. As this action precedes the issuance of our recommendation, Safety Recommendation H-16-15 is classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED. We commend your proactive efforts to provide this safety data with your roadway navigation products, and we encourage you to continue to incorporate new grade-crossing data as it becomes available. Thank you for your continued efforts to improve navigational product safety.
From: Garmin International, Inc.
To: NTSB
Date: 12/21/2016
Response: -From Jarod G. Goff, Assistant General Counsel: Garmin is in receipt of the attached letter regarding grade crossing data for railroad crossings. Garmin incorporated railroad grade crossing data into our 2016 Drive series automotive navigation products. Garmin uses HERE digital map data to compute at-grade railroad crossing locations and alert drivers with on-screen advisories as they approach these locations. Please advise of any questions.
From: NTSB
To: HERE Global BV (formerly Nokia HERE)
Date: 6/13/2022
Response: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over 5 years since these recommendations were issued, and we have not received any information regarding your actions to implement them. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that you have completed or planned to address these recommendations. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendations H-14-25 and H-16-15 remain classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.
From: NTSB
To: HERE Global BV (formerly Nokia HERE)
Date: 12/19/2016
Response: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. The NTSB determines the probable cause of the accidents and issues safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge Apple Inc. to take action on the safety recommendation being issued in this letter. On February 24, 2015, in the predawn hours, Metrolink commuter train 102, operated by Amtrak, was en route from Oxnard, California, to Los Angeles. As the train approached the South Rice Avenue grade crossing in Oxnard, it collided with a 2005 Ford F450 service truck towing a utility trailer.1 The truck driver had inadvertently turned from South Rice Avenue onto the Union Pacific Railroad track, and the truck became lodged on the track. The train was occupied by three crew members and 51 passengers. After striking the truck and trailer, the train continued through the grade crossing, where all four coach cars subsequently derailed. The truck was pushed along the track and came to rest about 130 feet east of the grade crossing. A postcrash fire consumed the trailer. As a result of the crash, the train engineer died, and 32 passengers and crew members were injured. The truck driver sustained minor injuries. Additional information about this crash and the resulting recommendations may be found at our website, www.ntsb.gov, under report number NTSB/HAB-16/07. The truck driver used an application on his cell phone to navigate to his intended destination in Oxnard, in addition to handwritten directions provided by his employer. The crash occurred at 5:44 a.m., and the driver was fatigued and unfamiliar with the area. It is possible that he relied on the application to find his destination and subsequently misinterpreted the visual and audible cues available to him. At the time of the crash, the application did not include grade crossing data; thus, it provided no specific information on the grade crossing located parallel to, and just 57 feet from, East Fifth Street, the driver’s intended route. We concluded that had the driver’s navigation application included information on the upcoming grade crossing, he would have been less likely to misinterpret the visual cues and mistakenly turn onto the railroad tracks on his approach to the East Fifth Street intersection. As a result of this investigation, we issued two new recommendations, including one to the North American Cartographic Information Society and the following recommendation to Apple Inc. and 13 other companies: H-16-15 Incorporate grade crossing-related geographic data, such as those currently being prepared by the Federal Railroad Administration, into your navigation applications to provide road users with additional safety cues and to reduce the likelihood of crashes at or near public or private grade crossings. This safety recommendation is derived from the NTSB’s investigation and is consistent with the evidence we found and the analysis we performed. Chairman HART, Vice Chairman DINH-ZARR, and Members SUMWALT and WEENER concurred in this recommendation. The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement it. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number. We encourage you to submit your response electronically to correspondence@ntsb.gov.
From: NTSB
To: TomTom NV
Date: 2/27/2017
Response: We are pleased to learn that you began incorporating grade crossing-related data into your US map products over 10 years ago and that, as recently as June 2016, you verified and updated your products using data from the FRA and similar sources. As this action precedes the issuance of our recommendation, Safety Recommendation H-16-15 is classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED. We commend your proactive efforts to provide this safety data with your roadway navigation products, and we encourage you to continue to incorporate new grade-crossing data as it becomes available.
From: TomTom NV
To: NTSB
Date: 1/31/2017
Response: -From Alain De Taeye, Board Member, CORP Management Board: We refer to your letter dated December 19th 2016 within which you enquire about the measures taken by TomTom N.V. in order to implement NTSB Safety Recommendation H-16-15. We can confirm that all the U.S. map products offered and supplied by Tom Tom incorporate full coverage of grade-separated crossings, including those pertaining to railroads {together "Crossing Data"). The Crossing Data featured in our map products have been fully populated for more than a decade and have been validated, most recently, utilizing the data received from the Federal Railroad Administration and other confirming sources in 2015 and 2016. In addition, such Crossing Data is included in our base map product, which means that all the licensees of TomTom's U.S. map products may use the Crossing Data without additional charges. Furthermore, as a result of our most recent efforts to verify and improve the safety-related aspects of our U.S. maps, we concluded that the Crossings Data meets a high level of completeness and accuracy. Between December 2015 and June 2016, TomTom specialists have examined and confirmed the accuracy of 144,975 grade separated railroad crossings in the U.S. as well as other railroad-related features included in our database. Such review included verifying them against the Federal Railroad Administration's data. In addition to the integration and verification of the Crossing Data, TomTom constantly improves the railroad coverage of its U.S. map products, which involves regular reviews to ensure that discontinued railroads are removed and the new railroads, even minor railroads, are added to the TomTom database. Notwithstanding the above, we wish to make two clarifying points: 1. Regardless of the thoroughness of our internal checks and processes, due to the ever-changing nature of the road and rail networks, we can never fully guarantee the accuracy of our Crossing Data; 2. We cannot control how our customers implement the Tom Tom Crossing Data into their end products and applications. Consequently, our customers are ultimately responsible for making effective use of the Crossing Data we provide as part of their navigation offerings in a way that will increase road users' safety by, for example, creating additional alert features. Nonetheless, we emphasize our conviction that the Tom Tom U.S. map products satisfy the National Transportation Safety Board's and Federal Railroad Administration's safety standards as well as our commitment to continue providing high-quality railroad information and to improve rail safety in the U.S.
From: NTSB
To: INRIX
Date: 6/13/2022
Response: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over 5 years since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any information regarding your actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that you have completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation H-16-15 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.
From: NTSB
To: INRIX
Date: 12/19/2016
Response: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. The NTSB determines the probable cause of the accidents and issues safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge Apple Inc. to take action on the safety recommendation being issued in this letter. On February 24, 2015, in the predawn hours, Metrolink commuter train 102, operated by Amtrak, was en route from Oxnard, California, to Los Angeles. As the train approached the South Rice Avenue grade crossing in Oxnard, it collided with a 2005 Ford F450 service truck towing a utility trailer.1 The truck driver had inadvertently turned from South Rice Avenue onto the Union Pacific Railroad track, and the truck became lodged on the track. The train was occupied by three crew members and 51 passengers. After striking the truck and trailer, the train continued through the grade crossing, where all four coach cars subsequently derailed. The truck was pushed along the track and came to rest about 130 feet east of the grade crossing. A postcrash fire consumed the trailer. As a result of the crash, the train engineer died, and 32 passengers and crew members were injured. The truck driver sustained minor injuries. Additional information about this crash and the resulting recommendations may be found at our website, www.ntsb.gov, under report number NTSB/HAB-16/07. The truck driver used an application on his cell phone to navigate to his intended destination in Oxnard, in addition to handwritten directions provided by his employer. The crash occurred at 5:44 a.m., and the driver was fatigued and unfamiliar with the area. It is possible that he relied on the application to find his destination and subsequently misinterpreted the visual and audible cues available to him. At the time of the crash, the application did not include grade crossing data; thus, it provided no specific information on the grade crossing located parallel to, and just 57 feet from, East Fifth Street, the driver’s intended route. We concluded that had the driver’s navigation application included information on the upcoming grade crossing, he would have been less likely to misinterpret the visual cues and mistakenly turn onto the railroad tracks on his approach to the East Fifth Street intersection. As a result of this investigation, we issued two new recommendations, including one to the North American Cartographic Information Society and the following recommendation to Apple Inc. and 13 other companies: H-16-15 Incorporate grade crossing-related geographic data, such as those currently being prepared by the Federal Railroad Administration, into your navigation applications to provide road users with additional safety cues and to reduce the likelihood of crashes at or near public or private grade crossings. This safety recommendation is derived from the NTSB’s investigation and is consistent with the evidence we found and the analysis we performed. Chairman HART, Vice Chairman DINH-ZARR, and Members SUMWALT and WEENER concurred in this recommendation. The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement it. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number. We encourage you to submit your response electronically to correspondence@ntsb.gov.
From: NTSB
To: MapQuest, Inc.
Date: 6/13/2022
Response: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over 5 years since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any information regarding your actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that you have completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation H-16-15 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.
From: NTSB
To: MapQuest, Inc.
Date: 12/19/2016
Response: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. The NTSB determines the probable cause of the accidents and issues safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge Apple Inc. to take action on the safety recommendation being issued in this letter. On February 24, 2015, in the predawn hours, Metrolink commuter train 102, operated by Amtrak, was en route from Oxnard, California, to Los Angeles. As the train approached the South Rice Avenue grade crossing in Oxnard, it collided with a 2005 Ford F450 service truck towing a utility trailer.1 The truck driver had inadvertently turned from South Rice Avenue onto the Union Pacific Railroad track, and the truck became lodged on the track. The train was occupied by three crew members and 51 passengers. After striking the truck and trailer, the train continued through the grade crossing, where all four coach cars subsequently derailed. The truck was pushed along the track and came to rest about 130 feet east of the grade crossing. A postcrash fire consumed the trailer. As a result of the crash, the train engineer died, and 32 passengers and crew members were injured. The truck driver sustained minor injuries. Additional information about this crash and the resulting recommendations may be found at our website, www.ntsb.gov, under report number NTSB/HAB-16/07. The truck driver used an application on his cell phone to navigate to his intended destination in Oxnard, in addition to handwritten directions provided by his employer. The crash occurred at 5:44 a.m., and the driver was fatigued and unfamiliar with the area. It is possible that he relied on the application to find his destination and subsequently misinterpreted the visual and audible cues available to him. At the time of the crash, the application did not include grade crossing data; thus, it provided no specific information on the grade crossing located parallel to, and just 57 feet from, East Fifth Street, the driver’s intended route. We concluded that had the driver’s navigation application included information on the upcoming grade crossing, he would have been less likely to misinterpret the visual cues and mistakenly turn onto the railroad tracks on his approach to the East Fifth Street intersection. As a result of this investigation, we issued two new recommendations, including one to the North American Cartographic Information Society and the following recommendation to Apple Inc. and 13 other companies: H-16-15 Incorporate grade crossing-related geographic data, such as those currently being prepared by the Federal Railroad Administration, into your navigation applications to provide road users with additional safety cues and to reduce the likelihood of crashes at or near public or private grade crossings. This safety recommendation is derived from the NTSB’s investigation and is consistent with the evidence we found and the analysis we performed. Chairman HART, Vice Chairman DINH-ZARR, and Members SUMWALT and WEENER concurred in this recommendation. The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement it. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number. We encourage you to submit your response electronically to correspondence@ntsb.gov.
From: NTSB
To: Microsoft
Date: 6/13/2022
Response: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over 5 years since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any information regarding your actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that you have completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation H-16-15 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.
From: NTSB
To: Microsoft
Date: 12/19/2016
Response: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. The NTSB determines the probable cause of the accidents and issues safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge Apple Inc. to take action on the safety recommendation being issued in this letter. On February 24, 2015, in the predawn hours, Metrolink commuter train 102, operated by Amtrak, was en route from Oxnard, California, to Los Angeles. As the train approached the South Rice Avenue grade crossing in Oxnard, it collided with a 2005 Ford F450 service truck towing a utility trailer.1 The truck driver had inadvertently turned from South Rice Avenue onto the Union Pacific Railroad track, and the truck became lodged on the track. The train was occupied by three crew members and 51 passengers. After striking the truck and trailer, the train continued through the grade crossing, where all four coach cars subsequently derailed. The truck was pushed along the track and came to rest about 130 feet east of the grade crossing. A postcrash fire consumed the trailer. As a result of the crash, the train engineer died, and 32 passengers and crew members were injured. The truck driver sustained minor injuries. Additional information about this crash and the resulting recommendations may be found at our website, www.ntsb.gov, under report number NTSB/HAB-16/07. The truck driver used an application on his cell phone to navigate to his intended destination in Oxnard, in addition to handwritten directions provided by his employer. The crash occurred at 5:44 a.m., and the driver was fatigued and unfamiliar with the area. It is possible that he relied on the application to find his destination and subsequently misinterpreted the visual and audible cues available to him. At the time of the crash, the application did not include grade crossing data; thus, it provided no specific information on the grade crossing located parallel to, and just 57 feet from, East Fifth Street, the driver’s intended route. We concluded that had the driver’s navigation application included information on the upcoming grade crossing, he would have been less likely to misinterpret the visual cues and mistakenly turn onto the railroad tracks on his approach to the East Fifth Street intersection. As a result of this investigation, we issued two new recommendations, including one to the North American Cartographic Information Society and the following recommendation to Apple Inc. and 13 other companies: H-16-15 Incorporate grade crossing-related geographic data, such as those currently being prepared by the Federal Railroad Administration, into your navigation applications to provide road users with additional safety cues and to reduce the likelihood of crashes at or near public or private grade crossings. This safety recommendation is derived from the NTSB’s investigation and is consistent with the evidence we found and the analysis we performed. Chairman HART, Vice Chairman DINH-ZARR, and Members SUMWALT and WEENER concurred in this recommendation. The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement it. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number. We encourage you to submit your response electronically to correspondence@ntsb.gov.
From: NTSB
To: Omnitracs, LLC
Date: 6/22/2020
Response: We note that your April 4, 2020, software update incorporated the recommended grade crossing–related geographic data into your product. We are pleased that you were able to complete this update earlier than originally planned and that the release notes explain the software changes to your users. These actions satisfy Safety Recommendation H 16-15, which is classified CLOSED--ACCEPTABLE ACTION. Thank you for your ongoing efforts to improve road-user safety near public or private grade crossings.
From: Omnitracs, LLC
To: NTSB
Date: 4/20/2020
Response: -From Michael Ahart, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, Omnitracs: Thank you for your letter of March 10, 2020 where you acknowledged receipt of Omnitracs' October 31 , 2019 commitment to fulfill an urgent request to act on the NTSB's Safety Recommendation H-16-015. I am pleased to inform you that we were able to complete both of our commitments, originally expected to extend into June 2020, with our 5. 7SR software update released into production on April 4, 2020. This included incorporating grade-crossing-related geographic data into our navigation application to provide road users with additional safety cues and to reduce the likelihood of crashes at or near public or private grade crossings. Our software release notes included the following notification to users of the Omnitracs Navigation product: "Letting your workers know when an unsafe event is about to occur can deter mishaps and accidents. For instance, being alerted to the risk of grounding their vehicle can certainly change the way a worker drives down a hilly road or if the worker knows a railway crossing is less than a mile away, they can prepare to stop for a train. New alerts have been added to Omnitracs Navigation to help your workers identify possible risks on their trips. The Risk of Grounding alert lets your worker know when there is a risk nearby of the vehicle grinding on the road surface and getting stuck. The Protected Railway Crossing alerts the worker to a nearby railway crossing with automatic barriers and signals, so it can be approached with caution. The Unprotected Railway Crossing alerts the worker to a nearby railway crossing that does not have barriers or signals. By default, each alert is enabled." We look forward to continuing to work with the NTSB, FMCSA and other agencies to improve transportation safety.
From: NTSB
To: Omnitracs, LLC
Date: 3/10/2020
Response: We understand that you did not receive this safety recommendation when it was originally issued in 2016. Please find attached the original letter. This document, as well as the associated accident report, are also available on our website. Our records show that we e-mailed the letter to Mr. John Graham, then Chief Executive Officer, on December 19, 2016; we are disappointed that you have no record of receiving it. We note that you are working to incorporate the recommended grade crossing–related geographic data into your product, as well as introducing an automated rerouting tool to help drivers and route planners avoid high-profile crossings. We look forward to receiving an update when your product enhancements are complete. Pending such action, Safety Recommendation H 16-15 is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. In addition, we commend your efforts to share our recommendation with your customers so that they can incorporate the crossing information into any third-party applications they may use. Please update us at ExecutiveSecretariat@ntsb.gov on your progress toward implementing this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.
From: Omnitracs, LLC
To: NTSB
Date: 10/31/2019
Response: -From Michael Ahart, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs: Omnitracs, LLC ("Omnitracs") recently received communications from both Senator Schumer and The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure regarding an important letter from the National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB") referencing a specific incident involving a truck driver mistakenly turning onto railroad tracks and the resulting collision, and an urgent request for our company to act on the NTSB's recommendation. After an extensive review of our archives, we were unable to locate a copy of the original request sent to Omnitracs in December 2016 which was referenced in their communications. This has left Omnitracs unaware of the correspondence and the critical nature of the request. Omnitracs has paved the way for companies to improve the productivity, reliability, safety and compliance of their fleets. For over 30 years, we have driven innovation and helped fleets thrive with our ever-evolving suite of Saas applications designed to make the most of every trip. This includes our enterprise-grade navigation product, Omnitracs Navigation, designed to assist commercial motor vehicles to safely navigate to their destinations. The various types of data found in our Omnitracs Navigation product comes from a wide range of sources. We want to ensure our products are easy and safe to use, reflecting information that is relevant to commercial vehicles of all sizes and in all lines of business. This includes commercial vehicles up to and including Class VIII tractor/trailers hauling hazardous materials of all types. As we look for new ways to bring drivers useful features that help them perform their duties, we are committed to exploring valuable, safety-conscious features for drivers. On the specific issue of railroad grade crossings, our product team has committed to include nearly 1,300 high-profile "hump" crossings into our Omnitracs Navigation product, with a general availability to our customers planned for March 2020. As you know, when a long-wheel based or low-ground-clearance vehicle negotiates a high profile roadway, such as a highway-railroad grade crossing, the vehicle may become lodged or stuck on the "hump". A somewhat common occurrence is one in which a railroad is on an embankment and a low-ground-clearance vehicle on the crossing roadway becomes lodged on the track and is subsequently struck by a train. The goal of adding these high-profile crossings to our Omnitracs Navigation product is to bring early awareness to the motor carrier and driver so proper routing detours are made as necessary. We plan to release more enhancements in June 2020, including an automated rerouting tool to assist with the pre-planned avoidance of these high-profile crossings. Additionally, we will incorporate all railroad crossing locations in that June 2020 release. These changes not only achieve the request of the NTSB for improving public safety, but we believe we will be exceeding them by furthering the opportunities to improve highway-railroad crossing safety for commercial vehicle drivers. We are also pleased to include enhanced geographical locations as part of the embedded code in our Omnitracs Navigation product. This means commercial vehicle drivers will not have to rely on cellular coverage in order to take advantage of these safety features. All Saas providers struggle to ensure users accept software updates. Omnitracs will make best efforts to notify customers of these enhancements as releases are made available. However, we are not currently able to force the software update to any device. Lastly, I want to point out that in addition to our homegrown navigation product, Omnitracs also provides our customers with the opportunity to integrate third-party navigation tools, allowing for a streamlined experience for drivers, managers and information technology in one unified platform. However, since we are unable to control product development of those third-party navigation tools, we have forwarded the NTSB's request to the owners of those products to inform them of this important safety enhancement opportunity. We look forward to continuing to work with the NTSB, FMCSA and other agencies to improve transportation safety. Please feel free to reach out to my office with any further questions.
From: NTSB
To: Omnitracs, LLC
Date: 12/19/2016
Response: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. The NTSB determines the probable cause of the accidents and issues safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge Apple Inc. to take action on the safety recommendation being issued in this letter. On February 24, 2015, in the predawn hours, Metrolink commuter train 102, operated by Amtrak, was en route from Oxnard, California, to Los Angeles. As the train approached the South Rice Avenue grade crossing in Oxnard, it collided with a 2005 Ford F450 service truck towing a utility trailer.1 The truck driver had inadvertently turned from South Rice Avenue onto the Union Pacific Railroad track, and the truck became lodged on the track. The train was occupied by three crew members and 51 passengers. After striking the truck and trailer, the train continued through the grade crossing, where all four coach cars subsequently derailed. The truck was pushed along the track and came to rest about 130 feet east of the grade crossing. A postcrash fire consumed the trailer. As a result of the crash, the train engineer died, and 32 passengers and crew members were injured. The truck driver sustained minor injuries. Additional information about this crash and the resulting recommendations may be found at our website, www.ntsb.gov, under report number NTSB/HAB-16/07. The truck driver used an application on his cell phone to navigate to his intended destination in Oxnard, in addition to handwritten directions provided by his employer. The crash occurred at 5:44 a.m., and the driver was fatigued and unfamiliar with the area. It is possible that he relied on the application to find his destination and subsequently misinterpreted the visual and audible cues available to him. At the time of the crash, the application did not include grade crossing data; thus, it provided no specific information on the grade crossing located parallel to, and just 57 feet from, East Fifth Street, the driver’s intended route. We concluded that had the driver’s navigation application included information on the upcoming grade crossing, he would have been less likely to misinterpret the visual cues and mistakenly turn onto the railroad tracks on his approach to the East Fifth Street intersection. As a result of this investigation, we issued two new recommendations, including one to the North American Cartographic Information Society and the following recommendation to Apple Inc. and 13 other companies: H-16-15 Incorporate grade crossing-related geographic data, such as those currently being prepared by the Federal Railroad Administration, into your navigation applications to provide road users with additional safety cues and to reduce the likelihood of crashes at or near public or private grade crossings. This safety recommendation is derived from the NTSB’s investigation and is consistent with the evidence we found and the analysis we performed. Chairman HART, Vice Chairman DINH-ZARR, and Members SUMWALT and WEENER concurred in this recommendation. The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement it. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number. We encourage you to submit your response electronically to correspondence@ntsb.gov.
From: NTSB
To: OpenStreetMap Foundation
Date: 3/1/2023
Response: We note that OSM is a worldwide, open-data mapping effort that relies on the collaboration of individual volunteers and companies to update its map content. Ms. Cawley wrote that your mapping contributors have been working collaboratively since August 2017 to update highway–rail grade crossing information on your US maps based on a combination of field surveys, street-level imagery, and public data made available by the Federal Railroad Administration and state regulators. We appreciate receiving a copy of OSM’s October 2019 response to a congressional inquiry about this matter, which Ms. Cawley included with her letter. Because you have established a systematic map maintenance effort that has already resulted in a significant number of grade-crossing updates, your actions have addressed the intent of this recommendation. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation H 16-15 is classified CLOSED-- ACCEPTABLE ACTION.
From: OpenStreetMap Foundation
To: NTSB
Date: 7/11/2022
Response: -From Maggie Cawley, Executive Director, OpenStreetMap US: Thank you for your message to OpenStreetMap US. Please find our response attached. I also wanted to share that OpenStreetMap US responded to a previous inquiry in October 2019 from the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. I have attached that correspondence for your records as well. Please let me know should you require anything further. Letter to Chair Homendy dated July 11, 2022: Thank you for following up with OpenStreetMap US. We responded to a previous inquiry in October 2019 and I have attached that correspondence for your records. From that previous response, I’d like to emphasize that OpenStreetMap (www.openstreetmap.org) is a free, collaboratively edited map of the entire world. The site is operated by the OpenStreetMap Foundation, a nonprofit organization registered in England and Wales, and the map is an online collaboration among tens of thousands of individual volunteers and companies. OpenStreetMap US is a local chapter of the OpenStreetMap Foundation and we hold events, support mappers, advocate for open data in the U.S, but have no ownership or editorial authority of the database. The OpenStreetMap community strives to maintain a variety of data relevant to transportation safety, including railroad crossings. In August 2017, mappers completed a campaign to systematically map road-rail crossings in the US. Since then, they have been annotating these crossings with detailed safety information, such as barriers, signals, and low ground clearance hazards, based on a combination of field surveys, street-level imagery, and public data from the Federal Railroad Administration and state regulators. As of writing, OpenStreetMap includes hundreds of thousands of railroad crossings of various kinds in the US, including private and pedestrian rail crossings. The community’s efforts have been recognized by the industry in the form of software adoption. Consumer-facing mobile navigation applications, such as OsmAnd, have supported railroad crossing alerts as early as 2014. Data distributors and service providers, such as Mapbox, now facilitate similar features in logistics and other applications. The community and its ecosystem of software vendors continue to explore additional corrections and improvements based on user needs. OpenStreetMap US maintains lines of communication between this community of mappers, software vendors who use OpenStreetMap data, and government agencies. We hope you find this information useful and please do reach out if you need anything further. Letter to Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure U.S. House of Representatives Washington DC 20515 written to Mr. DeFazio & Mr. Lipinski and dated October 2, 2019: Thank you for reaching out to OpenStreetMap US. We are a nonprofit organization based in Washington D.C. that supports the OpenStreetMap project in the United States. Our work focuses on education, advocacy and supporting the OpenStreetMap mapping community within the US. I believe your letter was intended to reach geolocation companies and service providers with commercial applications and interests. OpenStreetMap is something very different, but I am glad to have the opportunity to share more about the project. OpenStreetMap (www.openstreetmap.org) is a free, collaboratively edited map of the entire world that is being built by volunteers largely from scratch and released with an open-content license. Created by Steve Coast in the UK in 2004, OpenStreetMap was inspired by the success of Wikipedia and the predominance of proprietary map data in the UK and elsewhere. The global map database is edited by a community of over two million contributors from all over the world, in part by importing data from public domain sources. In places of the world where there are no open data sources, contributors start with a blank map and head outside to survey the streets themselves using GPS, mobile applications, or paper maps. This crowdsourced data is then made available under the Open Database License. No one owns OpenStreetMap; rather, it is an online collaboration among tens of thousands of individual volunteers and companies. The site is supported by the OpenStreetMap Foundation, a nonprofit organisation registered in England and Wales. Our nonprofit organization, OpenStreetMap US, holds events, supports mappers, and advocates for OpenStreetMap and open data specifically within the US. Despite the decentralized nature of the project, the global mapping community has taken steps to add railroad crossing data to OpenStreetMap in the US and worldwide. As of writing, OpenStreetMap contains the locations of well over 200,000 road-rail crossings in the US and many additional pedestrian rail crossings. OpenStreetMap’s coverage of road and railroad infrastructure is constantly improving, alongside the tools to enable the addition of detailed data. OpenStreetMap is a dataset rather than an application. We cannot legally require third-party navigation applications to highlight railroad crossings in their user interfaces. However, at least one mobile application, OSMAnd, does announce grade crossings based on OpenStreetMap data. Moving forward, OpenStreetMap US will continue to promote the need for accuracy and completeness to mappers in the US, especially in matters related to public safety. We also seek continued collaboration with US government agencies to enable OpenStreetMap to verify rail crossing data between both data sets and update data through collaborative mapping efforts at an institutional level. Thank you for your inquiry. I would be more than happy to meet with you or someone from your committee if you are interested in learning more about OpenStreetMap.
From: NTSB
To: OpenStreetMap Foundation
Date: 6/13/2022
Response: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over 5 years since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any information regarding your actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that you have completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation H-16-15 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.
From: NTSB
To: OpenStreetMap Foundation
Date: 12/19/2016
Response: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. The NTSB determines the probable cause of the accidents and issues safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge Apple Inc. to take action on the safety recommendation being issued in this letter. On February 24, 2015, in the predawn hours, Metrolink commuter train 102, operated by Amtrak, was en route from Oxnard, California, to Los Angeles. As the train approached the South Rice Avenue grade crossing in Oxnard, it collided with a 2005 Ford F450 service truck towing a utility trailer.1 The truck driver had inadvertently turned from South Rice Avenue onto the Union Pacific Railroad track, and the truck became lodged on the track. The train was occupied by three crew members and 51 passengers. After striking the truck and trailer, the train continued through the grade crossing, where all four coach cars subsequently derailed. The truck was pushed along the track and came to rest about 130 feet east of the grade crossing. A postcrash fire consumed the trailer. As a result of the crash, the train engineer died, and 32 passengers and crew members were injured. The truck driver sustained minor injuries. Additional information about this crash and the resulting recommendations may be found at our website, www.ntsb.gov, under report number NTSB/HAB-16/07. The truck driver used an application on his cell phone to navigate to his intended destination in Oxnard, in addition to handwritten directions provided by his employer. The crash occurred at 5:44 a.m., and the driver was fatigued and unfamiliar with the area. It is possible that he relied on the application to find his destination and subsequently misinterpreted the visual and audible cues available to him. At the time of the crash, the application did not include grade crossing data; thus, it provided no specific information on the grade crossing located parallel to, and just 57 feet from, East Fifth Street, the driver’s intended route. We concluded that had the driver’s navigation application included information on the upcoming grade crossing, he would have been less likely to misinterpret the visual cues and mistakenly turn onto the railroad tracks on his approach to the East Fifth Street intersection. As a result of this investigation, we issued two new recommendations, including one to the North American Cartographic Information Society and the following recommendation to Apple Inc. and 13 other companies: H-16-15 Incorporate grade crossing-related geographic data, such as those currently being prepared by the Federal Railroad Administration, into your navigation applications to provide road users with additional safety cues and to reduce the likelihood of crashes at or near public or private grade crossings. This safety recommendation is derived from the NTSB’s investigation and is consistent with the evidence we found and the analysis we performed. Chairman HART, Vice Chairman DINH-ZARR, and Members SUMWALT and WEENER concurred in this recommendation. The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement it. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number. We encourage you to submit your response electronically to correspondence@ntsb.gov.
From: NTSB
To: Sensys Networks, Inc.
Date: 6/13/2022
Response: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over 5 years since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any additional information regarding your actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that you have completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation H-16-15 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.
From: NTSB
To: Sensys Networks, Inc.
Date: 12/19/2016
Response: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. The NTSB determines the probable cause of the accidents and issues safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge Apple Inc. to take action on the safety recommendation being issued in this letter. On February 24, 2015, in the predawn hours, Metrolink commuter train 102, operated by Amtrak, was en route from Oxnard, California, to Los Angeles. As the train approached the South Rice Avenue grade crossing in Oxnard, it collided with a 2005 Ford F450 service truck towing a utility trailer.1 The truck driver had inadvertently turned from South Rice Avenue onto the Union Pacific Railroad track, and the truck became lodged on the track. The train was occupied by three crew members and 51 passengers. After striking the truck and trailer, the train continued through the grade crossing, where all four coach cars subsequently derailed. The truck was pushed along the track and came to rest about 130 feet east of the grade crossing. A postcrash fire consumed the trailer. As a result of the crash, the train engineer died, and 32 passengers and crew members were injured. The truck driver sustained minor injuries. Additional information about this crash and the resulting recommendations may be found at our website, www.ntsb.gov, under report number NTSB/HAB-16/07. The truck driver used an application on his cell phone to navigate to his intended destination in Oxnard, in addition to handwritten directions provided by his employer. The crash occurred at 5:44 a.m., and the driver was fatigued and unfamiliar with the area. It is possible that he relied on the application to find his destination and subsequently misinterpreted the visual and audible cues available to him. At the time of the crash, the application did not include grade crossing data; thus, it provided no specific information on the grade crossing located parallel to, and just 57 feet from, East Fifth Street, the driver’s intended route. We concluded that had the driver’s navigation application included information on the upcoming grade crossing, he would have been less likely to misinterpret the visual cues and mistakenly turn onto the railroad tracks on his approach to the East Fifth Street intersection. As a result of this investigation, we issued two new recommendations, including one to the North American Cartographic Information Society and the following recommendation to Apple Inc. and 13 other companies: H-16-15 Incorporate grade crossing-related geographic data, such as those currently being prepared by the Federal Railroad Administration, into your navigation applications to provide road users with additional safety cues and to reduce the likelihood of crashes at or near public or private grade crossings. This safety recommendation is derived from the NTSB’s investigation and is consistent with the evidence we found and the analysis we performed. Chairman HART, Vice Chairman DINH-ZARR, and Members SUMWALT and WEENER concurred in this recommendation. The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement it. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number. We encourage you to submit your response electronically to correspondence@ntsb.gov.
From: NTSB
To: StreetLight Data, Inc.
Date: 6/13/2022
Response: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over 5 years since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any information regarding your actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that you have completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation H-16-15 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.
From: NTSB
To: StreetLight Data, Inc.
Date: 12/19/2016
Response: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. The NTSB determines the probable cause of the accidents and issues safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge Apple Inc. to take action on the safety recommendation being issued in this letter. On February 24, 2015, in the predawn hours, Metrolink commuter train 102, operated by Amtrak, was en route from Oxnard, California, to Los Angeles. As the train approached the South Rice Avenue grade crossing in Oxnard, it collided with a 2005 Ford F450 service truck towing a utility trailer.1 The truck driver had inadvertently turned from South Rice Avenue onto the Union Pacific Railroad track, and the truck became lodged on the track. The train was occupied by three crew members and 51 passengers. After striking the truck and trailer, the train continued through the grade crossing, where all four coach cars subsequently derailed. The truck was pushed along the track and came to rest about 130 feet east of the grade crossing. A postcrash fire consumed the trailer. As a result of the crash, the train engineer died, and 32 passengers and crew members were injured. The truck driver sustained minor injuries. Additional information about this crash and the resulting recommendations may be found at our website, www.ntsb.gov, under report number NTSB/HAB-16/07. The truck driver used an application on his cell phone to navigate to his intended destination in Oxnard, in addition to handwritten directions provided by his employer. The crash occurred at 5:44 a.m., and the driver was fatigued and unfamiliar with the area. It is possible that he relied on the application to find his destination and subsequently misinterpreted the visual and audible cues available to him. At the time of the crash, the application did not include grade crossing data; thus, it provided no specific information on the grade crossing located parallel to, and just 57 feet from, East Fifth Street, the driver’s intended route. We concluded that had the driver’s navigation application included information on the upcoming grade crossing, he would have been less likely to misinterpret the visual cues and mistakenly turn onto the railroad tracks on his approach to the East Fifth Street intersection. As a result of this investigation, we issued two new recommendations, including one to the North American Cartographic Information Society and the following recommendation to Apple Inc. and 13 other companies: H-16-15 Incorporate grade crossing-related geographic data, such as those currently being prepared by the Federal Railroad Administration, into your navigation applications to provide road users with additional safety cues and to reduce the likelihood of crashes at or near public or private grade crossings. This safety recommendation is derived from the NTSB’s investigation and is consistent with the evidence we found and the analysis we performed. Chairman HART, Vice Chairman DINH-ZARR, and Members SUMWALT and WEENER concurred in this recommendation. The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement it. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number. We encourage you to submit your response electronically to correspondence@ntsb.gov.
From: NTSB
To: Teletrac, Inc.
Date: 6/13/2022
Response: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over 5 years since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any information regarding your actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that you have completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation H-16-15 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.
From: NTSB
To: Teletrac, Inc.
Date: 12/19/2016
Response: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. The NTSB determines the probable cause of the accidents and issues safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge Apple Inc. to take action on the safety recommendation being issued in this letter. On February 24, 2015, in the predawn hours, Metrolink commuter train 102, operated by Amtrak, was en route from Oxnard, California, to Los Angeles. As the train approached the South Rice Avenue grade crossing in Oxnard, it collided with a 2005 Ford F450 service truck towing a utility trailer.1 The truck driver had inadvertently turned from South Rice Avenue onto the Union Pacific Railroad track, and the truck became lodged on the track. The train was occupied by three crew members and 51 passengers. After striking the truck and trailer, the train continued through the grade crossing, where all four coach cars subsequently derailed. The truck was pushed along the track and came to rest about 130 feet east of the grade crossing. A postcrash fire consumed the trailer. As a result of the crash, the train engineer died, and 32 passengers and crew members were injured. The truck driver sustained minor injuries. Additional information about this crash and the resulting recommendations may be found at our website, www.ntsb.gov, under report number NTSB/HAB-16/07. The truck driver used an application on his cell phone to navigate to his intended destination in Oxnard, in addition to handwritten directions provided by his employer. The crash occurred at 5:44 a.m., and the driver was fatigued and unfamiliar with the area. It is possible that he relied on the application to find his destination and subsequently misinterpreted the visual and audible cues available to him. At the time of the crash, the application did not include grade crossing data; thus, it provided no specific information on the grade crossing located parallel to, and just 57 feet from, East Fifth Street, the driver’s intended route. We concluded that had the driver’s navigation application included information on the upcoming grade crossing, he would have been less likely to misinterpret the visual cues and mistakenly turn onto the railroad tracks on his approach to the East Fifth Street intersection. As a result of this investigation, we issued two new recommendations, including one to the North American Cartographic Information Society and the following recommendation to Apple Inc. and 13 other companies: H-16-15 Incorporate grade crossing-related geographic data, such as those currently being prepared by the Federal Railroad Administration, into your navigation applications to provide road users with additional safety cues and to reduce the likelihood of crashes at or near public or private grade crossings. This safety recommendation is derived from the NTSB’s investigation and is consistent with the evidence we found and the analysis we performed. Chairman HART, Vice Chairman DINH-ZARR, and Members SUMWALT and WEENER concurred in this recommendation. The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement it. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number. We encourage you to submit your response electronically to correspondence@ntsb.gov.
From: NTSB
To: United Parcel Service
Date: 6/13/2022
Response: We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. It has now been over 5 years since this recommendation was issued, and we have not received any information regarding your actions to implement it. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days regarding actions that you have completed or planned to address this recommendation. Pending our receipt of an update, Safety Recommendation H-16-15 remains classified OPEN-- AWAIT RESPONSE.
From: NTSB
To: United Parcel Service
Date: 12/19/2016
Response: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline. The NTSB determines the probable cause of the accidents and issues safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to provide assistance to victims and their family members affected by major transportation disasters. We are providing the following information to urge Apple Inc. to take action on the safety recommendation being issued in this letter. On February 24, 2015, in the predawn hours, Metrolink commuter train 102, operated by Amtrak, was en route from Oxnard, California, to Los Angeles. As the train approached the South Rice Avenue grade crossing in Oxnard, it collided with a 2005 Ford F450 service truck towing a utility trailer.1 The truck driver had inadvertently turned from South Rice Avenue onto the Union Pacific Railroad track, and the truck became lodged on the track. The train was occupied by three crew members and 51 passengers. After striking the truck and trailer, the train continued through the grade crossing, where all four coach cars subsequently derailed. The truck was pushed along the track and came to rest about 130 feet east of the grade crossing. A postcrash fire consumed the trailer. As a result of the crash, the train engineer died, and 32 passengers and crew members were injured. The truck driver sustained minor injuries. Additional information about this crash and the resulting recommendations may be found at our website, www.ntsb.gov, under report number NTSB/HAB-16/07. The truck driver used an application on his cell phone to navigate to his intended destination in Oxnard, in addition to handwritten directions provided by his employer. The crash occurred at 5:44 a.m., and the driver was fatigued and unfamiliar with the area. It is possible that he relied on the application to find his destination and subsequently misinterpreted the visual and audible cues available to him. At the time of the crash, the application did not include grade crossing data; thus, it provided no specific information on the grade crossing located parallel to, and just 57 feet from, East Fifth Street, the driver’s intended route. We concluded that had the driver’s navigation application included information on the upcoming grade crossing, he would have been less likely to misinterpret the visual cues and mistakenly turn onto the railroad tracks on his approach to the East Fifth Street intersection. As a result of this investigation, we issued two new recommendations, including one to the North American Cartographic Information Society and the following recommendation to Apple Inc. and 13 other companies: H-16-15 Incorporate grade crossing-related geographic data, such as those currently being prepared by the Federal Railroad Administration, into your navigation applications to provide road users with additional safety cues and to reduce the likelihood of crashes at or near public or private grade crossings. This safety recommendation is derived from the NTSB’s investigation and is consistent with the evidence we found and the analysis we performed. Chairman HART, Vice Chairman DINH-ZARR, and Members SUMWALT and WEENER concurred in this recommendation. The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement it. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendation by number. We encourage you to submit your response electronically to correspondence@ntsb.gov.