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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-08-001
Details
Synopsis: On February 7, 2006, a United Parcel Service Company (UPS) cargo aircraft had an in-flight cargo fire and made an emergency landing at Philadelphia International Airport. Although the cause of the in-flight fire could not be determined in the UPS accident, the presence of a significant quantity of electronic equipment in the containers where the fire most likely originated led the Safety Board to closely examine safety issues involving the transportation of rechargeable lithium batteries on commercial aircraft, including batteries in airline passengers’ laptop computers and other personal electronic devices.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AND THE PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION: In collaboration with air carriers, manufacturers of lithium batteries and electronic devices, air travel associations, and other appropriate government and private organizations, establish a process to ensure wider, highly visible, and continuous dissemination of guidance and information to the air-traveling public, including flight crews, about the safe carriage of secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries or electronic devices containing these batteries on board passenger aircraft.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Open - Acceptable Response
Mode: Aviation
Location: Philadelphia, PA, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA06MA022
Accident Reports: In-Flight Cargo Fire, United Parcel Service Company Flight 1307, McDonnell Douglas DC-8-71F, N748UP
Report #: AAR-07-07
Accident Date: 2/7/2006
Issue Date: 1/7/2008
Date Closed:
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Open - Acceptable Response)
PHMSA (Open - Acceptable Response)
Keyword(s): Cargo,Hazmat,Training and Education

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: PHMSA
Date: 9/27/2016
Response: The FAA informed us that they have decided to postpone the release of an advisory circular (AC) that would enhance passenger notification of the hazardous materials requirements specified in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 175.25 until after they have evaluated recently adopted changes made by the International Civil Aviation Organization Dangerous Goods Panel on Passenger Notification Provisions. In the meantime, we are pleased to learn that hazardous materials inspectors are attending conferences and meetings of interested parties to explain how the hazardous materials regulations apply to them. We are also aware of your involvement in developing a multistep process to measure the effectiveness of your efforts to educate the air-traveling public, including flight crews, about the safe carriage of secondary lithium batteries and electronic devices containing these batteries on passenger aircraft. We believe that your ongoing outreach efforts and the issuance of the FAA’s proposed AC could increase awareness among passengers and companies regarding the dangers associated with shipping—and traveling with—lithium batteries. We also believe that the process you are developing with the FAA could help you refine your outreach products and determine the overall effectiveness of your efforts to address this safety issue. Pending our receipt and review of the FAA’s AC and updates on your process to periodically measure the effectiveness of your outreach efforts, Safety Recommendations A-08-001 and -002 remain classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: PHMSA
Date: 9/19/2014
Response: The FAA informed us that an Aviation Rulemaking Committee would be developing recommendations for an advisory circular (AC) to establish an acceptable means of compliance with the new passenger notification requirements specified in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 175.25, which becomes effective on January 1, 2015. We are aware that the committee includes representatives from air carriers and air travel associations, pilots, flight attendants, and officials from the FAA and PHMSA. The FAA reported that the AC will include warnings about lithium batteries and will help to ensure that a consistent message is communicated to passengers. We are also aware of your combined efforts to improve the FAA and Safe Travel websites with a simplified, image-laden presentation and additional information on passenger allowances of lithium batteries. We believe that the proposed AC and website improvements could increase awareness among passengers and companies regarding the dangers associated with the shipping of, and travelling with, lithium batteries. Pending our receipt and review of the new information, Safety Recommendation A-08-1 remains classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: PHMSA
Date: 6/15/2011
Response: The NTSB notes PHMSA’s ongoing efforts to develop guidance material to educate the air-traveling public and flight crews about the safe carriage of secondary lithium batteries and the electronic devices that contain these batteries on board passenger aircraft. We believe that the guidance developed thus far contains much useful information; however, we remain concerned that the guidance will not prove effective unless individuals and/or companies are already familiar with the dangers associated with the shipping of, and travelling with, these batteries. The NTSB believes that outreach efforts, such as those targeted at e-cigarette retailers, are an effective method for increasing the level of awareness among travelers and other companies that may otherwise be unfamiliar with the associated risks, and we would like to know how PHMSA determines when these additional efforts are necessary and whether any are planned for the future. The NTSB previously requested additional information regarding the incident data being collected by PHMSA to assess changes in passenger and flight crew awareness and behavior with regard to safe transport of secondary lithium batteries. PHMSA had indicated that a method for evaluating the effectiveness of these efforts was being developed; however, we have received no information regarding the status of either of these efforts. Please share this data with us so that we may better assess your agency’s efforts. Because the guidance that PHMSA has developed to educate the public of the dangers of flying with lithium batteries, and with devices containing lithium batteries, contains useful information, Safety Recommendation A-08-1 remains classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. However, because PHMSA has not provided the NTSB with (1) documentation to indicate that the guidance has been effective or (2) information about the methodology used to measure the effectiveness of this guidance, Safety Recommendation A-08-2 is classified “Open—Unacceptable Response.” The NTSB would like to schedule a meeting with PHMSA to discuss these safety recommendations and to address any concerns or questions that either agency may have regarding them. We will contact your office in the near future to arrange such a meeting.

From: PHMSA
To: NTSB
Date: 4/4/2011
Response: CC# 20110149: - From Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator: I appreciate the effort you have made in the area of hazardous material and pipeline safety transportation. We share an interest in taking strong actions to continually improve the safe transportation of these materials throughout our country. In that regard, I have been meeting with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)'s hazardous materials and pipeline safety programs to assess our actions on the NTSB recommendations in the last six months. My goal is to continually address your safety recommendations by taking actions to assure that the "unacceptable actions" are moved into the "open-acceptable" category and to achieve a "closed-acceptable" in a timely manner on as many recommendations as possible. I recognize that a number of "open-acceptable" recommendations are works in progress and may take a year or more to complete. In the last six months you have issued four "Closed-Acceptable Action" classifications for the following recommendations: P-04-02, P-07-07, P-07-08 and P-10-01. In an effort to continue this progress, I have asked our hazardous material and pipeline staff to compile outstanding letters to the NTSB that request a change in the classification of a recommendation. I have enclosed a copy of the PHMSA letters requesting that the following five recommendations be classified as "Closed-Acceptable Action": A-07-107, A-07-108, R-07-05, A-08-01, and A-08-02. I am hopeful that you will review these letters and close the recommendations if you believe we have been responsive. In addition, I ask that you review NTSB Recommendation H-04-23 requiring that periodic nondestructive testing be conducted on nurse tanks to identify material flaws that could result in a failure. PHMSA published a final rule on February 1, 2011, requiring inspection and nondestructive testing to allow continued use of nurse tanks with missing or illegible ASME plates. I have enclosed a copy of the Final Rule as published in the Federal Register. In addition, our sister agency, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration contracted with Virginia Polytechnic Institute to research nurse tank safety. If you have questions regarding any of these recommendations, please do not hesitate to call. Together, we are making a positive difference in the safe transportation of hazardous materials, including those transported by pipelines.

From: PHMSA
To: NTSB
Date: 10/13/2010
Response: CC# 201000381: - From Cynthia Douglass, Chief Safety Officer: The PHMSA continues its ongoing focus to educate the public on the safe use and handling of batteries and devices containing batteries. The SafeTravel campaign focuses on bringing people to the SafeTravel Web site for information by branding guidance material and other content with the SafeTravel logo. The PHMSA includes the Safetravel logo on outreach materials and PHMSA Web site. Links to the Safetravel Web site also appear on many other familiar information sources for air travelers, such as the Transportation Security Administration and FAA. Recently, Fast Line, the official blog of the U.S. Secretary of Transportation featured SafeTravel. The PHMSA continues to maintain and expand the SafeTravel Web site to provide up-to-date guidance to air travelers. Additionally, PHMSA developed an extensive guide for shipping batteries safely by air that targets infrequent shippers of batteries of all types and includes full color pictures and plain language guidance to facilitate compliance with the applicable rules (copy enclosed). The PHMSA also modified the highly recognizable "These Fly... " poster (copy enclosed) to place a greater emphasis on lithium batteries and lithium battery-powered devices. Recently, PHMSA has targeted its outreach efforts to specific groups. During the fall of 2009, PHMSA contacted more than 100 retailers and distributors of e-cigarettes to make them aware that lithium batteries, such as those contained in e-cigarettes, are regulated by the Hazardous Materials Regulations and provided them with information on the safe shipment of lithium batteries and battery-powered devices. The FAA, in conjunction with the airline industry, embarked on a series of tests to determine the optimum procedure for fighting a laptop computer fire onboard an aircraft. Based on this testing, FAA developed a training video that demonstrates effective and practical methods of extinguishing a cabin fire involving lithium batteries in a laptop computer. The video, "Extinguishing In-Flight Laptop Computer Fires," may be viewed at the Fire Safety Team Web site: www.fire.tc.faa.gov. Subsequently, FAA issued a Safety Alert for Operators (June 23, 2009), titled, "Fighting Fires Caused by Lithium Type Batteries in Portable Electronic Devices." The purpose of the Safety Alert for Operators is to recommend procedures for fighting fires caused by lithium type batteries in portable electronic devices. The PHMSA and FAA continue to collect and assess incident data for changes in passenger and flight crew awareness and behavior. Independent of incident data, PHMSA assesses the continued visibility of the SafeTravel public awareness campaign as a measure of the success of the campaign. The PHMSA partnerships with government and industry have ensured that SafeTravel information continues to figure prominently on government and airline Web sites and monthly in-flight magazines. Based on the actions outlined above, we request that Safety Recommendations A-08-1 and A-08-2 be classified as "Closed-Acceptable Action." We appreciate your consideration of this request.

From: NTSB
To: PHMSA
Date: 8/17/2010
Response: CC# 201000303: No response necessary.

From: PHMSA
To: NTSB
Date: 8/9/2010
Response: CC# 201000303: - From Ola Parsons, PHMSA Executive Secretariat: Thank you for your letter of July 21 to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regarding Safety Recommendations A-07-104 through A-07-108 and A-08-1 and A-08-2 issued by the National Transportation Safety Board to the DOT, In light of the scope of your request and the need for DOT to coordinate its response, completion of our final response will take some time, We will provide a response as soon as possible, and we appreciate your patience. For your reference, we have assigned control number PHMSA-l 00803-002 to your letter.

From: NTSB
To: PHMSA
Date: 7/21/2010
Response: The NTSB has reviewed PHMSA’s notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), titled “Hazardous Materials: Transportation of Lithium Batteries,” published at 75 Federal Register 1302 on January 11, 2010. The proposed rule would require inaccessible cargo compartments and freight containers in which shipments of primary or secondary lithium batteries are being transported to be equipped with an FAA-approved fire suppression system; the batteries may alternatively be transported in an FAA-approved fire-resistant container. However, current FAA-approved suppression systems are ineffective in preventing fires involving primary lithium batteries. Until a fire suppression system proven to be effective against fires involving primary lithium batteries becomes available, the NTSB urges PHMSA to explicitly require that all shipments of primary lithium batteries be transported in FAA-approved fire resistant containers. The NPRM also indicates that PHMSA is considering whether a limit on the number of primary lithium battery packages transported in a single airplane or single container would further enhance safety. Although it acknowledges the cumulative effect and potential risks of packaging thousands of small primary batteries in close proximity, PHMSA does not propose any requirements to mitigate those risks. The NPRM is not responsive to Safety Recommendation A-07-104 because it does not completely address the unique hazards of shipping primary lithium batteries. Accordingly, pending issuance of a revised NPRM requiring operators of cargo-only aircraft to (1) stop the practice of clustering shipments of primary lithium batteries and (2) use FAA approved fire resistant containers for transporting all shipments of primary lithium batteries, Safety Recommendation A-07-104 is classified OPEN—UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: PHMSA
Date: 4/14/2010
Response: Notation 7772F: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), “Hazardous Materials: Transportation of Lithium Batteries,” that was published at 75 Federal Register 1302 on January 11, 2010. The NPRM requests comments on revisions to the requirements for the transportation of lithium batteries in the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs). The primary purpose of the NPRM is to enhance the safe transportation of primary (non-rechargeable) and secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries when transported as cargo in all modes, with an emphasis on aviation. The NTSB believes that PHMSA has proposed requirements that should improve the level of safety for transporting lithium battery cargoes, particularly on aircraft. However, the NTSB offers the following comments to strengthen and clarify the proposed rule. Overview The NPRM proposes new requirements that address Safety Recommendations A-07-104, A-07-105, and A-07-107 through -109 that were issued as a result of the NTSB’s 2006 investigation of an in-flight cargo fire on a cargo airplane at Philadelphia International Airport in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The NPRM specifically addresses these safety recommendations through proposed requirements concerning the stowage of lithium batteries, the reporting and analysis of lithium battery failures, and the elimination of regulatory exceptions for small lithium batteries. The NTSB has included detailed comments about each of these areas in subsequent sections of this letter. The NTSB notes that PHMSA also proposes other requirements, and those are addressed as well. The NPRM does not address Safety Recommendations A-08-1 and -2, which were issued separately from the Philadelphia accident report but also pertain to the transportation of lithium batteries. Safety Recommendations A-08-1 and -2 concern the implementation and evaluation of public awareness programs for air passengers and crews who carry portable electronic devices containing lithium batteries or pack spare lithium batteries in their baggage or carry-on items. The NTSB notes that PHMSA plans to address these two recommendations under a separate rulemaking. However, because of the proliferation of personal electronic devices carried by the traveling public, the NTSB urges PHMSA to expedite its rulemaking regarding these recommendations. Stowage of Lithium Batteries Cargo shipments of primary lithium batteries have been prohibited on passenger aircraft for more than 10 years, but they are still permitted on cargo-only aircraft. Cargo shipments of secondary lithium batteries are permitted on both passenger and cargo-only aircraft. The transportation of primary lithium batteries is potentially dangerous, particularly on board aircraft, because there is currently no known fire suppression system capable of extinguishing fires involving these types of batteries. Fires involving secondary lithium batteries are extinguishable by fire suppression systems approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Although fire suppression systems are required in cargo compartments of passenger aircraft, they are not required in cargo-only aircraft. The investigation of the Philadelphia accident showed that flight crews on cargo-only aircraft remain at risk from in-flight fires involving primary lithium batteries and from fires involving secondary lithium batteries on aircraft not equipped with fire suppression systems. Consequently, the NTSB issued the following recommendations to PHMSA: Require aircraft operators to implement measures to reduce the risk of primary lithium batteries becoming involved in fires on cargo-only aircraft, such as transporting such batteries in fire resistant containers and/or in restricted quantities at any single location on the aircraft. (A-07-104) Until fire suppression systems are required on cargo-only aircraft, as asked for in Safety Recommendation A-07-99, require that cargo shipments of secondary lithium batteries, including those contained in or packed with equipment, be transported in crew-accessible locations where portable fire suppression systems can be used. (A-07-105) The NTSB believes that the NPRM fully addresses Safety Recommendation A-07-105 but only partially addresses Safety Recommendation A-07-104. The proposed rule would require that if either primary or secondary lithium batteries are transported in inaccessible cargo compartments or freight containers, the compartments or containers must be equipped with an FAA-approved fire suppression system, or that the packages of batteries must be transported in an FAA-approved fire-resistant container. Because current FAA-approved suppression systems are ineffective on fires involving primary lithium batteries, the NTSB believes that the NPRM would be improved if it explicitly required that shipments of primary lithium batteries be transported in FAA-approved fire-resistant containers. When the FAA approves a fire suppression system that is proven to be effective on fires involving primary lithium batteries, the NTSB would consider such a suppression system an acceptable alternative to an FAA-approved fire-resistant container. Because current FAA-approved fire suppression systems are effective on fires involving secondary lithium batteries, the NTSB supports the NPRM in that it would require that inaccessible shipments of secondary lithium batteries be transported in either cargo compartments or freight containers equipped with an FAA-approved fire suppression system or in FAA-approved fire-resistant containers. PHMSA states in the NPRM that it is considering whether a limit on the number of primary lithium battery packages transported in a single airplane or single container would further enhance safety. Although PHMSA acknowledges the cumulative effect and the potential risks of packaging thousands of small primary batteries in close proximity, it has not proposed any requirements to mitigate the risks. The NTSB believes that the NPRM would be improved if restrictions were imposed on the clustering of primary lithium battery shipments on cargo-only aircraft. Reporting and Analysis of Lithium Battery Failures In the Philadelphia accident report, the NTSB noted that the causes of secondary lithium battery failures are not well understood or documented. The NTSB suggested that this may be due, in part, to the fact that proper evaluation of failed lithium batteries is not always performed, and that, in many cases, these batteries are disposed of before the incident is reported, precluding an accurate analysis of the failures. As a result, the NTSB issued the following recommendations to PHMSA: Require commercial cargo and passenger operators to report to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration all incidents involving primary and secondary lithium batteries, including those contained in or packed with equipment, that occur either on board or during loading or unloading operations and retain the failed items for evaluation purposes. (A-07-107) Analyze the causes of all thermal failures and fires involving secondary and primary lithium batteries and, based on this analysis, take appropriate action to mitigate any risks determined to be posed by transporting secondary and primary lithium batteries, including those contained in or packed with equipment, on board cargo and passenger aircraft as cargo; checked baggage; or carry-on items. (A-07-108) On July 31, 2008, PHMSA published an NPRM to revise requirements for the transportation of battery-powered devices and batteries and to harmonize the U.S. Department of Transportation HMRs with international standards. The NPRM included a proposal to require that all incidents involving lithium batteries and devices containing them be immediately reported. In a letter dated November 19, 2008, the NTSB suggested that the NPRM could be improved by also requiring that failed lithium batteries and associated equipment be retained in order to ensure proper analysis. The reporting requirement was included in the final rule published on January 14, 2009; however, the retention requirement was not. The NTSB is disappointed that the current NPRM also does not propose the retention requirement, but only requests comments about how retention of failed batteries and equipment might be achieved and a proper analysis conducted. The NPRM notes that available incident data suggest that the most likely causes of lithium battery incidents are • External short circuiting (an exposed battery terminal contacts a metal object). • In-use situation (improper charging or discharging conditions associated with the use of equipment, including inadvertent activation and overheating). • Noncompliance (faulty battery design, false certification, or improper packaging). • Internal short circuit (foreign matter within the cell or battery, or physical damage). However, PHMSA does not discuss the reliability of the data used to determine these causes, and the NTSB is concerned that such determinations are being made without retaining and analyzing failed batteries. In the absence of sound failure analyses, the establishment of the appropriate and effective transportation requirements is questionable, and without a regulatory requirement to retain failed batteries and a program to analyze the retained batteries and equipment, the NPRM fails to fully address Safety Recommendations A-07-107 and -108. The NTSB believes that the proposed rule would be significantly improved if retention and analysis of failed batteries and equipment were required. Elimination of Regulatory Exceptions for Small Lithium Batteries The NTSB’s investigation of the Philadelphia accident also dealt with regulatory exceptions for packages of small secondary lithium batteries, such as those used to power laptop computers, cameras, cell phones, and other personal electronic devices. Under these exceptions, based on battery power, size, and weight, certain shipments of small batteries are exempt from the hazardous materials packaging and identification requirements. The exceptions allowed batteries to be shipped undetected on both cargo and passenger aircraft. Because small secondary lithium batteries have been involved in at least nine documented aviation incidents and their failure modes are not fully understood, the NTSB expressed concern about the exceptions. The NTSB stated that cargo shipments of small lithium batteries should be subject to the same packaging and identification requirements that apply to medium and large lithium batteries in order to increase public and industry awareness of the risks associated with these batteries and to alert package handlers to exercise greater care when loading and unloading packages containing them. Consequently, the NTSB issued the following recommendation to PHMSA: Eliminate regulatory exemptions for the packaging, marking, and labeling of cargo shipments of small secondary lithium batteries (no more than 8 grams equivalent lithium content) until the analysis of the failures and the implementation of risk-based requirements asked for in Safety Recommendation A-07-108 are completed. (A-07-109) The NPRM proposes to eliminate the regulatory exceptions for lithium cells and batteries transported on board aircraft. The proposal would require that all lithium cells and batteries be regulated as class 9 materials in air transportation and subjected to the requirements found in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 173.185, including the packaging standards and the hazard communication requirements. Adoption of this proposal would ensure that all lithium battery shipments are packaged appropriately and that packages are clearly labeled, providing a visible indication of the presence of hazardous material. The proposal also would ensure that all aviation shipments of lithium batteries are listed on the notice to the pilot in command. The NTSB fully supports the proposal to eliminate exceptions for small lithium batteries and believes that the proposal, if implemented, will satisfy the intent of Safety Recommendation A-07-109. Other Proposed Requirements The NPRM proposes new requirements that have not been the subject of NTSB safety recommendations. The new proposals are discussed below. The NPRM proposes to change all references to primary and secondary lithium batteries in the HMRs to “lithium metal batteries” and “lithium ion batteries,” respectively. Because the chemistry, functionality, and fire exposure behavior of lithium metal batteries and lithium-ion batteries are notably different, PHMSA identified a need to distinguish between them. As a result, the NPRM proposes creating separate shipping names and entries for lithium metal and lithium-ion batteries, reassigning existing United Nations (UN) identification numbers for lithium batteries to lithium metal batteries, and creating new UN identification numbers for lithium-ion batteries. These changes would facilitate the development and implementation of transportation requirements that are most appropriate for each battery type. The NPRM proposes to adopt a methodology for determining the relative hazard associated with lithium-ion batteries by using measurements of watt-hours instead of equivalent lithium content. The NTSB agrees with PHMSA’s assessment that “watt-hours” is a more commonly used unit of measurement that is easier to calculate and understand. The NPRM notes that most of the recent lithium battery incidents in the aviation industry have involved noncompliant shipments. PHMSA contends that noncompliance often results from confusion regarding regulatory requirements, which in turn results from a lack of proper training. The NPRM points out that while shippers of small lithium batteries are currently exempted from the training requirements found in 49 CFR Part 172, Subpart H, the proposal to eliminate regulatory exceptions for shipments of small lithium batteries would require that these shippers train employees who prepare such shipments. PHMSA believes that the training would ensure that employees are knowledgeable about applicable regulatory requirements and that shipments conform to the requirements, which would ultimately result in a reduction of lithium battery incidents. The NTSB supports these additional proposals. The NTSB appreciates the opportunity to comment on this proposed rule and PHMSA’s continuing efforts to improve the safety of lithium battery transportation. Should you require any additional information or clarification, please contact us.

From: PHMSA
To: NTSB
Date: 10/16/2009
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 10/22/2009 3:09:01 PM MC# 2090655 - From John D. Porcari, Deputy Secretary of Transportation, Department of Transportation: We agree with NTSB that air carriers should be required to report all incidents involving lithium batteries, consistent with Safety Recommendation A-07-107. To this end, on January 14, PHMSA published a final rule under Docket No. HM-215JlHM-224D entitled "Hazardous Materials: Revision to Requirements for the Transportation of Batteries and Battery-Powered Devices; and Harmonization With the United Nations Recommendations, International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code, and International Civil Aviation Organization's Technical Instructions" (74 2200; copy enclosed). In this final rule, we amended the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) to include a comprehensive incident reporting requirement for batteries and battery-powered devices. As specified in the final rule, incidents involving batteries and battery powered devices that result in a fire, violent rupture, explosion, or dangerous evolution of heat must be reported. In addition to the written incident report, the final rule requires immediate telephonic reporting of incidents involving batteries and battery-powered devices in air transportation. We agree that an examination of failed batteries and associated electronic devices and equipment will provide valuable data and information as we continue to assess the transportation risks associated with these items. To that end, we are working with FAA and airlines to establish a cooperative program for effectively securing and preserving evidence and passenger information when incidents occur. We developed a standard protocol to be used by aircraft operators in the event of an incident. This protocol includes procedures for: (1) immediate reporting of the incident to DOT; (2) preservation of the batteries and/or electronic equipment that failed and transfer to appropriate authorities for analysis and evaluation; and (3) obtaining relevant information from passengers and crewmembers, including contact information for follow-up interviews as necessary. In addition, we are proposing a regulatory change to require a shipper, carrier, package owner or person reporting an incident to provide upon request by an authorized government representative reasonable assistance in investigating the damaged package or article. Consistent with Safety Recommendation A-07-108, PHMSA has completed an analysis of the causes of lithium battery incidents (copy enclosed). The data suggest that the most likely causes of lithium battery incidents are: 1. External short circuiting - occurs when an exposed battery terminal contacts a metal object. When this happens, the battery can heat up and may cause ignition of the battery and/ or the surrounding combustible materials. 2. In-use situation - generally relating to improper "charging" and/ or "discharging" conditions associated with the use of equipment (e.g., computer or cell phone). This also includes inadvertent activation and subsequent overheating (such was the case when a power drill activated and burned in a passenger's checked baggage). 3. Non-compliance - includes faulty design of the battery (cells or battery packs), false certification of compliance with regulatory testing/classification requirements, and improper packing and handling including some counterfeit batteries. 4. Internal shall circuit - can be caused by foreign matter introduced into a cell or battery during the manufacturing process. An internal short circuit can also occur when a battery is physically damaged (e.g. dropped or punctured). PHMSA has initiated a rulemaking project to propose enhanced regulatory requirements to mitigate the risks identified in the incident analysis. The rulemaking is intended to strengthen the current regulatory framework by imposing more effective safeguards, including design testing, packaging, and hazard communication measures for various types and sizes of lithium batteries in specific transportation contexts. PHMSA plans to publish an NPRM this fall. The rulemaking will address the following issues: Elimination of current exceptions for small lithium batteries. Currently, shipments of small lithium batteries are excepted from certain packa-g in-g and hazard communication requirements. Instead, packages must conform to minimum packaging requirements and must be identified as containing lithium batteries for which special procedures should be followed in the event the package is damaged. We are considering eliminating the exceptions for small lithium batteries and imposing more stringent packaging and hazard communication requirements, including shipping papers, package marks and labels, and emergency response information. Elimination of the current exceptions would enhance safety by ensuring that all lithium batteries would be packaged to reduce the possibility of damage to the batteries that could lead to an incident and accompanied by hazard information that would ensure appropriate and careful handling by air carrier personnel and inform transport workers and emergency response personnel of actions to be taken in the event of an emergency. UN design type test results. Currently, all lithium battery and cell types must be subjected to a series of tests as specified in the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria. The tests are intended to ensure that lithium batteries and cells will withstand conditions encountered during transportation. We are considering adopting a requirement for manufacturers to provide evidence of satisfactory completion of the UN design type tests for each lithium battery and cell that is offered for transportation in commerce. The intended effect would be to enhance compliance with the test requirements. Lithium battery shipping descriptions. Currently, all types of lithium batteries are transported using the same UN identification number. However, differences in chemistry, functionality and behavior when exposed to a fire are well documented for different types of batteries. The fact that all types of lithium batteries share the same UN number has the potential to cause significant problems in acceptance procedures for carriers and may unnecessarily hinder or delay the transportation of these products. Thus, we are considering revising the current shipping descriptions to account for different battery types and chemistries and for consistency with shipping descriptions in international transport standards and regulations. Stowage in crew accessible locations. We are proposing restricting stowage of lithium batteries on an aircraft to crew accessible locations to permit immediate investigation and response to smoke or fire. Recalled batteries. We are considering the development of appropriate safety measures for the air transport of lithium cells or batteries identified by the manufacturer, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, or the Department of Transportation as being defective for safety reasons, or those that have been damaged or are otherwise being returned to the manufacturer. PHMSA and FAA also plan to continue to evaluate the risks posed by all types and sizes of lithium batteries with a view towards further risk reduction. Depending on the availability of resources, we plan to address the following areas: Fire behavior. Test fire behavior of lithium batteries of various sizes and packaging configurations to better understand the transportation risks posed by these batteries and to develop more effective requirements to prevent fires and overheating. Fire resistant containers. Develop performance standards for fire resistant containers, including fireproof overpacks and ULDs, which can be used for the transportation of lithium cells Ad batteries of all types onboard aircraft. Cargo compartments. Analyze aircraft cargo compartment configurations and how both current and performance based container designs and their locations may decrease potential risks of fire. Fire detection and suppression. Analyze possible container internal detection and suppression methods and their effectiveness on the control or containment of lithium bazery fires. We are continuing our efforts to heighten public awareness related to the hazards associated with the air transportation of lithium batteries, including batteries contained in electronic devices. This is a key component of our comprehensive strategy to enhance safety and reduce incidents. Since 2007, PHMSA has been working with air carriers, battery manufacturers, air travel associations, airline pilot and flight crew associations and other government agencies, including the Transportation Security Administration, to educate the public about potential safety problems and measures that will reduce or eliminate those problems. PHMSA agrees that these efforts must be highly visible and continuous to be effective. One of our most visible programs to promote battery safety is the SafeTravel Web site, which includes guidance and information on how to travel safely with batteries and battery-powered devices. We have also been working with the major airlines, travel and battery industries to provide SafeTravel information for ticketed passengers and frequent flyers, and place printed battery safety materials in seat pockets on passenger planes. We have recorded several million hits on our SafeTravel Web site. PHMSA continues to maintain and update the SafeTravel website as new information becomes available and is currently in the process of a major revision to the site. TSA includes SafeTravel information and links on its popular public website and FAA has issued Travel Tips and FAQs on Batteries Carried by Airline Passengers with a link to the SafeTravel website. We are mindful that NTSB stressed actions to promote lithium battery safety awareness among flight crew specifically, and that Recommendation A-08-002 focuses on more robust assessment of passenger and flight crew awareness and behavior. We are working with FAA, ATA, its member airlines, the Airline Pilots Association, and the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA) to raise flight crew awareness of measures they can take to avoid incidents as well as how to respond effectively should an incident occur in the cabin. Thousands of pilots and flight attendant personnel have been trained in how to appropriately respond to and mitigate a fire involving lithium batteries in a passenger aircraft cabin. Additionally, the ICAO Dangerous Goods Panel added the appropriate procedures to the ICAO Emergency Response Guidance for Aircraft Incidents Involving Dangerous Goods (Red Book). We have requested available metrics for partner actions, and are coordinating with FAA to continually assess incident data focusing on root causes, in order to gauge any changes in passenger behavior. In the coming year, we will work to capture information about passenger behaviors independent of incidents, and work with FAA and with partners representing airline flight crews to ensure that battery safety and response information is made available. We also will develop a method for evaluating the effectiveness of our efforts to educate the public and flight crews.

From: NTSB
To: PHMSA
Date: 11/25/2008
Response: In its letter, PHMSA described an extensive program to make the public aware of the dangers posed by lithium batteries transported by air, including when the batteries are transported inside electronic devices; the program involves airlines, airline associations, other government agencies, manufacturers and associations related to lithium batteries and devices that use lithium batteries, general media, and media that specifically appeals to users of devices that rely on lithium batteries. As outlined, the program may satisfy the intent of Safety Recommendation A-08-1. In addition, the Safety Board believes that the activities being taken in response to Safety Recommendation A-08-2, described in the next paragraph, will provide a reliable basis after some time to determine whether the activities being taken in response to Safety Recommendation A-08-1 have fully achieved the intent of informing flight crews and the public of the dangers of lithium batteries transported by air. Pending completion of these actions and our review of documentation that the program has succeeded in effectively informing the public about this issue, Safety Recommendation A-08-1 is classified OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: PHMSA
To: NTSB
Date: 3/28/2008
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 4/7/2008 2:14:34 PM MC# 2080174: - From Stacey L. Gerard Assistant Administrator/Chief Safety Officer: We are committed to heightening public awareness related to the hazards associated with the air transportation of lithium batteries, including batteries contained in electronic devices. This is a key component of our comprehensive strategy to enhance safety and reduce incidents. Since February 22, 2007, we have been working with air carriers, battery manufacturers, air travel associations, airline pilot and flight crew associations and other government agencies, including the Transportation Security Administration, to educate the public about potential safety problems and measures that will reduce or eliminate those problems. We agree that our initiative must be highly visible and continuous to be effective and are initiating several approaches to achieve this objective. One of our most visible programs to promote battery safety is the SafeTravel Web site, which includes guidance and information on how to travel safely with batteries and battery-powered devices. Traffic on the SafeTravel site increased from a hit count of 57,000 in April 2007, to a count of 1,316,000 hits in December 2007. In January, the site recorded 4,608,000 hits, over 3.5 times the December count. In terms of external web mentions of the SafeTravel site by URL name, a mid-November count found about 500 mentions. That number has since grown to over 5,000. In conjunction with development of the SafeTravel website, we have been working with major airlines to place SafeTravel on their web sites and to include battery safety tips in their in-flight magazines and in their electronic communications with passengers. We are also contacting personal computer and gaming magazines to provide information to their customers; contacting local print and electronic news media sources and major print media contacts in major metropolitan markets in advance of holiday travel; developing magazine drop-in advertisements; and distributed 1,000 media kits and over 30,000 digital information packets with links to the media kit. We have also been working with the Air Transport Association (ATA) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) to provide SafeTravel information for ticketed passengers and frequent flyers, and to place printed battery safety materials in seat pockets on passenger planes. As a result of our partnership with ATA, many airlines now include battery safety tips on their websites and in travel magazines and are working with us to promote passenger awareness and safety. We continue to enhance our battery safety outreach efforts and are making progress in additional venues. For example, to increase visibility in the coming months, we initiated a partnership with the Interactive Travel Services Association (ITSA) to encourage large online travel vendors such as Orbitz, Travelocity, Hotwire, and others, to include access to the SafeTravel site in their electronic communications and on their web sites. ITSA has agreed to assist us with enhancing the branding of our safety message and to expand our reach to the traveling public. We have also met with the Association of American Airport Executives (AAAE) and the Airports Council International to discuss placement of awareness materials in airports. We are considering how we can simplify our safety message and effectively communicate it to the common airline passenger so that the message is easily understandable and effective for broadcast through displays in airports. We are working with FAA and TSA to develop a strategy for introducing our hazardous materials and battery safety public safety announcements in airports. In addition to promoting SafeTravel articles and links to gaming and PC industry magazines, we have directly promoted the web site to gadget and travel blogs and online vendors of batteries and electronics. We are also contacting major retailers and distributors with the goal of establishing in-store, electronic, and print media promotion of the battery safety agenda. We recently acquired commitments from Wal-Mart and Radio Shack to support our efforts. An important component our public awareness campaign is our partnership with the Portable Rechargeable Battery Association (PRBA) and the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA). Both PRBA and NEMA have published articles in support of battery safety awareness for air travelers. PFWA and NEMA are working with member manufacturers to include a reference to the SafeTravel website on lithium battery retail packaging. They are also working with their members to include SafeTravel information in printed material accompanying rechargeable batteries, such as those used in laptop computers. We are continuing to leverage our existing industry partnerships in an effort to create a more visible public campaign, in addition to specific news events and press releases. We are participating in major conventions and exhibitions to conduct outreach and increase both industry and consumer awareness of battery safety issues. PHMSA staff recently participated in the 25th International Battery Safety Conference, where more than 350 representatives from the battery and battery powered device manufacturing industry attended, and explained the incidents that have occurred, the steps being taken and invited them to partner with us in expanding the outreach and public awareness campaign. On April 11, 2008, we will meet with stakeholders to discuss partner actions to provide continuous, repeated mass media presence and to roll out a renewed battery safety plan focused on a multi-faceted approach to reducing the risk of the transport of lithium batteries. We are mindful that NTSB stressed actions to promote lithium battery safety awareness among flight crew specifically, and that Recommendation A-08-2 focuses on more robust assessment of passenger and flight crew awareness and behavior. We are working with ATA, their member airlines, the Airline Pilots Association and the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA) to raise flight crew awareness of measures they can take to avoid incidents as well as how to respond effectively should an incident occur in the cabin. We have requested available metrics for partner actions, and are coordinating with FAA to continually assess incident data focusing on root causes, in order to gauge any changes in passenger behavior. In the coming year, we will work to capture information about passenger behaviors independent of incidents, and work with FAA and with partners representing airline flight crews to ensure that battery safety and response information is made available. We also will develop a method for evaluating the effectiveness of our efforts to educate the public and flight crews. We will keep you informed of our progress. Attached is a status report of our actions. We are now compiling monthly status reports to track and measure our effectiveness. If you have any questions, please contact me at (202) 366-4831. We request that you classify recommendations A-08-1 and A-08-2 as Open -Acceptable Action. We thank you for consideration of our request.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 10/5/2016
Response: We note that you have decided to postpone the release of an advisory circular (AC) that would enhance passenger notification of the hazardous materials requirements specified in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 175.25 until after you have evaluated recently adopted changes made by the International Civil Aviation Organization Dangerous Goods Panel on Passenger Notification Provisions. In the meantime, we are pleased to learn that your hazardous materials inspectors are attending conferences and meetings of interested parties to explain how the hazardous materials regulations apply to them. We also note that you are developing a multistep process to measure the effectiveness of your efforts to educate the air-traveling public, including flight crews, about the safe carriage of secondary lithium batteries and electronic devices containing these batteries on passenger aircraft. We believe that your ongoing outreach efforts and the issuance of the proposed AC could increase awareness among passengers and companies regarding the dangers associated with shipping—and traveling with—lithium batteries. For example, in a recent case, the FAA distributed the following statement to the media: “In light of recent incidents and concerns raised by Samsung about its Galaxy Note 7 devices, the Federal Aviation Administration strongly advises passengers not to turn on or charge these devices on board aircraft and not to stow them in any checked baggage.” We also believe that the process you are developing could help you refine your outreach products and determine the overall effectiveness of your efforts to address this safety issue. Pending our receipt and review of the AC and updates on your process to periodically measure the effectiveness of your outreach efforts, Safety Recommendations A 08 001 and -002 remain classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 7/6/2016
Response: -From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: As previously noted, the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Pack Safe Web site (www.faa.gov/go/packsafe/) is a key component of our public outreach efforts. This Web site complements the various brochures, luggage tags, and other outreach materials referenced in previous updates. In addition, Hazardous Materials Inspectors regularly attend conferences and meetings to convey how hazardous materials regulations apply to a particular group's area of interest. For example, the FAA was on hand at a recent consumer electronics show to engage attendees on relevant lithium battery regulations. With respect to our efforts to enhance passenger notification under Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations§ 175.25, the FAA will postpone the release of an advisory circular (AC) on this issue to evaluate recently adopted changes made by the International Civil Aviation Organization Dangerous Goods Panel on Passenger Notification Provisions. If the FAA and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration were to harmonize with these regulatory provisions, then significant changes would be required to the draft AC.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 11/18/2015
Response: We note that the Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) on Passenger Notification of Hazardous Materials has developed guidance for operators to comply with the new passenger notification requirements specified in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 175.25 that specifically address lithium battery restrictions. We also note that you are considering publishing an advisory circular (AC) that would include the ARC’s proposed guidance and would encourage operators to refer passengers to the FAA’s “Pack Safe” website. In addition, we note that, as part of your lithium battery outreach program, you have (1) developed a lithium battery outreach poster for dissemination to the air cargo industry, (2) developed frequently asked questions (on your website) for airline passengers traveling with batteries, and (3) are working with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to update their “Shipping Batteries by Air” booklet. We believe that the actions you have taken thus far and the issuance of the proposed AC could increase awareness among passengers and companies regarding the dangers associated with shipping, and travelling with, lithium batteries. We look forward to learning about your efforts to develop an evaluation program to help you refine your outreach products and to determine the overall effectiveness of your efforts to address this safety issue. Pending our receipt and review of the AC and an evaluation process to periodically measure the effectiveness of your efforts, Safety Recommendations A-08-1 and -2 remain classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 8/14/2015
Response: -From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) '•Pack Safe" Web site (www.faa.gov/go/packsafe/) has been rolled out to specifically address if and how passengers may bring common hazardous items in their baggage. The FAA's Office of Hazardous Materials Safety keeps the Web site updated to reflect regulatory changes and the FAA's social media activities direct the public to this Web site. The "Pack Safe" Web site also allows the public to ask specific questions directly to the FAA. Most questions receive responses within 24 hours. With the FAA's support, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) has amended Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations§ 175.25 to ensure passengers are notified about and acknowledge hazardous material restrictions as a part of the ticket purchase and check-in process. Section 175.25 requirements will become fully effective on January 1, 2016. The Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) on Passenger Notification of Hazardous Materials Regulations was tasked and has since developed recommended guidance for operators to comply with these regulations. Special attention was given to lithium battery restrictions. The FAA is reviewing the ARC's proposed guidance and is considering publishing an Advisory Circular (AC) on this issue. The ARC's proposed guidance and a potential FAA AC would reference and encourage operators to refer passengers to FAA's "Pack Safe" Web site if there are questions during ticket purchase and/or unassisted check-in. In the past year, additional elements of the FAA's comprehensive strategy on lithium battery outreach have also been fulfilled. These activities include: • The development and distribution of a lithium battery outreach poster for dissemination to the air cargo industry by FAA hazmat specialists. The poster includes a Quick Response code (similar to a barcode, but more complex) that can be scanned by smartphones and directs the public to the "Pack Safe" Web site; • The development of the •'Airline Passengers and Batteries" frequently asked questions under the "Battery Incidents and Battery Safety" section available at the following Web site: www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ash/ash_programs/hazmat/aircarrier_info/ • Reaching an agreement with the PI-IMSA Office of Hazardous Materials Safety to update their Shipping Batteries by Air" booklet directed at the shipping public.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 5/12/2014
Response: We note that an Aviation Rulemaking Committee was tasked with developing recommendations for an advisory circular (AC) that would establish an acceptable means of compliance with the new passenger notification requirements specified in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 175.25, which becomes effective on January 1, 2015. You reported that the AC will include warnings about lithium batteries and will help to ensure that a consistent message is communicated to passengers. You also mentioned efforts to improve the FAA and Safe Travel websites with a simplified and image-heavy presentation and additional information on passenger allowances of lithium batteries. We believe that the proposed AC and website improvements could increase awareness among passengers and companies regarding the dangers associated with the shipping of, and travelling with, lithium batteries. Pending our receipt and review of the new information, Safety Recommendation A-08-1 remains classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 1/21/2014
Response: -From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: On April 13,2013, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) chartered an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) on Passenger Notification of Hazardous Materials Regulations. This ARC •was tasked with developing recommendations for an FAA Advisory Circular (AC) to establish an acceptable means of compliance with the new passenger notification requirements in Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations§ 175.25. The new passenger notification requirements become effective on January 1, 2015, and the AC will result in a consistent message communicated to a majority of passengers. These communications, which will include warnings about lithium batteries, are in addition to long-standing signage requirements at airport ticket counters, gates, and baggage check locations. The ARC's membership is consistent with th is recommendation's instruction to collaborate with a wide-array of stakeholders. It is comprised of representatives from air carriers, air travel associations, pilots, flight attendants, as well as officials from the FAA and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). The FAA is also finalizing Web site enhancements specific to passenger allowances. A considerable focus will be on the safe transportation of lithium batteries. In addition, PHMSA is updating safetravel.dot.gov in an effort to modernize and streamline information for the air-traveling public consistent with FAA's Web site. The revamp will emphasize the safe transportation of lithium batteries in addition to other common items carried by passengers through a simplified and image-heavy presentation. PHMSA plans to utilize web analytics and social media to monitor the effectiveness of the Web site redesign. In light of the risks and increasing numbers of lithium batteries in air transportation, the FAA's outreach mission will be continuous. Both the AC and Web site enchantments are scheduled to be completed before Calendar Year 2015.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 3/28/2013
Response: We are aware of the FAA’s and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) ongoing efforts to develop guidance material to educate the air traveling public and flight crews about the safe carriage of secondary lithium batteries and the electronic devices that contain these batteries on board passenger aircraft. We are also aware that PHMSA published a final rule, titled “Hazardous Materials: Harmonization With the United Nations Recommendations, International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code, and the International Civil Aviation Organization Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air,” which requires air carriers to notify passengers of hazmat requirements using various technologies. However, we are not aware of any requirement to include information specifically pertaining to the safe carriage of secondary (rechargeable) lithium batteries or electronic devices containing these batteries on board passenger aircraft, as recommended. We believe that the guidance developed thus far to educate the public of the dangers of flying with lithium batteries, or with devices containing lithium batteries, provides useful information; however, we remain concerned that the guidance will not prove effective unless individuals and companies are already familiar with the dangers associated with shipping, and travelling with, these batteries. Accordingly, we believe that the FAA should include additional information in passenger notifications to address this concern. Pending the FAA’s taking such action, Safety Recommendation A-08-1 remains classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 1/4/2013
Response: -Michael P. Huerta, Acting Administrator: The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) published a final rule updating regulations pertaining to lithium batteries on January 19, 2011. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) worked closely with PHMSA on this rule. The rule was entitled, "Hazardous Materials: Harmonization With the United Nations Recommendations, International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code, and the International Civil Aviation Organization Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air," and most elements became effective on January 1, 2012 (76 FR 3308). Air carrier requirements for passenger notification of hazmat requirements (49 CFR § 175.25) were modified by this rule to require passenger notification via a variety of technologies throughout the customer interaction experience, originally effective January 1, 2013 (76 FR 3382). However, PHMSA extended this effective date to no less than one-year beyond January 1,20 13 (77 FR 69926). The FAA will work with industry to maintain standards for compliance with these new rules to provide effective guidance to the public about carriage of hazardous materials, including lithium batteries or devices containing lithium batteries. The FAA along with the Department of Transportation, provides additional lithium battery guidance at: http://www.faa.gov/aboutloffice_org/headquarters_offices/ash/ash_programs/hazmat/. http://safetravel.dot.gov/. and http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov. We will continue to monitor lithium battery incidents and potential solutions with the highest priority. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on these recommendations and provide an update by December 31. 2013.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 11/25/2008
Response: The Safety Board notes that the FAA has been working in conjunction with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) in actively educating the air-traveling public, including flight crews, about the safe carriage of rechargeable lithium batteries on board passenger aircraft. The FAA listed industry gatherings to which it has contributed, along with two guidance documents: Hazardous Materials Carried by Passengers and Crewmembers and Batteries Carried by Airline Passengers Frequently Asked Questions, which includes a table, with illustrations and simple verbiage explaining the allowances and limits for carrying all types of batteries and battery-powered equipment in airplane checked or carry-on baggage. The documents are located on the FAA’s Web site and are proactive measures for mitigating the hazards associated with the carriage of rechargeable lithium batteries. The FAA indicated that it will continue to work with PHMSA and other government and industry entities to develop processes for the continued dissemination of information to the flying public and methods for periodically measuring the effectiveness of these and other established processes. The Safety Board commends the FAA on its timely efforts and looks forward to reviewing an update on this information. Pending an established process that will ensure the continuous dissemination of guidance and information to the air-traveling public and a process for periodically measuring the effectiveness of those efforts, Safety Recommendations A-08-01 and A-08-02 are classified OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 3/28/2008
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 4/9/2008 12:53:11 PM MC# 2080188: - From Robert A. Sturgell, Acting Administrator: The FAA and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) are actively involved in efforts to raise awareness on the safe transport of lithium batteries. Lithium battery fires remain a top safety priority for the FAA, and we have been involved in several government and industry outreach activities regarding lithium batteries. These include industry meetings and the development of guidance documents. A list of some of the meetings held and documents developed follows: Industry Meetings: February 13, 2008-National Air Carrier Association safety meeting, Arlington, Virginia: FAA delivered a presentation to U.S. charter air carriers that centered on lithium battery dangers, incidents, and regulations; January 29, 2008-Air Transport Association, Washington, D.C.; FAA met with the safety representatives of the major U.S. air carriers and discussed a variety of hazmat issues including lithium batteries carried as carry-on and in checked baggage; November 15, 2007-Dangerous Goods Advisory Council, Annual Conference, Santa Fe, New Mexico: FAA gave a presentation on various hazmat subjects including lithium batteries to an industry audience that included shippers, air carriers, freight forwarders, and hazmat consultants; August 28, 2007-PHMSA public meeting, Washington, D.C.: FAA’s Office of Security and Hazardous Material (ASH), Flight Standards Service (AFS), and PHMSA discussed lithium battery cargo and baggage issues with the major laptop computer manufacturers. The on-board charging of laptops was a major issue discussed; May 24-25, 2007- Portable Rechargeable Battery Association (PRBA)-PHMSA public meeting, Dulles, Virginia: The ASH and AFS offices of FAA participated in a battery safety conference sponsored by the PRBA and PHMSA. Lithium ion battery design, testing, and charging issues were discussed; and February 22, 2007-PHMSA public meeting, Washington, D.C.: The ASH office of FAA participated in a public meeting specifically dedicated to the air transport of batteries. Attendees included representatives from the major passengers and cargo air carriers and members of the battery and electronics industries. Meeting attendees were asked for their input on how to best deal with the ongoing battery fires in air cargo and baggage. Guidance Documents January 9, 2008-FANASH posted on its Web site “Batteries Carried by Airline Passengers - Frequently Asked Questions,” (copy enclosed) a guidance document for airline passengers. This guidance document answers the most frequent passenger questions about batteries and provides an illustrated table that explains in layman’s terms the allowances and limits for carrying all types of batteries (including lithium metal and lithium ion) and battery-powered equipment in checked or carry-on baggage; and January 1, 2008-FANASH updated its on-line guidance document, “Hazardous Materials Carried by Passengers and Crewmembers” (copy enclosed) to include the recent changes in 49 Code of Federal Regulations affecting lithium batteries in checked and carry-on baggage. The FAA will continue to work with government agencies and industry to develop processes for the continued dissemination of information to the flying public. I will provide an update on our progress within six months. FAA Comment to A-08-02: The FAA concurs with this recommendation and will work with PHMSA and the groups identified in the recommendation to increase efforts to devise ways to measure the effectiveness of our outreach efforts. Because we can expect the production, use and transport of lithium batteries to increase every year, using data such as transportation incidents would not be an effective metric. We will continue to seek ways to measure our effectiveness and will provide an update on our progress within six months.