SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS A-72-27 & 28

As a result of our investigations of a midair collision between a United States Air Force RB57C and a Cessna 150 at Albuquerque, New Mexico, on September 24, 1971, and a midair collision between an Eastern Air Lines DC-9 and a Cessna 206 at Raleigh-Durham Airport, North Carolina, on December 4, 1971, the National Transportation Safety Board is forwarding two recommendations for your consideration.

At Albuquerque, the approach controller was providing Stage II Radar Advisory Service to the pilot of a Cessna 150 when the aircraft became involved in a midair collision. In effect, the approach control facility possessed information relative to the altitude, heading, and position of the light aircraft. This information could have been beneficial to the tower controller in aiding the pilot of the RB57C, who was on the tower frequency, in avoiding a collision with the Cessna 150, which was on the approach control frequency. Both aircraft were being operated in accordance with Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and the visibility was unrestricted.

At the Raleigh-Durham Airport, the tower controller was in communication with a Cessna 206 and had received a report from the pilot regarding the aircraft altitude and the pilot's intentions. This information could have been useful to the approach controller who, although he had a primary radar target on the Cessna, did not know the altitude of this aircraft or the pilot's intentions. Subsequently, an Eastern Air Lines DC-9 collided with the Cessna 206 while on an approach to the Raleigh-Durham Airport. The air carrier was on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan while the Cessna 206 was being operated in accordance with VFR.
We know that air traffic control responsibilities for aircraft separation do not include VFR aircraft other than Special VFR aircraft. We also know that it would not be feasible to coordinate all VFR traffic information between the tower and approach control. However, we believe that in the interest of reducing the potential for midair collisions, such coordination should be accomplished whenever it is operationally feasible.

Our investigation also indicated that the Cessna 206 which was involved in the second accident, was equipped with an operable transponder, although no transponder return from this aircraft was observed by the radar approach control facility.

In view of the above, the Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

1. Require an exchange of pertinent traffic information between the control tower and the associated radar approach control facility whenever a pilot who is operating in accordance with VFR has requested a service or stated his intended flight operations. Such exchanges of information should be accomplished on a lower priority basis than that accorded to the transmission of control clearances.

2. Require the pilots of all aircraft equipped with an operable transponder to have the transponder turned "on" and adjusted to reply on the appropriate Mode A/3 code whenever VFR operations are conducted into, or in proximity to, an airport serviced by a radar approach control facility.

Members of our Bureau of Aviation Safety will be available for consultation in the above matter if desired.

These recommendations will be released to the public on the issue date shown above. No public dissemination of the contents of this document should be made prior to that date.

Reed, Chairman; Laurel, McAdams, Thayer, and Burgess, Members, concurred in the above recommendations.