



National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, DC 20594

Safety Recommendation

Date: September 25, 2014

In reply refer to: A-14-72 through -86

The Honorable Michael P. Huerta
Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
Washington, DC 20590

On September 9, 2014, the NTSB adopted its report concerning the August 14, 2013, accident, in which UPS flight 1354, an Airbus A300-600, N155UP, crashed short of runway 18 during a localizer nonprecision approach to runway 18 at Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport, Birmingham, Alabama.¹ Additional information about this accident and the resulting recommendations may be found in the report of the investigation, which can be accessed at our website, <http://www.nts.gov>, under report number AAR-14/02.

As a result of this investigation, we reclassified and closed Safety Recommendation A-06-8 and issued 20 new recommendations, including 2 to UPS, 2 to the Independent Pilots Association, 1 to Airbus, and the following 15 recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration:

A-14-72

Require principal operations inspectors to ensure that operators with flight crews performing 14 *Code of Federal Regulations* Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K overnight operations brief the threat of fatigue before each departure, particularly those occurring during the window of circadian low.

A-14-73

Require operators to develop an annual recurrent dispatcher resource management module for dispatchers that includes participation of pilots to reinforce the need for open communication.

¹ *Crash During a Nighttime Nonprecision Instrument Approach to Landing, United Parcel Service Flight 1354, Airbus A300-600, N155UP, Birmingham, Alabama, August 14, 2013.* NTSB/AAR-14/02, Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board, 2014.

A-14-74

Require principal operations inspectors to work with operators to ensure that their operating procedures explicitly state that any changes to an approach after the completion of the approach briefing should be rebriefed by the flight crewmembers so that they have a common expectation of the approach to be conducted.

A-14-75

Require principal operations inspectors to ensure consistency among their operators' training documents, their operators' Federal Aviation Administration-approved and -accepted documents, such as the aircraft operating manual, and manufacturers' guidance related to terrain awareness and warning system caution and warning alert responses, and ensure that responses are used during night and/or instrument meteorological conditions that maximize safety.

A-14-76

Require principal operations inspectors of 14 *Code of Federal Regulations* Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to ensure that Federal Aviation Administration-approved nonprecision instrument approach landing procedures prohibit "dive and drive" as defined in Advisory Circular 120-108. (Supersedes Safety Recommendation A-06-8)

A-14-77

Require that the remarks section of meteorological aerodrome reports be provided to all dispatchers and pilots in flight dispatcher papers and through the aircraft communication addressing and reporting system.

A-14-78

Expand the current guidance available in Federal Aviation Administration Order 7110.65, "Air Traffic Control," to further define meteorological aerodrome report pertinent remarks.

A-14-79

Issue a safety advisory bulletin to air traffic controllers providing examples of the types of meteorological aerodrome report remarks information considered pertinent and reminding them of the requirement to add such pertinent remarks to automatic terminal information service broadcasts.

A-14-80

Issue a special airworthiness information bulletin to notify operators about the circumstances of this accident and the potential safety improvements related to

the Honeywell enhanced ground proximity warning system part number 965-0976-003-218-218 or later software update.

A-14-81

Advise operators of aircraft equipped with terrain awareness and warning systems (TAWS) of the circumstances of this accident, including that, in certain situations, an escalating series of TAWS warnings may not occur before impact with terrain or obstacles. Encourage operators to review their procedures for responding to alerts on final approach to ensure that these procedures are sufficient to enable pilots to avoid impact with terrain or obstacles in such situations.

A-14-82

Revise the minimum operational performance standards to improve the effectiveness of terrain awareness and warning systems when an airplane is configured for landing and near the airport, including when the airplane is descending at a high rate and there is rising terrain near the airport.

A-14-83

Require all operators of airplanes equipped with the automated “minimums” alert to activate it.

A-14-84

For those airplanes not equipped with an automated “minimums” alert, require all operators of airplanes equipped with terrain awareness and warning systems (TAWS) to activate the TAWS 500-ft voice callout or similar alert.

A-14-85

Require principal operations inspectors of 14 *Code of Federal Regulations* Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to verify that procedures critical to approach setup, like configuring an approach in the flight management computer for those approaches dependent on that step, are included in Federal Aviation Administration-approved or -accepted manuals.

A-14-86

Work with industry, for all applicable aircraft, to develop and implement means of providing pilots with a direct and conspicuous cue when they program the flight management computer flight plan incorrectly such that it contains such elements as improper waypoints or discontinuities that would allow the vertical deviation indicator to present misleading information for an approach.

The following recommendation has been reclassified and superseded:

A-06-8

Require all 14 *Code of Federal Regulations* Part 121 and 135 operators to incorporate the constant-angle-of-descent technique into nonprecision approach procedures and to emphasize the preference for that technique where practicable.

This safety recommendation is superseded by A-14-76 and is now classified “Closed—Unacceptable Action/Superseded.”

Acting Chairman HART and Members SUMWALT, ROSEKIND, and WEENER concurred in these recommendations.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90 days detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement them. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number. We encourage you to submit your response electronically to correspondence@ntsb.gov.

[Original Signed]

By: Christopher A. Hart,
Acting Chairman