

# National Transportation Safety Board



Requirement	Class A Airspace	Class B Airspace	Mode C Veil	Class C Airspace	Class E Airspace inc. Gulf of America
ADS-B Out	Required	Required	Required	Required	Required
NTSB Rec on ADS-B In	Required	Required	Required	Required	Required
ROTOR Act on ADS-B In	Required	Required	Required	Required	Required
ALERT Act on ADS-B In*	Not required	Not required	Not required	Not required	Not required

\* See analysis below

## NTSB Analysis of ALERT Act

NTSB Recommendations	ALERT Act
<p><b>To FAA:</b> Evaluate the feasibility of decreasing traffic advisory and resolution advisory inhibit altitudes in ACAS Xa to enable improved alerting throughout more of the flight envelope. (A-26-34)</p> <p>If the evaluation finds that the altitudes can be safely decreased, require retrofitting of the applicable ACAS X variant incorporating the reduced traffic advisory and resolution advisory inhibit altitudes on all aircraft that are subject to traffic alert and collision avoidance system equipage regulations. (A-26-35)</p>	<p>Does not fully implement our recommendations as intended; requires the FAA Administrator, in consultation with industry and labor, to complete an evaluation of the “feasibility” of decreasing traffic advisory and resolution advisory inhibit altitudes in ACAS Xa. Section 102 requires ACAS rulemaking committee to consider the results of the evaluation in developing and submitting findings and recommendations to the Administrator.</p> <p>(Sec 101/102)</p>
<p><b>To FAA:</b> Modify ACAS traffic advisory aural alerts to include clock position, relative altitude, range, and vertical tendency. (A-26-29) Require existing and new TCAS I, TCAS II, and ACAS X</p>	<p>Does not fully implement our recommendation, including installations on existing TCAS I and TCAS II. Requires the Administrator to establish a rulemaking committee, consisting of industry, manufacturers, and labor to review and develop findings</p>

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<p>installations to integrate directional traffic symbols. (A-26-30) Require the use of the appropriate variant of ACAS X on new production aircraft that are currently subject to TCAS equipage regulations. (A-26-32) Require existing aircraft that are subject to TCAS equipage regulations be retrofitted with the appropriate variant with ACAS X. (A-26-33)</p>	<p>and recommendations to require select aircraft be equipped with ACAS-Xa. Committee does not include the NTSB.</p> <p>Requires modifications to performance standards (MOPS) to include traffic advisory aural alerts to include clock position, relative altitude, range and vertical tendency and the integration of directional traffic symbols. This needs to be strengthened to mandate changes to MOPS. Includes a number of considerations that are not in our report; staff is concerned it is too prescriptive and may harm implementation of ACAS Xa. Staff is also concerned about the timeline. (Sec 102/103)</p>
<p><b>To FAA:</b> Require that all rotorcraft operating in Class B airspace be equipped with ACAS Xr technology once the ACAS Xr standard has been published. (A-26-36)</p> <p><b>To RTCA:</b> Finalize and publish a MOPS for ACAS Xr for rotorcraft. (A-26-57)</p>	<p>Partially implements our recommendation; does not apply to military aircraft. Requires the Administrator to take necessary action no later than December 31, 2026, to work with the appropriate standards setting organization to develop, finalize, and publish performance standards for ACAS Xr. Establishes a negotiated rulemaking committee to review and develop findings and recommendations to require civil rotorcraft in Class B airspace. All deadlines for retrofit and newly manufactured aircraft must be based on the findings and recommendations of the negotiated rulemaking committee. (Sec 103)</p>
<p><b>To FAA:</b> Require all aircraft operating in airspace where Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) Out is required to also be equipped with ADS-B In with a cockpit display of traffic information that is configured to provide alerting audible to the pilot and/or flight crew. (A-26-31)</p>	<p>Does not implement our recommendation. The ALERT Act requires that only “covered aircraft” be equipped with technology “<b>capable</b>” receiving ADS-B In transmissions. There is a big difference between mandating ADS-B In be operational and requiring that tech be “capable” of receiving ADS-B In. (Sec 104)</p> <p>Even if this was a drafting error, the ALERT Act still fails to implement our recommendation. Our recommendation is for the FAA to require all aircraft operating in airspace where ADS-B Out is required to also be equipped with ADS-B In; that means ALL AIRCRAFT operating in</p>



<p>In our probable cause, we cited “the FAA’s failure across multiple organizations to implement previous NTSB recommendations, including ADS-B In.”</p>	<p>Class A, Class B, Class C, Mode C Veil (30 nm around major airports), and Class E airspace plus the Gulf of America. This is the requirement in ROTOR, but unlike ROTOR, the ALERT Act requires ONLY turbine-powered civil aircraft to be equipped with technology capable of receiving ADS-B In transmissions in Class A airspace (above 18,000 ft msl), Mode C Veil (within 30 nm of a major airport); Class E including the Gulf of America (2500 to 10,000 ft MSL), even though aircraft subject to parts 91 and 135 share much of this same airspace (the risk of a collision is still present). The ALERT Act requires almost all other civil aircraft to be equipped with technology capable of receiving transmissions solely in Class B and C airspace except it exempts:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>(1) Aircraft manufactured before the date of enactment that have a limited category special airworthiness certificate; or</li><li>(2) An experimental airworthiness certificate</li></ul> <p>provided the pilot of the aircraft is authorized to operate in the airspace by ATC.</p> <p>Simply put, this fails to implement our recommendation and our longstanding position on ADS-B In, going back to 2008.</p> <p>Further, the ALERT Act requires the Administrator to initiate a negotiated rulemaking committee to require only “covered aircraft” be equipped with “collision mitigation” technology. The NTSB is not familiar with “collision mitigation” technology; we believe all aircraft should be equipped with technology that avoids collisions, not mitigates them.</p>
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	<p>Finally, the negotiated rulemaking committee must, consider - among other things - a host of issues that have a high likelihood of not implementing ADS-B In, including requiring consideration of the use of existing air traffic control deviation authorization tools to implement the requirement, especially given the fact the final rule MUST incorporate the recommendations of the Committee.</p> <p>In fact, the investigative team - as a whole - believes this entire section would seriously harm our efforts to implement ADS-B In at FAA. If the House wants to implement the NTSB recommendation, we believe it should do just that: direct the Administrator to implement our recommendation citing the number of the recommendation, as Congress did following the MAX investigations.</p>
<p><b>To the FAA:</b> Develop and implement time on position limitations for supervisory air traffic control personnel including guidance for district and facility level management to adapt these limitations to account for their own staffing and local standard operating procedures. (A-26-8)</p>	<p>Does not implement our recommendation; supervisors are not bargaining unit employees. FAA-NATCA already have limitations for bargaining unit controllers; we are requesting the same for supervisors and would argue it's just as important, if not more so in many cases. Permits the Administrator to execute an MOU to review the time on position practices for operations supervisory personnel, which the Administrator is already permitted to do. (Sec 105)</p>
<p><b>To the FAA:</b> Develop instructor-led, scenario-based training on threat and error management that trains controllers to continuously monitor their environment to more quickly and accurately identify threats; promote team communication to ensure that communications are clear, timely and assertive; emphasize effective scanning habits; recognize patters in the development of adverse events; and</p>	<p>Does not implement our recommendation. Establishes a working group to provide the FAA Administrator with recommendations for revising regulations and standards pertaining to initial and recurrent training of air traffic controllers on threat and error management and tower-applied and pilot-applied visual separation procedures. Requires a report to Congress and a proposed and final rule for training "as recommended by the Working Group." Administrator can decide not to implement any of the recommendations and just issue a report to Congress. (Sec 106)</p>

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<p>enhanced decision making under stress by developing habits that balance procedural compliance with problem solving to mitigate the risks of threats and errors and provide this training to all air traffic controllers annually. (A-26-9_</p>	
<p><b>To the FAA:</b> Develop and implement a risk assessment tool for supervisors that incorporates the principals of threat and error management to assist in risk identification mitigation and operational decision making. (A-26-10)</p>	<p>Does not implement our recommendation. Requires the Administrator "to seek" to enter into an agreement with a federally funded research and development center to develop a safety risk assessment tool for use by ATC to assist in airspace risk identification, mitigation, and operational decision-making. Requires a briefing to Congress on development of the tool. (Sec 107)</p>
<p><b>To the FAA:</b> Initiate a rulemaking in 14 CFR Part 93 that prescribes air carrier operation limitations at DCA in 30- minute periods, similar to those imposed at LaGuardia Airport, to ensure that the airport does not exceed capacity and to mitigate inconsistent air carrier scheduling practices. (A-26-11)</p> <p><b>To the FAA:</b> Reassess the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport's airport arrival rate with special consideration to airspace complexity, airfield limitations, mix-fleet operations, and traffic volume. (A-26-13)</p>	<p>Implements our recommendation. Requires Administrator to initiate an assessment of the arrival rates at DCA and initiate a rulemaking to require allocated instrument flight rules operations at DCA to be prescribed in periods not greater than 30 minutes to ensure such airport does not exceed safe capacity. (Sec 108)</p>

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<p><b>To the FAA:</b> Fully implement operational use of TBFM at Potomac TRACON and its associated air traffic control towers. (A-26-12)</p>	<p>Implements our recommendation. Mandates operational use of TBFM at Potomac TRACON. (sec 109)</p>
<p><b>To the FAA:</b> Define objective criteria for the determination of air traffic facility levels considering traffic and airspace volume, operational factors unique to each facility, and cost-of-living. (A-26-15) Using the criteria established, determine whether the classification of DCA’s ATC tower as a Level 9 facility appropriately reflects the complexity of its operations. (A-26-16)</p>	<p>Does not implement our recommendation. Authorizes but does not require the National Validation Team to review and update the criteria and procedures used to assess, determine, and validate the classification level of ATC facilities. Upon completion of the review, requires reassessment of ATC facility levels at DCA and other facilities with high volumes of mixed helicopter and airplane traffic. Authorizes the National Validation Team to determine whether a higher level is appropriate for such facilities.</p> <p>They have the authority to do all of this now. (sec 110)</p>
<p><b>To the FAA:</b> Conduct a comprehensive evaluation in conjunction with local operators to determine the overall safety benefits and risks to requiring all aircraft to use the same frequency when the helicopter and local positions are combined in the DCA ATC tower. (A-26-18)</p>	<p>Partially implements our recommendation; must include local operators working group.</p> <p>Convenes a working group to conduct an evaluation of the safety benefits and risks of requiring all aircraft to use the same communications frequency during any period in which helicopter and local ATC positions are combined in the DCA tower. Allows the Administrator to take action on the recommendations of the working group. (sec 111)</p>
<p><b>To the FAA:</b> Implement anti-blocking technology that will alert controllers and/or flight</p>	<p>Does not implement our recommendation. Requires the Administrator to initiate an assessment on the feasibility and maturity of technology that serves to alert ATC or flight crews to instances of</p>

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<p>crews to potentially blocked transmissions when simultaneous broadcasting occurs. (A-26-19)</p>	<p>potentially blocked transmissions when simultaneous broadcasting occurs. (Sec 112)</p>
<p><b>To the FAA:</b> Develop and implement improvements to the conflict alert system to provide more salient and meaningful alerts to controllers based on the severity of the conflict triggering the alert. (A-26-20) Once that is implemented, provide training to controllers on its use. (A-26-21)</p>	<p>Does not implement our recommendation. Convenes a taskforce to develop a framework detailing the priorities, goals, timeline, and recommendations to implement improvements to the conflict alert system. Requires Administrator to finalize and submit to Congress a plan to implement such a framework. (Sec 113)</p>



<p><b>To the FAA:</b> Revise the ATO’s initial event response procedures so that an appropriate onsite supervisor makes each post-accident and post incident drug and alcohol testing determination based on their assessment of whether the event meets testing criteria and which controllers had duties pertaining to the involved aircraft without needing to wait for investigation or approval. (A-26-22)</p> <p>At least annually provide training on the revised post-accident and post incident drug and alcohol testing determination procedure to all staff who have responsibilities under that procedure; this training should include a post learning knowledge assessment. (A-26-23)</p> <p><b>To the DOT:</b> Require the Federal Aviation Administration to demonstrate at least annually that each air traffic control facility it operates has the routine capability to accomplish required postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing within the US Department of Transportation’s specified timeframes of 2 hours for alcohol and 4 hours for drugs, and implement a process to ensure that any facility without such capability will</p>	<p>Attempts but fails to implement our recommendations. The Administrator is required to review and revise “as appropriate” the initial event response procedures of the ATO to ensure an appropriate on-site supervisor makes each postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing determination “in a timely manner.” (Sec 114) Our recommendations assert that revision of the procedures is appropriate and necessary, to correct deficiencies that the FAA failed to identify. Further, the measure of a determination being made “in a timely manner” is not at the discretion of the Administrator. Rather, a determination is timely if it allows DOT-required testing timeframes to be met.</p> <p>Additionally, to correctly implement our recommendations, the Administrator should ensure the revised procedures require <i>each postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing determination</i> to be based on an on-site supervisor’s assessment, without needing to wait for investigation or approval, of whether the event meets testing criteria, and of which air traffic controllers had duties pertaining to the involved aircraft. This is unclear as written.</p> <p>Requires a review of the ability of each ATC facility to routinely accomplish testing within specified timeframes (regulations). We have concerns about wording here which could lead to longer timeframes. Additionally, the Administrator is charged with developing and implementing a remediation process. While this could be appropriate, the Secretary should also hold responsibility for remediation. Our recommendation in this area was directed to the DOT because the DOT has key oversight and administrative responsibilities for FAA drug and alcohol testing.</p>
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demonstrate timely remediation. (A-26-54)	
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<p><b>To the FAA:</b> Ensure that annual reviews of helicopter route charts are being conducted throughout the NAS as required by FAA Order. (A-26-24)</p> <p>Conduct a safety risk management (SRM) process to evaluate whether modifications to the remaining helicopter route structure in the vicinity of DCA are necessary to safely deconflict helicopter and fixed-wing traffic and provide the results to the NTSB. (A-26-25)</p> <p>Amend your helicopter route design criteria and approval process to ensure that current and future route designs or design changes provide vertical separation from airport approach and departure paths. (A-26-26)</p> <p>Once that is done, review all existing helicopter routes to ensure alignment with these updated criteria. (A-26-27)</p> <p>Incorporate the lateral location and published altitudes of helicopter routes onto all instrument and visual approach and departure procedures to provide necessary situation awareness to fixed-wing operators of the risk of the</p>	<p>Partially implements our recommendations; requires a lot of changes. (Secs 115/116/117/118)</p> <p>Requires the Administrator to publish on a website the date on which the annual review was completed and issue a report to congress on changes, additions, or deletions.</p> <p>Requires the Administrator to evaluate charted helicopter routes in the vicinity of DCA and ensure routes utilized by fixed-wing aircraft are safely deconflicted physically at all times or have operating procedures that require positive control from the controller to ensure safe deconfliction during operations. Requires a SRM review of any route changes. The SRM should be utilized for the whole evaluation/changes.</p> <p>Requires the Administrator to ensure that each segment of a helicopter route contains, in the appropriate helicopter route chart, recommended flight altitudes, including altitude ceilings and floors. Adds minimum vertical separation requirements to the criteria for the helicopter route chart program.</p> <p>Requires only a study on incorporating the lateral location and published altitudes of helicopter routes into all instrument and visual approach and departure procedures for airports.</p>
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<p>helicopter traffic operating in their vicinity. (A-26-28)</p>	
<p><b>To the FAA:</b> Create an objective definition of close proximity encounter and a public database of those encounters and their locations that can be used to monitor their prevalence and identify areas of potential traffic conflict for safety assurance and safety risk management. (A-26-37)</p>	<p>Would not meet the intent of the recommendation as currently written; Seems to confuse objective measure of close proximity encounters with subjective measures like NMAC, loss of separation, or compliance. To meet the intent of the recommendation, a close proximity encounter would need to be defined by <b>objective</b> criteria such as slant-range or lateral and vertical distance. The recommendation also calls for a <b>public database of those encounters</b>, not aggregated information. That database could be deidentified, but to meet the stated goal, "to monitor their prevalence and identify areas of potential traffic conflict" it would need to <b>include at a minimum time, altitude, and location</b>. (Note: These data are already available to FAA through multiple sources, including ARIA and PDARS. They simply need to establish an objective definition and make the data they already have available to the public.) (Sec 119)</p>



<p><b>To the FAA:</b> Develop and implement a process that will, in a timely manner, notify involved parties after events such as near midair collisions or traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolution advisory activations, such that notification occurs while relevant data remain available and before meaningful safety analysis, reporting, or corrective action is no longer practicable. (A-26-38)</p>	<p>Seems to conflate recommendations A-26-37 and A-26-38, and as written would not meet the intent of the recommendation. The recommendation specifically references NMACs and TCAS RAs rather than objective close proximity encounters or losses of separation. Since this would necessarily include identifiable information about the aircraft, the recommendation does not ask for a database of those events (as A-26-37 does for close proximity encounters.) Sec 120 also calls for consideration of surface events and terrain proximity events, which could be valuable and—if included in addition to NMACs and TCAS RAs—would exceed the recommendation. (Sec 120)</p>
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<p><b>The DOT IG:</b> Complete an audit of the FAA ATO’s safety management system (SMS) functions and data sharing activities at all ATC facilities and determine whether these activities are conducted in collaboration with all relevant external stakeholders, ensuring that the audit’s results are documented, reported to the Secretary of Transportation and FAA Administrator and made available to the public. (A-26-56)</p> <p><b>To the FAA:</b> Based on the results of the audit completed in accordance with Safety Recommendation A-26-56, ensure that all safety management system functions and data sharing activities at all air traffic control facilities are conducted in collaboration with all relevant external stakeholders. (A-26-39)</p>	<p>Combines recommendation A-26-56 (DOT IG audit ATO SMS implementation) and A-26-55 (DOT and FAA audit of ATO Safety Culture). This could meet the intent of the recommendation, but it may be more practical to separate these audits into two distinct tasks. The recommended audit of ATO SMS would presumably include a simple review of ATO SMS requirements, guidance materials, and documentation to ensure that ATO aligns with the larger FAA SMS. In contrast, an audit of ATO safety culture would be a more involved task, to include sensitive information collection like employee interviews and/or surveys, history of personnel and disciplinary actions, and confidential reports. (Sec 121)</p>
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<p><b>To the FAA:</b> Establish a requirement across all ATC tower standard operating procedures that the operations supervisor or controller in charge (CIC) document in the daily facility log when any control position is combined with the local control position or when the operators supervisor/CIC position is combined with a local control position along with a rationale for doing so. (A-26-40)</p>	<p>Implements our recommendation. (Sec 122)</p>
<p><b>To the FAA:</b> Require each Class B or Class C ATC tower facility to evaluate its existing miles in trails procedures or agreements to ensure that the spacing provided is appropriate for operational safety and make the results publicly available. (A-26-14)</p>	<p>Implements our recommendation. (Sec 123)</p>
<p><b>To the US Army:</b> Revise training procedures for flight crews assigned to operate in the NCR to ensure that they receive initial and recurrent training on fixed-wing operations at DCA including approach and departure paths, runway configurations, and the interaction of those traffic flows with published helicopter routes. (A-26-41)</p>	<p>Exceeds our recommendation; applies not just to NCR but Class B airspace. (Sec 2658)</p>

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<p><b>To the US Army:</b> Develop and implement a recurring procedure, at an interval not to exceed 18 months, to verify the continued accuracy of recorded flight data. (A-26-42)</p>	<p>Does not implement our recommendation; implements different standard. (Sec 2659)</p>
<p><b>To the US Army:</b> Incorporate information within the appropriate operator’s manual for all applicable aircraft on the potential total error allowed by design that could occur in flight on an otherwise airworthy barometric altimeter, including the increased position error associated with the external stores support system configuration. (A-26-43)</p>	<p>Implements the intent of our recommendation. (Sec 2659)</p>
<p><b>To the US Army:</b> Develop and implement a transponder inspection procedure on all aircraft with transponders capable of transmitting Mode S and Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) and operated in the National Airspace System (NAS), at least annually and upon each aircraft’s entry into service in the NAS, that ensures 1) the transponder ADS-B settings are correct, 2) the transponder is transmitting ADS-B, and 3) the transponder is transmitting the correctly assigned address. (A-26-44)</p>	<p>Does not implement our recommendation; implements different standard. Requires DOD to memorialize best practices for ensuring the correct configuration of ADS-B Out and other transponders, including routine intervals for verifying transponder settings and proper operation. There are no best practices for such configurations; hence, our recommendation. (Sec 2656)</p>
<p><b>To the US Army:</b> Establish a flight data monitoring program for rotary-wing</p>	<p>Does not implement our recommendation; implements different standard that is not responsive to our recommendation. It is</p>

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<p>aircraft the US Army operates in the National Airspace System. (A-26-45)</p>	<p>conceivable the committees do not understand what flight data monitoring is, based on the drafting. (Secs 2656/2659)</p>
<p><b>To the US Army:</b> Survey US Army helicopter pilots to identify barriers to the utilization of flight safety reporting systems, develop a plan to address the identified barriers, and implement that plan across Army aviation units. (A-26-46)</p>	<p>Does not implement our recommendation; implements different standard that is nonresponsive to our recommendation. (Sec 2657)</p>
<p><b>To the US Army:</b> Revise the method for allocating resources to ensure the development of a robust safety management system that will, at a minimum, identify and monitor the potential for midair collisions between Army aircraft and civil air traffic operating in the National Airspace System. (A-26-47)</p>	<p>Does not implement our recommendation; implements different standard. (Secs 2657/2659)</p>

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<p><b>To the Department of War Policy Board on Federal Aviation</b>—Conduct a study to evaluate the quality of radio transmissions and reception for those aircraft operated within the National Airspace System to identify factors that degrade communications equipment performance and adversely affect the safety of civilian and military flight operations. (A-26-49)</p> <p>Implement appropriate enhancements, based on the findings of the study recommended in Safety Recommendation A-26-49, to remediate identified deficiencies in air-ground radio communications performance. (A-26-50)</p>	<p>Does not implement our recommendation; implements different standard. Secs 2659/2657)</p>
<p>Require the Department of War to verify on all aircraft with transponders capable of transmitting Mode S and Automatic Dependent Surveillance—Broadcast (ADS-B) and operated in the National Airspace System (NAS), at least annually and upon each aircraft’s entry into service in the NAS, that 1) the transponder ADS-B settings are correct, 2) the transponder is transmitting ADS-B, and 3) the transponder is transmitting the correctly assigned address. (A-26-51)</p>	<p>Does not implement our recommendation; implements different standard. Requires DOD to memorialize best practices for ensuring the correct configuration of ADS-B Out and other transponders, including routine intervals for verifying transponder settings and proper operation. There are no best practices for such configurations; hence, our recommendation. (Sec 2656)</p>



<p>Require armed services to amend their operational procedures to allow flight crews to enable Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast Out while in flight. (A-26-52)</p>	<p>Does not implement our recommendation; introduces <b>significant</b> risk in NAS and reverses Secretary of Transportation mitigations near DCA on mixed traffic.</p> <p>Requires DOD to clarify operational procedures regarding flight crew authority to enable ADS-B Out transmission in flight, including in response to air traffic or weather conditions. There are no operational procedures regarding flight crew authority to enable ADS-B Out; they are prohibited from doing so.</p> <p>Allows fighter aircraft, bomber aircraft, unmanned aircraft, and special mission aircraft to conduct operations in the NAS without broadcasting ADS-B Out or utilizing collision mitigation technologies.</p> <p>Allows the Secretary of any military department to operate a training mission in the NCR if ADS-B Out or similar technology is broadcasting. Similar technology would be Mode C and Mode S transponder interrogations which existed the night of the midair collision. Strikes requirements in the NDAA to do a safety risk assessment and national security determination. Allows the Secretary of any military department to waive requirements for ADS-B Out, Mode S, or Mode C interrogations (essentially allowing them to turn off their transponder). Eliminates requirement in NDAA for Secretary of Transportation to agree to such waiver.</p> <p>Requires the Secretary of Defense to prioritize ADS-B Out or use of Mode C/Mode S when operating within 30 nm of a major airport.</p>
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	Ensures the Secretary of Defense has sole control over the determination of which specific collision mitigation technology is appropriate for installation and operation on all aircraft. (Sec 2656)
Require all military aircraft operating in the National Airspace System (NAS) be equipped with Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) In with a cockpit display of traffic information that is configured to provide alerting audible to the pilot and/or flight crew, and that such requirement apply wherever in the NAS the Federal Aviation Administration requires any aircraft to operate with ADS-B Out. (A-26-53)	Does not implement our recommendation. (Sec 2656)