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National Transportation Safety Board

Office of Highway Safety

**Truck-Tractor and Cargo Tank Semitrailer
Rollover and Fire
Interstate Highway 69
Indianapolis, Indiana
October 22, 2009**



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Opening Statement


**Westbound
I-465**

**Northbound
I-69**

**Southbound
I-69**

**Southbound
I-465**

**Accident
location**





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Office of Research and Engineering

Truck-Tractor and Cargo Tank Semitrailer Rollover Animation

Indianapolis, Indiana

October 22, 2009

HWY-10-MH-001







LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM



Injuries

- Truck driver
 - Seriously injured
- Passenger vehicle occupants
 - 1 serious injury (Volvo driver)
 - 3 minor injuries

Parties to the Investigation

- Federal Highway Administration
- Indiana Department of Transportation
- Lawrence Township Fire Department
- Indiana State Police
- Mississippi Tank Company
- AmeriGas Propane

Safety Issues

- Driver fatigue management and rollover prevention programs
- Stability control systems and vehicle design
- Cross-slope breaks and protection of bridge pier columns
- Crashworthiness of Department of Transportation specification cargo tanks



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Human Performance Factors

Driver Information

- Current license and endorsements
 - Cargo tank and hazardous materials
 - Corrective lens restriction
- 45 years driving trucks, 15 with cargo tanks
- Current medical card
- No evidence of drug/alcohol use
- No evidence of distractions

Consideration of Fatigue

- Driver could set work hours
- Uncertainty in sleep opportunity
- Uncertainty in sleep obtained
- Wide range of possibilities
- Insufficient information to determine fatigue

Fatigue Management Programs

- Displayed poor fatigue management
- Role of fatigue in rollovers
- Fatigue management programs
- AmeriGas practices
- Driver may be representative



Rollover Prevention Program

- Rollover is a problem
- “Vehicle Incident Prevention Program” not effective for rollovers
- Rollover awareness efforts
- Comprehensive rollover prevention program
- Australian program successful

Summary

- Cannot determine whether driver was fatigued
- Poor fatigue management by driver
- Rollover is a problem



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Vehicle Factors




Rollover Prevention

Cargo tanks

prone to rollover:

6% of fleet, 31% of fatal rollover accidents



Approaches

1. Stability control systems

- Adding technology
- Prevent excessive curve speed rollovers
- Prevent loss of control from oversteer and understeer

2. Vehicle design

- Lower and wider
- Prevent all types of rollovers

Stability Control Systems

- Roll Stability Control (RSC)
 - Tractor or trailer based
- Electronic Stability Control (ESC)
 - Tractor based

With ESC



Without ESC



Images courtesy of Bendix Commercial Vehicle Systems LLC

Stability Control Systems

- Market facts
 - Bendix, Meritor WABCO, Haldex
 - Available on all new tractors and trailers
 - Cost range \$600 - \$2,000
 - On the market for 10 years
 - 100,000 RSC and ESC units installed as of 2009 (ATRI)
 - 25% of tractors will have ESC by 2012 (NHTSA)
 - No current requirement for ESC on heavy vehicles



Stability Control Systems

- ESC required for passenger vehicles
 - Loss of control accidents reduction (NASS data)
 - 40% with cars, 70% with SUVs
 - NHTSA issued final rule in April 2007
 - All vehicles be equipped with ESC by model year 2012
- Benefits of RSC and ESC for heavy vehicles
 - 2009 NHTSA Study
 - RSC could prevent 3,489 crashes, 106 fatalities, and 4,384 injuries each year - \$1.4 billion savings
 - ESC could prevent 4,659 crashes, 126 fatalities, and 5,909 injuries each year - \$1.7 billion savings

Summary

- Previous NTSB recommendations on stability control standards (Dolan Springs)
- Stability control systems for ALL commercial vehicles



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
Vehicle Design

- Design considerations
 - Tank structural integrity
 - Ground clearance
 - Loading heights
 - Size and weight
- Roll Stability can be improved by
 - Lowering center of gravity height (CG)
 - Increasing track width


Vehicle Design

- Lowering CG
 - Fifth wheel height reduction
 - From 49 - 50 inches to 40 inches
 - Changing tank shape
 - Wider, elliptical, and drop-center

Double Taper Design



Vehicle Design



Summary

- Performance-based standards
 - Design rollover resistant characteristics
 - Direct attention to vehicle design




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Highway Factors




Cross-Slope Break

- AASHTO standards
 - 7 percent (1950s and 1960s)
 - 8 percent (current standard)

Cross-Slope Break Research

- Limited research conducted
- 1981 FHWA study
 - Simulation used a passenger car
 - Driver discomfort increased with shoulder slope
- No research found to address heavy trucks



Summary

- Best practices approach
- Knowledge gained at NTSB Public Hearing
- Options to assist state transportation agencies



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W-Beam Guardrail

- Primarily designed to redirect passenger cars and pickup trucks
- Overall height – 30 inches
- Bridge columns located within clear zone
 - 14 feet from the edge of traveled way
 - 6 feet from the guardrail

Risk Assessment

- Existing bridges
- Higher standard of bridge column protection
- Documentation limited
- New construction represents small percentage of overall number of bridges

Indianapolis Connection Ramp

- Level of protection had not changed in 40 years
- Upgrading existing roadside barriers generally not high on list of priorities
- If new bridge, 42-inch-high concrete barrier would be required

Before and After Condition

Before



After



NTSB Safety Recommendations

- H-94-5, Evergreen, AL, 1993
 - Closed–Acceptable Alternate Action
- H-95-32 & 33, White Plains, NY, 1994
 - H-95-32, Closed–Acceptable Alternate Action
 - H-95-33, Closed–Acceptable Action

Attributes of Risk Assessment

- Two specific attributes
 - Redundancy and continuity
- Prevented I-465 overpass from collapsing
- Prioritize bridges in terms of vulnerability to collapse and damage

Summary

- FHWA position in the past
- Target the most unsafe locations
- Focused and strategic
- Proactive instead of reactive



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
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Hazardous Materials Factors

Hazardous Materials Release



Cargo Tank Damage



Structural Integrity Requirements

- Stress to the cargo tank must account for
 - Maximum working pressure, plus
 - Liquid surge force of twice the weight of a full load
- Varying degrees of relevance to different tank types
- Federal regulations do not address external impacts to tank surfaces



Summary

- Cargo tank accident performance standards needed
- Analyze accident data to identify susceptible cargo tank structures
- Modeling and testing
- Develop improved design criteria



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Trend Analyses

- Population of cargo tanks by DOT specification unknown
- Data must be normalized to conduct risk analyses
- DOT and industry studies based on uncertain cargo tank population estimates

Statistical Data

NAT'L B.D. NO. 9504
MANUFACTURED AND CERTIFIED BY
MISSISSIPPI TANK COMPANY
HATTIESBURG, MISSISSIPPI

W	NPV	UHT
RTA	HT	
MAWP	250	PSI AT 200 °F
MDMT	-20	°F AT 250 PSI
MFR'S SERIAL NO	3513A1	
YEAR BUILT	1994	
I.D.	83.5	IN O.A.L. 519 IN
HD TH	.25	IN SHL TH .378 IN
W	11,600	GAL SURF AREA 966 SQ FT

MFR'S SERIAL NO 3513A1
D.O.T. SPEC NO MC-331
WATER CAP. IN LBS 96,628
TARE WT. IN LBS 21,860
MAT. SPEC. SA-517E
MAT. SPEC.
ORIG. TEST DATE 02/23/94
THIS CONTAINER SHALL NOT
CONTAIN A PRODUCT HAVING
A VAPOR PRESSURE IN EXCESS
OF 125 PSIG AT 100 °F

Summary

- Absence of distribution data for DOT-specification cargo tanks
- Limited ability to perform accurate trend analyses
- Insufficient information collected from motor carriers



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