Survival Flight Inc.
Bell 407
January 29, 2019
Zaleski, Ohio

Human Performance presentation
Survival Flight’s Poor Safety Culture

Demonstrated by lack of effective risk management

• Management pressuring bases to remain operational and accept flights
• Advertising operating in lower weather minimums
• Pushing flights to be airborne
Survival Flight’s Poor Safety Culture (cont.)

- Pilots responded to pressure at expense of SOPs
  - Accident pilot accepted flight without shift change briefing and adequate preflight risk assessment
  - Pilots likely influenced by management’s lack of support for SOP compliance
- Company lacked SMS
NTSB SMS Advocacy

- 2009: Recommendation for all HAA operators implement SMS (A-09-89)
  - FAA 2014 HEMS rule did not require SMS
  - Classified “Closed–Unacceptable Action”
- 2016: Recommendation for all Part 135 operators implement SMS (A-16-36)
  - FAA intended to evaluate voluntary implementation
  - Initially classified “Open–Acceptable Response”
- 2016 to 2019: A-16-36 reiterated 3 times
- 2019 to 2020: Part 135 safety on NTSB Most Wanted List
- Proposal to reiterate and change classification of A-16-36 to “Open–Unacceptable Response”
SMS and Survival Flight

Requirement for SMS would have:

• Held Survival Flight management accountable for developing and maintaining robust safety program

• Provided FAA with insight into Survival Flight’s safety process and performance
Recommendations proposed to:

- Survival Flight to voluntarily establish SMS
- FAA to require SMS for all Part 135 operations (reiteration of A-16-36)