



National Transportation Safety Board

Motorcoach Collision With Combination
Vehicle After Traffic Break

Interstate Highway 10 Westbound
Palm Springs, CA
October 23, 2016



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
Opening Statement

Robert Accetta
Investigator-In-Charge

Crash Sequence

- California Highway Patrol (CHP) 5:07
 - Initiated traffic break
- International truck-tractor and Utility semitrailer 5:12
 - Stopped at traffic queue
- Traffic released 5:14
 - Combination vehicle remained stopped
- Motor Coach Industries (MCI) 5:16
 - 47-passenger motorcoach





Source: California Highway Patrol

Injuries

- Motorcoach
 - Driver fatality
 - 12 passenger fatalities
 - 30 passengers serious-to-minor injuries
- Truck
 - Driver minor injuries

Video Evidence and Data Recording Systems

- Surveillance camera videos
- CHP in-car videos
- Truck engine control module
- Truck telematics

NTSB On-Scene Staff

- Earl Weener, PhD
- Kristen Shea
- Robert Accetta
- Kenny Bragg
- Shawn Currie
- Jerome Cantrell
- Dan Walsh, PE
- Thomas Barth, PhD

Board Member
Special Assistant
Investigator-in-Charge
Human Performance Factors
Motor Carrier Factors
Vehicle Factors
Highway Factors
Survival Factors

NTSB On-Scene Staff (continued)

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Safety Recommendations

Parties to Investigation

- Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)
- California Department of Transportation (Caltrans)
- California Highway Patrol (CHP)

Safety Issues

- Traffic break policies
- Obstructive sleep apnea and diabetes in commercial vehicle drivers
- Oversight of commercial vehicle drivers and carriers
- Emergency egress
- Collision avoidance systems



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Traffic Break Policies

Dan Walsh

Overview

- Traffic break performed by CHP in support of utility work
- Safety policies for temporary work zones
- Caltrans implementation of traffic breaks
 - Prevalence of traffic breaks performed in other states
- Postcrash actions implemented by Caltrans


Utility Work – Southern California Edison

- Consisted of transferring 6 transmission lines
- Stage 1 – transferring top 3 lines
- Stage 2 – transferring bottom 3 lines
- Stage 3 – removing wood H-frame structure



Traffic Break Performed by CHP

- Traffic break in eastbound and westbound directions
- A serpentine maneuver across all 4 travel lanes
- Only traffic break performed before the crash
- No portable changeable message signs (PCMS)



Safety Policies for Temporary Work Zones

- FHWA and Caltrans regulate temporary work zones
- Criteria for significant project
 - FHWA Rule on Work Zone Safety and Mobility – more than 3 days
 - Caltrans – more than 30 minutes
- Traffic stoppage – planned for 5 minutes
 - Considered a nonsignificant project

Caltrans Implementation of Traffic Breaks


- Issued 461 permits for traffic breaks in 2014-2015
- Did not require the use of advance warning devices
- Warning devices may have modified the motorcoach driver's expectations
- Additional law enforcement vehicle
 - Provide warning to approaching vehicles
 - Monitor dispersal of traffic queue

Traffic Breaks in Other States

- FHWA inquiry with Divisional Offices
 - More than 40% of responding states do not have standard policies
- 3 states with standard policies
 - All 3 states use PCMS
 - 2 states use an additional law enforcement vehicle on the shoulder

Postcrash Actions Implemented by Caltrans

1. Minimum of 2 CHP vehicles in each direction
2. At least 1 PCMS
3. Meeting 2 weeks prior to start of work
4. Scheduled for Sunday mornings from daylight to 10 a.m.



Summary

- Caltrans did not have a policy for conducting traffic breaks
- Caltrans made improvements after the crash
 - Includes advance warning devices and multiple law enforcement vehicles
- FHWA plays a key role in urging states to adopt policies through uniform guidance
- Informing local law enforcement agencies



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Truck and Motorcoach Driver Performance

Kenny Bragg

Overview

- Truck driver performance
 - Fatigue
- Motorcoach driver performance
 - Fatigue
 - Visibility

Exclusions

- Alcohol or other drugs
- Licensing/experience
- Cell phone distraction
- Weather

Truck Driver Performance

- Traffic stopped about 7 minutes
- Truck stopped about 650 feet from beginning of the traffic break
- Truck stopped about 4 minutes
 - Was stopped for 2-3 minutes after traffic was released

Truck Driver Performance (continued)

- Did not move the truck when traffic was released
- Stated he had been stopped 25-30 minutes
 - Actual time was about 4 minutes
- Likely asleep when the crash occurred

Truck Driver Fatigue

- Could not remember the time and the amount of sleep he obtained
- Examination of GPS data and phone records
 - 11-hour sleep opportunity each of the 3 nights leading up to the crash
 - Had adequate opportunity for sleep

Truck Visibility and Motorcoach Driver Perception

- Truck visibility
 - Retroreflective rear of the trailer
 - Tail and marker lights, no hazard lights
 - Visible for 20 seconds
- Diminished perceptual cues indicating the stopped truck



Motorcoach Driver Expectations and Performance

- Expectations
 - No advance notice of stopped traffic
 - Traffic flowed normally around the stopped truck
- Precrash actions
 - No precrash brake application
 - Lack of adequate steering response

Motorcoach Driver Fatigue

- Worked the night of October 21-22
 - Two nights before the crash
- 3 hours of sleep in the afternoon of October 22
 - 1 day before the crash
- 1 hour of sleep before leaving the casino
- In the 35 hours before the crash, the driver obtained about 4 hours of sleep

Summary

- Truck driver likely fell asleep
- Truck driver had adequate opportunity for sleep
- Stopped truck was visible
- Motorcoach driver likely fatigued



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Obstructive Sleep Apnea and Diabetes in Commercial Vehicle Drivers

Mary Pat McKay, MD, MPH

Overview

- Truck driver
 - Likely moderate-to-severe obstructive sleep apnea (OSA)
- Motorcoach driver
 - Poorly controlled, likely undiagnosed diabetes

Truck Driver

- 50-year-old male, 6 feet 2 inches tall
- Weight variously recorded as 350 – 390 pounds
 - BMI: 44.9 – 50.0 kg/m²
 - Extreme obesity
- Received commercial driver's license (CDL) medical certification in January 2015
- Reported no medical conditions or medications

Truck Driver and OSA

- Risk factors: older age, male gender, obesity
 - No OSA screening by healthcare providers
- Moderate-to-severe OSA and obesity
 - 56% of patients with a BMI between 40 and 50 kg/m²
 - 80% of patients with a BMI between 50 and 60 kg/m²
- Truck driver likely had moderate-to-severe OSA
 - Fell asleep during the traffic break

OSA: NTSB and FMCSA History

- 2009 NTSB recommendations
 - Develop and require OSA screening protocols
- March 2016: FMCSA and FRA release advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM)
- August 2016: Medical Review Board (MRB) developed OSA recommendations

OSA: FMCSA Actions

- MRB guidance
 - Would have recommended a sleep study
 - OSA diagnosis established and treatment administered
- MRB guidance is not required or publicized
- August 2017: FMCSA and FRA withdrew the ANPRM

Motorcoach Driver

- 59-year-old male
- Received CDL medical certification in July 2016
 - Certified medical examiner (CME) was a chiropractor
 - Urine dip test was positive for glucose
 - Driver asked to return
 - Urine dip test negative the next day
 - Certified for 2 years

Motorcoach Driver: Postcrash Testing

- Hemoglobin A1C: 11.4%
 - > 6.4% indicates diabetes
 - > 9% indicates poorly controlled diabetes
- Poorly controlled diabetes
- Effect of the driver's diabetes on the safety of his driving is unknown

FMCSA and Diabetes Guidance

- CME missed an opportunity to diagnose and treat the motorcoach driver's diabetes
- CMEs include healthcare providers without experience in diagnosing or treating diabetes
- FMCSA does not provide guidance on interpretation of urine dip tests

Summary

- Truck Driver: undiagnosed, untreated moderate-to-severe OSA
- Motorcoach Driver: undiagnosed, poorly controlled diabetes
- Ensuring Fitness for Duty remains on the NTSB Most Wanted List



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Oversight of Commercial Vehicle Drivers and Carriers

Shawn Currie

Overview

- Tri-State Collision
 - FMCSA carrier oversight
 - Hours-of-service (HOS) oversight

FMCSA Carrier Oversight

- May 2011 - New entrant audit
- October 2011 - Notice of failure
- November 2011 - Corrective action plan approved

FMCSA Carrier Oversight (continued)

- HOS alerts
 - August 2013 to present
- No intervention until postcrash compliance review
 - NTSB recommendation H-14-27 on conducting compliance review after failed new entrant audit

HOS Compliance

- Carrier used safety consultant to verify compliance
- Safety consultant checked hours of service against fuel receipts

HOS Compliance (continued)

- Truck-tractor was equipped with GPS
- A review of the GPS data revealed violations and false entries
- Violations of the 11-, 14-, and 70-hour rules were noted from October 15 until the crash
- Oversight of paper logbooks would have been insufficient to detect HOS violations

Summary

- FMCSA had no intervention with the carrier after the failed new entrant audit
- Carrier did not utilize all of the technology available to validate its drivers' logbooks



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Emergency Egress

Thomas Barth, PhD

Overview

- Motorcoach Emergency Egress
 - Evacuation postcrash event
 - Emergency response
 - Motorcoach design

Survival Factors




Figure not to scale

Injuries:

Red: Fatal Yellow: Serious Grey: Minor

Emergency Egress

- Intrusion of the semitrailer
 - Reduced evacuation points of egress
 - Limited evacuation space
- Emergency exit window challenges
 - Retaining opening for victims and responders
 - Height of windows inside and outside motorcoach

Emergency Response

- Fire/Rescue
 - Arrived quickly
 - Made proper use of tools
- Evacuation challenges
 - Cut “doors” in the sides of the motorcoach
 - Required > 2.5 hours for all victim extrication and transport

Motorcoach Design

- Secondary service door
 - Applications exist for handicap access and in Europe
 - Permitted under FMVSS
- Use of secondary door for emergency egress
 - Mitigate evacuation challenges
 - NTSB recommendation H-15-13

Summary

- Passenger evacuation and extrication challenges
- Secondary service doors can expedite evacuation and improve responder access
- Can also improve injury outcomes



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Collision Avoidance Systems

Jerome Cantrell

Overview

- Mechanical systems inspection of motorcoach
- Collision avoidance systems

Exclusions

- Mechanical systems
 - Steering
 - Suspension
 - Brake
 - Electrical
 - Drivetrain
 - Tires & wheels

Commercial Vehicle Collision Avoidance Systems

- Motorcoach not equipped with collision avoidance system
- Collision avoidance systems
 - No performance standards
 - Not required

Recommendation History

- NTSB has advocated for collision avoidance technologies for more than 20 years
- 2015 Special Investigation Report
 - Development of performance standards and installation as standard equipment
 - NTSB recommendations H-15-5, -8, and -9
- NTSB Most Wanted List

Summary

- Collision avoidance technologies
 - Designed for rear-end crashes
 - Alert the driver
 - Mitigate crash severity

