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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation M-95-058
Details
Synopsis: ON 10/8/94, THE LIBERIAN TANKSHIP SEAL ISLAND WAS MOORED AT THE HESS OIL REFINERY IN ST. CROIX U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS WHEN A FIRE ERUPTED IN THE ENGINEROOM. THREE CREWMEMBERS DIED AND SIX OTHER CREWMEMBERS WERE SERIOUSLY INJURED IN THE FIRE. THE VESSEL'S ENGINEROOM, ACCOMODATIONS HOUSE, & PILOTHOUSE WERE DAMAGED SUCH THAT THE SEAL ISLAND WAS DECLARED "NO LONGER A USEFUL CARRIER" AND ITS OWNER, THE SEAL ISLAND SHIPPING CORPORATION, HAD IT TOWED TO SPAIN WHERE IT WAS SOLD AS SCRAP FOR $12 MILLION.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE USCG: PROPOSE TO THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION THAT ALL VESSELS BE REQUIRED TO INSTALL SPRAY SHIELDS BETWEEN LUBRICATING AND FUEL OIL STRAINERS AND POTENTIAL IGNITION SOURCES.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Marine
Location: Harbor, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA95MM001
Accident Reports:
Engineroom Fire on Board the Liberian Tankship Seal Island while Moored at the Amerada Hess Oil Terminal
Report #: MAR-95-04
Accident Date: 10/8/1994
Issue Date: 12/22/1995
Date Closed: 3/5/2004
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: USCG (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: USCG
Date: 3/5/2004
Response: The Safety Board is pleased to learn that the IMO has implemented regulations requiring the installation of spray shields between lubricating and fuel oil strainers and potential ignition sources on all vessels. Specifically, the Board notes that the 2000 amendments to SOLAS, 1974, Chapter II-2, Regulations 4.2.2.5.3, 4.2.2.6, and 4.2.3.1, now require that lubricating oil systems be treated the same as oil fuel systems in regard to their isolation from heated surfaces. Thus, fuel and lubricating oil piping must be arranged so that it is far apart from hot surfaces, electrical installations, or other sources of ignition, and must be screened or suitably protected to avoid oil spray or oil leakage onto ignition sources. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-95-58 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: USCG
To: NTSB
Date: 11/21/2003
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 11/24/2003 11:46:52 AM MC# 2030571 The 2000 amendments to SOLAS Chapter II-2 now requires in Regulations 4.2.2.5.3, 4.2.2.6, and 4.2.3.1, that lubricating oil systems be treated the same as oil fuel systems in regard to their isolation from heated surfaces. Fuel and lubricating oil piping must be arranged so that it is far apart from hot surfaces, electrical installations or other sources of ignition and must be screened or suitably protected to avoid oil spray or oil leakage onto ignition sources. The Coast Guard believes that these regulations provide the level of safety envisioned by this recommendation. We consider our action on this recommendation complete and request that it be closed.

From: NTSB
To: USCG
Date: 9/19/2001
Response: The Safety Board notes that in its August 1996 response, the Coast Guard concurred with this recommendation and indicated that it would work with the Navy and others to study the feasibility of spray shields and that it would take the results of these efforts to IMO for inclusion in SOLAS, if appropriate. The Safety Board is disappointed about the time that has lapsed since this recommendation was issued; however, the Board notes that the Coast Guard is presently evaluating research on fuel/lube oil filters onboard vessels. One of the recommendations of the research is to install spray shields. The Board understands that the Coast Guard will propose to the IMO the installation of spray shields in conjunction with localized fire extinguishing systems. Pending receipt of further information from the Coast Guard on the outcome of this proposal at IMO, Safety Recommendation M-95-58 is classified “Open--Acceptable Response.” The Safety Board encourages the Coast Guard to complete this action without delay.

From: NTSB
To: USCG
Date: 3/6/2001
Response: The Safety Board is continuing to review its safety recommendation files to identify recommendations for which there has been no correspondence for an extended period of time. Our review indicates that currently, 79 safety recommendations that have been issued to the Coast Guard are being held in an "Open" status; no information was provided in the Coast Guard’s July 31, 2000, letter regarding these recommendations. In some cases, action on these 78 recommendations has not been reported for some time; for recommendations issued in 2000, there has been no response at all to the original recommendation letter. Enclosed is a list of these safety recommendations.

From: NTSB
To: USCG
Date: 7/14/1998
Response: NTSB REQUESTED A FOLLOWUP.

From: NTSB
To: USCG
Date: 5/21/1997
Response: BECAUSE THE CG STATES THAT IT GENERALLY AGREES WITH THIS RECOMMENDATION AND WILL CHECK WITH THE NAVY AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS ON THE FEASIBILITY OF REQUIRING SPRAY SHIELDS, RECOMMENDATION M-95-58 WILL BE CLASSIFIED "OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE, " PENDING FURTHER RESPONSE FROM THE CG ON IMPLEMENTING THIS RECOMMENDATION. THE BOARD WOULD APPRECIATE PERIODIC UPDATES ON THE STATUS OF THIS INITIATIVE.

From: USCG
To: NTSB
Date: 8/6/1996
Response: WE CONCUR WITH THE INTENT OF THIS RECOMMENDATION. BECAUSE THE SEAL ISLAND FIRE WAS A RESULT OF HUMAN ERROR AND IMPROPER MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR PROCEDURES, WE ARE SOMEWHAT HESITANT TO ENDORSE A MECHANICAL MEANS TO MITIGATE THE EFFECTS OF FUTURE HUMAN ERRORS. HOWEVER, HAD THERE BEEN SOME FORM OF A SPRAY SHIELD BETWEEN THE TURBINE AND THE OIL STRAINER, IT COULD HAVE PROTECTED THE CREW FROM THEIR OWN ERRORS. REGARDLESS OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIS CASUALTY SUPPORTS THE INSTALLATION OF SPRAY SHIELDS, OTHER CASUALTIES SUPPORT THIS RECOMMENDATION. THE U.S. NAVY'S APPARENT SUCCESS EMPLOYING THIS RELATIVELY SIMPLE PREVENTIVE MEASURE IS ENCOURAGING. WE WILL WORK WITH THE U.S. NAVY AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS WHO HAVE EXPERIENCE WITH SPRAY SHIELDS TO STUDY THE FEASIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE DEVICES. WE WILL TAKE THE RESULTS OF THESE EFFORTS TO IMO FOR INCLUSION IN SOLAS IF APPROPRIATE. FINALLY, THE CG'S ONGOING PREVENTION THROUGH PEOPLE PROGRAM WILL INCLUDE A SEGMENT TO IMPROVE AWARENESS BY VESSEL OPERATORS, OWNERS AND SURVEYORS OF THE HAZARDS CREATED BY IMPROPER MAINTENANCE OF PRESSURIZED FUEL OIL AND LUBRICATING OIL EQUIPMENT. CG REQUESTS THAT THE STATUS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION BE CHANGED TO OPEN--ACCEPTABLE ACTION.