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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation R-10-013
Details
Synopsis: On Monday, June 22, 2009, about 4:58 p.m., eastern daylight time, inbound WMATA Metrorail train 112 struck the rear of stopped inbound Metrorail train 214. The accident occurred on aboveground track on the Metrorail Red Line near the Fort Totten station in Washington, D.C. The lead car of train 112 struck the rear car of train 214, causing the rear car of train 214 to telescope1 into the lead car of train 112, resulting in a loss of occupant survival space in the lead car of about 63 feet (about 84 percent of its total length). Nine people aboard train 112, including the train operator, were killed. Emergency response agencies reported transporting 52 people to local hospitals. Damage to train equipment was estimated to be $12 million.
Recommendation: TO THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY: Based on the findings of the safety analysis recommended in R-10-12 incorporate the design, operational, and maintenance controls necessary to address potential failures in the automatic train control system.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Railroad
Location: Washington, D.C., DC, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA09MR007
Accident Reports: Collision of Two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail Trains Near Fort Totten Station
Report #: RAR-10-02
Accident Date: 6/22/2009
Issue Date: 8/10/2010
Date Closed: 6/25/2014
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Transit, Positive Train Control, Maintenance

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Date: 6/25/2014
Response: The executive summary of your analysis states that “WMATA is currently in the phase of implementing control measures identified in the Safety Analysis, thus it is expected that NTSB Recommendation R-10-13 will be satisfied once this implementation is complete.” We contacted Mr. Louis Brown, Assistant Chief Safety Officer, to inquire whether action to address Safety Recommendation R-10-13 had been completed. Mr. Brown reported that, although some other measures will still take many months to implement, ATC control measures to satisfy the priority safety conditions have been fully implemented and no findings are open that would require WMATA to remove equipment from service. Because you have incorporated the design, operational, and maintenance controls necessary to address potential failures in the ATC system, Safety Recommendation R-10-13 is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 4/30/2014
Response: -From James M. Dougherty, Chief Safety Officer: In collective review of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) "Open Acceptable" National Transportation Safety Board recommendations, the attached documentation is provided to support the closure of recommendation R-10-012 and R-10-13. To satisfy this finding, WMATA is providing a copy of the "Automatic Train Control Safety Analysis" that was completed by our consultant with reference to the WMATA automatic train control system. The initiation of this study demonstrates our goal of making safety the top priority throughout the Metrorail system. Please review the enclosed documentation.

From: NTSB
To: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Date: 10/23/2013
Response: We encourage you to submit your reply regarding actions to address Safety Recommendations R-08-4, R-09-16, R-10-12, R-10-13, R-10-16, R-10-17, R-10-20, R-10-21, and R-10-22 at the following e-mail address: correspondence@ntsb.gov. If your response, including attachments, exceeds 10 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

From: NTSB
To: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Date: 4/5/2011
Response: The NTSB notes that WMATA intends to use the analysis results as the basis for remediating and correcting identified issues. In addition, we note (1) that WMATA has implemented a new quarterly procedure (T-163) to test for parasitic oscillation, (2) that WMATA engineers conduct twice-daily LOS analysis of the ATC system to identify any track circuits that display parasitic oscillation, and (3) that WMATA planned to continue this practice until the completion of the real-time alert system, which was implemented in December 2010. WMATA is now capable of monitoring real-time operations of the rail system through the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC), and testing continues to ensure the effective use of audio and visual alarms in the ROCC. Accordingly, pending completion of these efforts, Safety Recommendation R-10-13 is classified OPEN – ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 11/4/2010
Response: MC# 201000408: - From Richard Sarles, General Manager: WMATA is fully committed to implementing the results of the analysis to ensure a safer and more reliable system.