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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation R-10-012
Details
Synopsis: On Monday, June 22, 2009, about 4:58 p.m., eastern daylight time, inbound WMATA Metrorail train 112 struck the rear of stopped inbound Metrorail train 214. The accident occurred on aboveground track on the Metrorail Red Line near the Fort Totten station in Washington, D.C. The lead car of train 112 struck the rear car of train 214, causing the rear car of train 214 to telescope1 into the lead car of train 112, resulting in a loss of occupant survival space in the lead car of about 63 feet (about 84 percent of its total length). Nine people aboard train 112, including the train operator, were killed. Emergency response agencies reported transporting 52 people to local hospitals. Damage to train equipment was estimated to be $12 million.
Recommendation: TO THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY: Conduct a comprehensive safety analysis of the Metrorail automatic train control system to evaluate all foreseeable failures of this system that could result in a loss of train separation, and work with your train control equipment manufacturers to address in that analysis all potential failure modes that could cause a loss of train detection, including parasitic oscillation, cable faults and placement, and corrugated rail.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Railroad
Location: Washington, D.C., DC, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA09MR007
Accident Reports: Collision of Two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail Trains Near Fort Totten Station
Report #: RAR-10-02
Accident Date: 6/22/2009
Issue Date: 8/10/2010
Date Closed: 6/25/2014
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Positive Train Control, Transit

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Date: 6/25/2014
Response: We have reviewed a copy of the comprehensive “Automatic Train Control Safety Analysis,” which satisfies the requirements of Safety Recommendation R-10-12. Accordingly, the recommendation is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 4/30/2014
Response: -From James M. Dougherty, Chief Safety Officer: In collective review of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) "Open Acceptable" National Transportation Safety Board recommendations, the attached documentation is provided to support the closure of recommendation R-10-012 and R-10-13. To satisfy this finding, WMATA is providing a copy of the "Automatic Train Control Safety Analysis" that was completed by our consultant with reference to the WMATA automatic train control system. The initiation of this study demonstrates our goal of making safety the top priority throughout the Metrorail system. Please review the enclosed documentation.

From: NTSB
To: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Date: 10/23/2013
Response: We encourage you to submit your reply regarding actions to address Safety Recommendations R-08-4, R-09-16, R-10-12, R-10-13, R-10-16, R-10-17, R-10-20, R-10-21, and R-10-22 at the following e-mail address: correspondence@ntsb.gov. If your response, including attachments, exceeds 10 megabytes, please e-mail us at the same address for instructions. Please do not submit both an electronic copy and a hard copy of the same response.

From: NTSB
To: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Date: 7/19/2012
Response: The NTSB notes that WMATA has contracted with Hatch Mott MacDonald to perform the recommended safety analysis of the ATC system and have reviewed the contractor’s plan for this analysis. Pending completion of this project and our review of its results, Safety Recommendation R-10-12 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 6/10/2011
Response: CC# 201100318: - From James M. Dougherty, WSO-CSSD, Chief Safety Officer: Consistent with our discussions held on May 3, 2011, in collective review of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) "Open Acceptable" National Transportation Safety Board recommendations, the enclosed documentation is provided to support the closure of recommendation R-07-024. As requested, WMATA is providing information on our wheel truing procedures, along with examples of audits conducted by the Quality Assurance and Warranty department, whose responsibilities include, verification of accurate wheel truing at all locations.

From: NTSB
To: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Date: 4/5/2011
Response: The NTSB notes that WMATA has hired two companies to conduct a safety analysis of the Metrorail ATC system and address all foreseeable failures identified as a result of the analysis. The analysis will focus on potential failure modes that could cause a loss of train detection or loss of shunt (LOS) detection, and establish mitigation efforts to resolve them. Pending completion of this analysis, Safety Recommendation R-10-12 is classified OPEN – ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 11/4/2010
Response: MC# 201000408: - From Richard Sarles, General Manager: WMATA has retained two independent firms, Hatch Mott MacDonald and Parsons, to perform a rigorous safety analysis of the automatic train control system and provide recommendations to address potential failures identified as a result of the analysis. The analysis will focus on the potential for LOS conditions, and the processes and procedures to establish mitigation efforts to resolve LOS. It also addresses recurring maintenance issues, communication of ATC issues, and integration of the various components that are required for reliable ATC performance; inclusive of track, traction power, and periodic testing procedures. The analysis results will provide the basis from which WMATA will develop remediation and corrective actions of identified issues. The focus of the analysis will also examine long term condition assessments, new technologies to improve reliability, maintenance, response to corrective actions, and automatic status/health information of the system.