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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation R-10-011
Details
Synopsis: On Monday, June 22, 2009, about 4:58 p.m., eastern daylight time, inbound WMATA Metrorail train 112 struck the rear of stopped inbound Metrorail train 214. The accident occurred on aboveground track on the Metrorail Red Line near the Fort Totten station in Washington, D.C. The lead car of train 112 struck the rear car of train 214, causing the rear car of train 214 to telescope1 into the lead car of train 112, resulting in a loss of occupant survival space in the lead car of about 63 feet (about 84 percent of its total length). Nine people aboard train 112, including the train operator, were killed. Emergency response agencies reported transporting 52 people to local hospitals. Damage to train equipment was estimated to be $12 million.
Recommendation: TO THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY: Completely remove the unnecessary Metrorail wayside maintenance communication system to eliminate its potential for interfering with the proper functioning of the train control system.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Railroad
Location: Washington, D.C., DC, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA09MR007
Accident Reports: Collision of Two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail Trains Near Fort Totten Station
Report #: RAR-10-02
Accident Date: 6/22/2009
Issue Date: 8/10/2010
Date Closed: 10/23/2013
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Transit, Positive Train Control

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Date: 10/23/2013
Response: We are pleased that the recommended action was completed in March 2013 by Systems Maintenance. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation R 10-11 is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 6/6/2013
Response: -From James M. Dougherty, WSO-CSSD, Chief Safety Officer: I want to personally thank you for taking the time out of your schedule to meetwith members of my staff on May 23, 2013, to discuss the WashingtonMetropolitan Area Transit Authority's (WMATA), National Transportation SafetyBoard (NTSB) recommendations that are currently classified "Open AcceptableAction". It is my belief that the dialogue, along with the documentation that wasprovided to support the closure of several recommendations, will assist theNTSB in its evaluation of WMATA's progress and move these recommendationsto closure. Enclosed is a listing of all of the items in which closure documentation wasprovided during the meeting. WMATA would like to thank the NTSB for its consideration and support as wecontinue to demonstrate our goal of making safety a top priority for both ouremployees and patrons. We look forward to continued meetings with the NTSBwhere we can exchange technical information in support of our common goal. Provided documentation which verifies that all unnecessary items have been identified and removed.

From: NTSB
To: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Date: 4/5/2011
Response: The NTSB notes that WMATA is identifying locations throughout the Metrorail system where its maintenance communication system exists and is developing a plan to disable and/or remove the system to prevent interference with the automatic train control system. We are aware that Phase I began, as scheduled, in December 2010. We encourage expeditious action by WMATA to complete this effort. Pending complete removal of the unnecessary communications system, Safety Recommendation R-10-11 is classified OPEN – ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 11/4/2010
Response: CC# 201000408: - From Richard Sarles, General Manager: WMATA is currently working to identify all locations throughout the rail system where unnecessary wayside communication equipment exists, and is developing a plan to disable and/or remove it. The first phase for removal is scheduled before the end of the calendar year 2010.