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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation M-02-004
Details
Synopsis: On May 1, 1999, the amphibious passenger vehicle Miss Majestic, with an operator and 20 passengers on board, entered Lake Hamilton near Hot Springs, Arkansas, on a regular excursion tour. Shortly after entering the water, the vehicle listed to port and rapidly sank by the stern in 60 feet of water. One passenger escaped before the vehicle submerged but the remaining passengers and the operator were trapped by the vehicle's canopy roof and drawn under water. During the vehicle's descent to the bottom of the lake, 6 passengers and the operator were able to escape and, upon their reaching the water's surface, were rescued by pleasure boaters. The remaining 13 passengers, including 3 children, lost their lives. The vehicle damage was estimated at $100,000.
Recommendation: The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following safety recommendations to the U.S. Coast Guard: Develop and promulgate guidance for all amphibious passenger vehicles similar in purpose to the Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular 1-01.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Marine
Location: Other Lakes, AR, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA99MM021
Accident Reports:
Sinking of the Amphibious Passenger Vessel Miss Majestic
Report #: MAR-02-01
Accident Date: 5/1/1999
Issue Date: 5/2/2002
Date Closed: 10/5/2007
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: USCG (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: USCG
Date: 10/5/2007
Response: The Safety Board has again reviewed NVIC 1-01, and after discussion with Coast Guard staff has learned that NVIC 1-01, while initially intended for DUWK APVs, has been used since 2001 as the primary guidance for all classes of APVs. Therefore, because NVIC 1-01 provides sufficient information and guidance for OCMIs, owners, and operators to evaluate all types of amphibious vehicles and to make the necessary determinations within the regulations to ensure an equivalent level of safety, Safety Recommendation M-02-4 is classified Closed Acceptable Action.

From: USCG
To: NTSB
Date: 1/30/2007
Response: No change since 9/5/02 response: We concur with this recommendation. Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 1-01 provides supplemental guidance for the certification of all passenger carrying amphibious vehicles. It provides guidance to Officers in Charge, Marine Inspection, owners, and operators to ensure that the risks presented by the unique features of amphibious vehicles are addressed. While specific guidance has been provided for the DUKW type of amphibious passenger vehicle, we believe the NVIC provides sufficient information and guidance for Officers in Charge, Marine Inspection (OCMIs), owners, and operators to evaluate any type of amphibious vehicle and to make the necessary determinations within the regulations to ensure an equivalent level of safety. We intend to take no further action on this recommendation and request that it be closed.

From: NTSB
To: USCG
Date: 5/6/2003
Response: The Safety Board notes that the Coast Guard concurs with this recommendation but believes that NVIC 1-01 provides supplemental guidance for the certification of all passenger-carrying amphibious vehicles. Although the Coast Guard concurs that specific guidance has been provided for the DUKW type of APV, it believes the NVIC also provides sufficient information and guidance for OCMIs, owners, and operators to evaluate any type of amphibious vehicle and to make the necessary determinations within the regulations to ensure an equivalent level of safety. In reviewing NVIC 1-01, the Safety Board found that it does not address the inspection issues of other types of APVs such as Larks, Stalwarts, and hydroterras. Therefore, guidance and background information relating to maintenance, inspection, and operation of these types of APVs is not readily available for use by owners, operators, refurbishers, and inspectors. The Board believes that the industry and Coast Guard inspectors need to become familiar with the unique safety issues and general background for all types of APVs. However, because the Coast Guard indicates that it concurs with this recommendation and believes that NVIC 1-01 provides sufficient guidance for all types of APVs, the Safety Board requests that the Coast Guard demonstrate how Larks, Stalwarts, and hydroterras are complying with NVIC 1-01. Pending further response from the Coast Guard on this issue, Safety Recommendation M-02-4 is classified "Open--Acceptable Response."

From: USCG
To: NTSB
Date: 9/5/2002
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 09/17/2002 12:51:03 PM MC# 2020819 - From RADM Paul J. Pluta, Commandant for Marine Safety, Security and Environmental Protection We have reviewed the National Transportation Safety Board’s safety recommendation letter dated May 2, 2002, concerning the sinking of the amphibious passenger vehicle MISS MAJESTIC on Lake Hamilton, near Hot Springs, Arkansas, on May 1, 1999. As a result of its investigation of this casualty, the Board issued recommendations M-02-1 through -4 to the U.S. Coast Guard. The following is our response to these recommendations. Recommendation M-02-04: Develop and promulgate guidance for all amphibious passenger vehicles similar in purpose to the Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular l-01. Response: We concur with this recommendation. Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) I-01 provides supplemental guidance for the certification of all passenger carrying amphibious vehicles. It provides guidance to Officers in Charge, Marine Inspection, owners, and operators to ensure that the risks presented by the unique features of amphibious vehicles are addressed. While specific guidance has been provided for the DUKW type of amphibious passenger vehicle, we believe the NVIC provides sufficient information and guidance for Officers in Charge, Marine Inspection (OCMIs), owners, and operators to evaluate any type of amphibious vehicle and to make the necessary determinations within the regulations to ensure an equivalent level of safety. We intend to take no further action on this recommendation and request that it be closed.