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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation M-01-018
Details
Synopsis: The recommendation addresses the following safety issues: the adequacy of shipboard training and drills in firefighting management for masters and other officers; the adequacy of Holland America Lines Westours, Inc.'s (Holland America's) policies, procedures, training, and drills for limiting and controlling the spread of smoke during a fire; and the adequacy of Holland America's safety management oversight of shipboard firefighting operations. The recommendation is derived from the Safety Board's investigation of the fire on board the Netherlands-registered ship Nieuw Amsterdam near Glacier Bay National Park, AK, on 5/23/00, and is consistent with the evidence we found and the analysis we performed. As a result of this investigation, the Safety Board has issued six safety recommendations, one of which is addressed to the cruise line companies listed on the attachment. Information supporting the recommendation is discussed below. The Safety Board would appreciate a response from you within 90 days addressing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement our recommendation.
Recommendation: The NTSB recommends to the cruise companies, including their subsidiary operating cruise lines, where applicable: Review the circumstances of the 5/23/00, fire on board the Netherlands-registered passenger ship Nieuw Amsterdam, in particular, the unauthorized use of electrical appliances by the crew and the company's smoke control management policies and procedures. Based on your review, make changes, as appropriate, to improve fire safety on your ships.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Marine
Location: Bays, AK, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA00MM027
Accident Reports:
Fire on Board the Netherlands-Registered Passenger Ship Nieuw Amsterdam
Report #: MBR-01-01
Accident Date: 5/23/2000
Issue Date: 8/8/2001
Date Closed: 11/26/2006
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: American Classic Voyages Company (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Crystal Cruises (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Disney Cruise Line (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Norwegian Cruise Line (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Norwegian Cruise Line, Orient Lines (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Princess Cruise Lines (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Radisson Seven Seas Cruises (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Regal Cruises (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Renaissance Cruises, Inc. (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Royal Olympic Cruises (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Silversea Cruises Ltd. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: Royal Olympic Cruises
Date: 2/25/2003
Response: Your letter indicates that Royal Olympic has instituted a policy to control the use of electrical appliances and ensure that only authorized appliances are used. The company enforces compliance by weekly inspections of crew spaces by the vessel's master; company safety circulars, including guidance on the use of appliances in the employee handbook; and lectures on safety. In addition, Royal Olympic outfits its vessels with fog-generating equipment to provide realism in training the company's officers and crews to fight shipboard fires. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-18 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Royal Olympic Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 12/13/2002
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 12/18/2002 3:15:10 PM MC# 2021047 It is the Company's Policy to control the use of personal electrical appliances by: · Masters weekly inspection. · Circular letters (attached). · Instructions included in the Employee Handbook. · Safety Lectures. Our ships are provided with fog generating machine for the training of our officers and crew.

From: NTSB
To: Royal Olympic Cruises
Date: 11/12/2002
Response: On April 25, 2002, the Safety Board asked Royal Olympic Cruises for information on action that had been taken or was planned to implement this recommendation. To date, the Safety Board has not received a response from Royal Olympic Cruises on any of these recommendations. The Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement these recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Carol J. Carmody, Acting Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letters and related correspondence are enclosed for your reference.

From: NTSB
To: Royal Olympic Cruises
Date: 4/25/2002
Response: To date, the Safety Board has not received a response from Royal Olympic Cruises on this safety recommendation and would appreciate learning what action has been taken or planned to be taken to implement the recommendation. The Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure the public the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. Enclosed is a copy of the Board's August 8, 2001, letter for your reference. Please address your response to Ms. Marion C. Blakey, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendation by number in your response.

From: NTSB
To: Silversea Cruises Ltd.
Date: 5/2/2007
Response: The Safety Board is pleased to learn that Silversea includes fire safety in the onboard orientations for all crewmembers, and that it conducted the requested review and implemented appropriate changes on its four vessels. The Board notes that the Welcome Aboard handbook distributed to new crewmembers includes a review of Silversea’s smoke control policies and procedures, and electrical safety warnings. We further note that Silversea fire safety policy is posted on the safety notice boards on board the vessels and is distributed to all crewmembers, and weekly inspections of crew accommodations include safety checks for unauthorized electrical equipment. These actions fully satisfy the recommendation. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-18 is classified Closed Acceptable Action.

From: Silversea Cruises Ltd.
To: NTSB
Date: 12/21/2006
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 12/22/2006 1:54:17 PM MC# 2060613: As of today’s date, all four (4) of our vessels are in full compliance with recommendation M-01-18. We have improved fire safety measures onboard all vessels in order to comply with this suggestion. Fire safety has been included in our onboard orientations for all crew members and in our Welcome Aboard handbook which is distributed to newly hired crew - this includes a review of Silversea’s smoke control policies and procedures as well as electrical safety warnings. Weekly inspections of crew accommodations have been established, which include safety checks for unauthorized electrical equipment. Circular letter 002/04 SS dated May 8, 2004, has been posted on the safety notice boards onboard the vessels and is distributed to all crew.

From: NTSB
To: Silversea Cruises Ltd.
Date: 11/28/2006
Response: On November 12, 2002, on May 28, 2004, and on December 12, 2005, the Safety Board requested information from Silversea Cruises, Ltd., on actions taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendations M-00-6 and -7, and M-01-18. To date the Board has received no further information regarding Safety Recommendations M-00-6 and -7, nor have we received a response on actions either taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-01-18. On at least three occasions, Safety Board staff has exchanged e-mails with your staff requesting information on the status of implementing these recommendations. Although your staff indicated that a response would be forthcoming, the Board has received no further information from Silversea Cruises, Ltd. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations M-00-6 and -7 are classified "Closed--Unacceptable Action," and Safety Recommendation M-01-18 is classified "Closed--Unacceptable Action/No Response Received." Should the Safety Board receive a timely response indicating action taken or planned to address these recommendations, the Board will consider reevaluating the classification of these recommendations.

From: NTSB
To: Silversea Cruises Ltd.
Date: 12/12/2005
Response: On November 12, 2002, the Safety Board requested information from Silversea Cruises, on actions taken or planned to be taken to implement Safety Recommendation M-01-18. In addition, on at least 3 occasions, Safety Board staff has exchanged e-mails with your staff requesting information on the status of implementing these recommendations. While your staff has indicated that a response would be forthcoming, the Safety Board has not received any further information from Silversea Cruises regarding these recommendations. The Safety Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement these recommendations; if we do not receive a substantive reply, we will have little alternative but to classify these recommendations as unacceptable. Please refer to the recommendations by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letters and related correspondence are enclosed for your reference.

From: Silversea Cruises Ltd.
To: NTSB
Date: 11/3/2004
Response: email: In regard of the NTSB Safety Recommendations, the subject is not ignored at this time. We are at the moment making an assessment of what is fitted (or not) on Silversea vessels. Understand this issue goes on since long time now but we had to go back to the time of previous management to recollect situation. We will come back to you with the status asap.

From: NTSB
To: Silversea Cruises Ltd.
Date: 5/28/2004
Response: On April 25, 2002, and on November 12, 2002, the Safety Board requested information from Silversea Cruises, Ltd., on the action taken or planned to be taken to implement Safety Recommendation M-01-18. The Safety Board has not received any further information from Silversea Cruises regarding these recommendations. The Safety Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement the recommendation. Please address your response to Ms. Ellen Engelman Conners, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendation by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letter and related correspondence is enclosed for your reference. Please call me at 202-314-6174 or by email at brownm@ntsb.gov if you have any questions.

From: NTSB
To: Silversea Cruises Ltd.
Date: 11/12/2002
Response: On April 25, 2002, the Safety Board requested information from Silversea Cruises, Ltd., on the action taken or planned to be taken to implement Safety Recommendation M-01-18. The Safety Board has not received any further information from Silverseas Cruises regarding these recommendations. The Safety Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement these recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Carol J. Carmody, Acting Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letters and related correspondence are enclosed for your reference.

From: NTSB
To: Silversea Cruises Ltd.
Date: 4/25/2002
Response: To date, the Safety Board has not received a response from Silversea on this safety recommendation and would appreciate learning what action has been taken or planned to be taken to implement the recommendation. The Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure the public the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others.

From: NTSB
To: Regal Cruises
Date: 12/26/2001
Response: The Safety Board is pleased that International Shipping Partners (ISP), acting as technical managers for Regal Cruises, has reviewed the circumstances of this accident, has taken action to address the company's prohibition of unauthorized electrical appliances by vessel personnel, and has reassessed the company's smoke control management policies and procedures to improve fire safety on company vessels, as requested. In addition, the Board notes that ISP provided a comprehensive review of the fire's circumstances to all company masters restating and/or clarifying company policies and practices. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-18 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Regal Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 9/12/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 09/13/2001 4:46:06 PM MC# 2010732 We see the benefit in informing all of our fleet and your report on the incident has been forwarded to all Masters of our fleet together with the attached memo, which serves as explanation on how we have addressed this situation. To: MASTERS ALL VESSELS FROM: STEN BERGQVIST DATES: SEPTEMBER 10, 2001 RE: NTSB REPORT, SAFETY DRILLS Please find attached report from NTSB pertaining to the fire onboard the MV "Nieuw Amsterdam." After reviewing the mentioned fire incident, I felt it prudent to send this memo to all of our vessels. The report addresses several issues, which I will mention in chronological order ending with my own comments. The fire started with a fire in an unattended coffee maker in a crew cabin. I want to Stress the importance of the cabin inspections already included in our SMS. Also, please note that soonest you will receive a revision of the Operations Manual saying ? any unauthorized cooking facility in crew cabins as well as any deliberate tampering with fire detection material or safety equipment will render immediate dismissal. The Quartermaster, who was sent to investigate an activated smoke detector, was the first person to notice smoke coming through the louvers from the mentioned cabin. When smoke of the magnitude like in this case is observed. The Fire Screen Doors should have been closed, ventilation closed down and the area evacuated Size importance of securing the f re area, in an instance like this cannot be stressed enough. As soon as smoke is detected Juice Screen Doors need to be closed, something that need to be practiced during fire drills. Also remember that Water Tight Doors Are Fire Screen Doors and need to he closed in order to prevent the spreading of smoke. I suggest that in a case like this, effected Water Tight Doors be closed locally. Another very important part in preventing the spreading of smoke, is the closing down of ventilation, which needs to be done al an early stage. Again, finis also needs to be part of the drill. Make closing of all Fire Screen Doors and closing down of ventilation a realistic part of the drill integrated in the whole emergency procedure. The person, sent to investigate the situation, who must be in contact with the bridge via radio informing about his progress, is the one to firstly initiate these steps, which include: securing of the area. Alerting people in the area and try to extinguish the fire, using hand held fire extinguisher. As soon as this person reports that he alone cannot handle the situation`, the 1st step of the emergency plan, "Mr. Skylight," must be activated, in order not to delay the extinguishing of the fire. Should he encounter excessive spread of smoke, He /5' step of the emergency plan must be activated and no attempt should be made to extinguish the fire by anybody who is not fully equipped for the task. When the Master arrived on the bridge, he ordered Be Chief Officer to investigate the area In doing so he delayed the process both ~ extinguishing of the fire as well as other parties to be assembled at their stations If like in this case the Quartermaster is being sent to the aria his reporting of the situation should have triggered: actions according to the emergency plan If his evaluation of the situation were nor to be taken seriously, he should not have been sent to the area in the first place. According to our Emergency plan, as soon as the Quartermaster reported the seriousness of this situation, Mr. Skylight should have been alerted In sending the Chief Officer to the location of the fire, the Master took too much responsibility upon himself. This also included a delay in reporting to Port State. Please remember that in our emergency plan both the Master and the Staff Captain/Chief Officer Depending on the vessel) have their emergency stations on the bridge. The Second in command should be the person in charge of the emergency operation and the blaster should overlook the operation and only intervene when he deems so is needed Please follow the contingency plan and report to all involved parties, such as Port State, when such is required. When the Chief Officer approached the area of fire, he did not report the spread of the smoke. Remember to stress this in your drills, with every crewmember. It can easily be trained with the involvement of the smoke machine. By trying to extinguish the fire the Chief Engineer and the Chief Officer delayed actions according to the emergency plan. Fire squad "Bravo" successfully extinguished the fire, but probably would have done so before it had spread to adjacent areas? If the Chief Engineer and the Chief Officer had let the emergency plan take its normal course. However, they did not act properly in having both the squad leader and his deputy fighting the fire actively, jeopardizing breakdown of the squad, should something happened to both of them. Again, remember to activate the emergency plan as early as possible, when the Quartermaster was unsuccessful in his efforts to extinguish the f re, no further attempt should have been made until the arrival of the proper fire group, but the door to the cabin should have been kept closed, which would have prevented, although not being an A60 door, the spread of the fire. Further more the two of Dicers put themselves in danger by trying to extinguish the fire without being properly equipped. At times during CV exams, the USCG officer has requested the officer at the location of the fire to be considered a casualty This is a very important part of the training A fire group needs to function with a shortfall of anybody including the leader of the group. Please stress this in your further trainings. As you can see in the report, crewmembers had been tampering with smoke detectors in order for them not to be caught, cooking in the cabins. Please have the checking of smoke defectors to be part of your scheduled crew cabin inspection and again I stress the importance of checking for unauthorized cooking facilities and over self rigged electrical installations in the crew cabins. Additionally, to the comments by NTSB, I take this opportunity to mention a few other areas of concern pertaining to the emergency plan and muster list. Evacuation of passengers and crew is a very important part of the emergency plan. In this case, as soon as smoke is observed, this area should be evacuated. When it is determined that an official announcement has to be naiads, it is important to have the announcement repeated at intervals of about 2 minutes or so in order to make sure that everyone has been properly advised about the situation. Remember the importance to have all persons out of the area and eventually all assembled at their muster stations, to have all persons accounted for, the importance of evacuation groups in achieving this, the proper use of the search and rescue groups to ascertain that all areas have been properly evacuated. Always have tile latest update of passenger and crew lists, including all late cabin changes. We understand that a certain number of crewmembers need to be excused from the drills for practical purposes. A good training would be to make sure that the crewmembers, who are on the excuse list, are being located by the search and rescue groups.

From: NTSB
To: Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.
Date: 5/24/2002
Response: Captain Wright reports that Royal Caribbean Cruises has reviewed the findings of the Safety Board's investigation and the circumstances of the May 2000 Nieuw Amsterdam fire as requested. He indicates that the company has a strict policy prohibiting the use of private electrical appliances, open flames, and any-substandard or improvised electrical arrangements on board its vessels. Captain Wright reports that these restrictions are enforced by weekly inspections, and crewmembers found in violation are subject to immediate discharge depending on the seriousness of the infraction. In addition, he provided the Board a synopsis of Royal Caribbean's smoke control management policies and procedures. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-18 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.
To: NTSB
Date: 11/30/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 02/12/2002 6:58:58 PM MC# 2020154 We have reviewed the circumstances of the May 23, 2000 fire onboard the cruise ship Nieuw Amsterdam and evaluated our own Policies and Procedures relating to smoke control and use of private electrical appliances. Royal Caribbean has a strict policy in place for use of private electrical appliances. Any cooking equipment is strictly prohibited in cabins, as are open flames (candles) and any sub-standard or improvised electrical arrangements. Compliance with this and other fire safety policies is a primary focus during the weekly occurring inspections of randomly selected crew cabins. Any crewmember found to violate fire safety policies or tamper with fire detection equipment could be discharged immediately depending on the seriousness of the violation. Our smoke control management procedures are basically focused on containing any smoke, to the extent that this is practically possible. To this end, our newer ships (built after 1995) have fire screen doors equipped with a small hatch for a fire hose to pass through. The doors can then be kept closed even while fighting a fire. The majority of our ships are built with atriums, and they all have a smoke extraction system that starts automatically whenever smoke is detected within the space. Our fire teams routinely practice smoke control as part of their weekly fire drills. The emphasis is again to limit the spread of smoke as much as possible. Theatrical smoke is used extensively for this exercises to provide realism. Additionally, all ships are equipped with Thermal Imaging cameras that allow fire teams to find "hot" areas and to conduct search and rescue in smoke filed surroundings. The standing order for any crewmember detecting smoke is to raise the alarm and then close surrounding fire screen doors in order to prevent spreading of heat and smoke. The Safety Center (Bridge) has an item in the fire checklist to remotely close fire screen doors, as well as considering a remote stop of ventilation fans/closing of fire dampers to the affected fire zone. The secret to ensure that the crewmembers stick to the established procedures is to have procedures that make sense, and are proven to work well. We are confident that this is the case with our procedures. When crewmembers have confidence in the system, they will then do their best to follow procedures. We have had fires recently (outside of US waters) where the procedures were correctly applied and proved to work well. The most important difference between the described sequence of events onboard Nieuw Amsterdam and the RCCL procedures is that we have a code word (Bravo-Bravo-Bravo) that activates the part of the emergency response organization responding to fire and damage. This is a tool that allows us to deal properly with fires and similar emergencies immediately while postponing the decision to alert the passengers, and thereby having to activate the full crowd control organization. We have this code word as an acknowledgement that most tires are minor, and can be dealt with straight off without having to muster the passengers. One important advantage of this procedure is that there is no reason to think twice before raising the alarm. The standing order for the Officer of the watch is to raise the alarm as soon as it has been confirmed that the detected smoke is real. There are three ways to reach this conclusion: 1. More than one smoke detector is activated. 2. The response guard reports that he can see smoke. 3. A phone call to the cabin confirms that there is smoke. As we can conclude from the narrative, both items 1 and 2 were confirmed, and each of these would have activated our Bravo teams. Activating the response teams is the call of the Officer of the Watch, he/she is not supposed to delay the decision process in any way by asking the Master or anyone else for permission. While we are confident that our present procedures would have adequately dealt with the events onboard the Nieuw Amsterdam, we find your investigation reports important reminders as to how accidents happen. We have issued a "Lessons Learned" memo to all ships based on the NTSB report with instructions to the Master to brief his officers and crew accordingly.

From: NTSB
To: Radisson Seven Seas Cruises
Date: 10/21/2004
Response: Because V. Ships indicates that all Radisson vessels have implemented weekly inspections of all electrical appliances in crew cabins and the company's smoke management policy and procedures have been reviewed as requested, Safety Recommendation M-01-18 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Radisson Seven Seas Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 7/16/2004
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 7/21/2004 11:11:24 AM MC# 2040435 V.Ships, management company for Radisson reports the following: Seven Seas Mariner: the electrical officer subject's electrical appliances in crew cabins to weekly checks. Weekly inspections include checks for unauthorized electrical equipment. Seven Seas Navigator, Seven Seas Voyager, and Radisson Diamond: Fire safety is part of safety and security induction on board for all crewmembers. Weekly Inspections of crew accommodation include checks for unauthorized electrical equipment.

From: NTSB
To: Radisson Seven Seas Cruises
Date: 5/28/2004
Response: On April 25, 2002, and November 12, 2002, the Safety Board requested information on the status of implementing this safety recommendation. To date the Safety Board has not received any further information from Radisson Seven Seas Cruises regarding these Safety Recommendations. The Safety Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement the recommendation. Please address your response to Ms. Ellen Engelman Conners, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendation by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letter and related correspondence is enclosed for your reference. Please call me at 202-314-6174 or by email at brownm@ntsb.gov if you have any questions.

From: NTSB
To: Radisson Seven Seas Cruises
Date: 11/12/2002
Response: The Safety Board has not received any further information from Radisson Seven Seas Cruises regarding these recommendations. The Safety Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement these recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Carol J. Carmody, Acting Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letters and related correspondence are enclosed for your reference.

From: NTSB
To: Radisson Seven Seas Cruises
Date: 4/25/2002
Response: To date, the Safety Board has not received a response from Radisson on this safety recommendation and would appreciate learning what action has been taken or planned to be taken to implement the recommendation. The Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure the public the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others.

From: NTSB
To: American Classic Voyages Company
Date: 10/3/2002
Response: Closed by Notation 6837B adopted 3 OCT 2002. From the Notation Memorandum: Because these companies have ceased operation and are being dissolved, staff recommends that safety recommendations to Renaissance and ACV be classified "Closed-No Longer Applicable" as follows: Renaissance: M-00-6 and -7, and M-01-10 and -18 AMC: M-00-6 and -7, and M-01-7 through -10 and -18

From: NTSB
To: Renaissance Cruises, Inc.
Date: 10/3/2002
Response: Closed by Notation 6837B adopted 3 OCT 2002. From the Notation Memorandum: Because these companies have ceased operation and are being dissolved, staff recommends that safety recommendations to Renaissance and ACV be classified "Closed-No Longer Applicable" as follows: Renaissance: M-00-6 and -7, and M-01-10 and -18 AMC: M-00-6 and -7, and M-01-7 through -10 and -18

From: NTSB
To: Norwegian Cruise Line, Orient Lines
Date: 9/13/2002
Response: Your letter indicated that the Group has established a comprehensive Safety and Environmental Management System, whereby both the Crown Odyssey and Marco Polo are covered by an automated fire alarm and detection system, which is monitored on a 24-hour basis. Your letter also indicated that the use of unauthorized electrical appliances by the crew is prohibited, and a process for crew accommodation inspections is in place to verify compliance. Further, your letter stated that a comprehensive training program is employed in conjunction with on board drills to familiarize the crew, fire fighting teams and operational command to the different aspects of on board fire emergencies and to establish high standards of awareness and proficiency. The Group also developed an emergency plan manual for its vessels to prevent and mitigate incidents. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-18 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Norwegian Cruise Line, Orient Lines
To: NTSB
Date: 5/30/2002
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 06/25/2002 1:13:01 PM MC# 2020625 Lines on August 8, 2001, as a result of the Safety Boards investigation of the fire onboard the passenger ship Nieuw Amsterdam in Glacier Bay, Alaska, on May 23, 2000. I would like to update you on the status of the Safety Recommendation issued to (Norwegian and) Orient Norwegian Cruise Line and Orient Lines the GROUP have establish a comprehensive SEMS (Safety and Environmental Management System). Both the Crown Odyssey and Marco Polo are covered by an automated fire alarm and detection system, which is monitored on a twenty-four hour basis. The use of unauthorized electrical appliances by the crew is prohibited, and a process of crew accommodation inspections is in place to verify compliance. As required by the STCW 95 convention our crew undergoes the required training. Based on the rank and onboard responsibilities, this training varies from advance firefighting courses to basic fire fighting and safety aspects. Apart of that, every crewmember undergoes an initial safety familiarization upon signing on. Further more, onboard drills are exercised to familiarize the fire fighting teams and operational command to the different aspects of onboard fire emergencies and establish the highest possible standards of awareness and proficiency. It will become apparent from the attached documents, which are extracts of the GROUPS safety system, that every effort has been taken not only to mitigate an incident but also to prevent an occurrence in it's route. Comprehensive procedures, inspections and exercises have been put in place not only as a response to the Safety Boards recommendations but also as a tribute to the Company's approach to Safety. Enclosed please find extracts from the system.

From: NTSB
To: Norwegian Cruise Line, Orient Lines
Date: 4/25/2002
Response: To date, the Safety Board has not received a response from Orient Lines on this safety recommendation and would appreciate learning what action has been taken or planned to be taken to implement the recommendation. The Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure the public the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others.

From: NTSB
To: Crystal Cruises
Date: 7/16/2002
Response: Crystal Cruises reports that it has reviewed the circumstances of this accident and taken action to improve the fire safety on its vessels. Specifically, Crystal Cruises has brought the problems identified in this accident to the attention of its vessel personnel and instructed its masters to ensure consideration is given to smoke management in their on-board fire-fighting training. Further, this topic will be included in the next series of fire-fighting team training sessions conducted on board the vessel under the guidance of professional fire-fighter trainers. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-18 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Crystal Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 11/29/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 12/05/2001 3:51:12 PM MC# 2010951 Crystal Cruises has established a policy of inspecting and tagging all small electrical appliances on board our vessels for the purpose of insuring the devices are appropriate and can be used safely on board. The issues raised regarding smoke control management that arose out of the Nieuw Amsterdam fire have been brought to the attention of our vessels and instruction had been given to masters to insure consideration is given to smoke management in their on board fire fighting training. Further, this topic will be included in the next series of fire fighting team training sessions conducted on board the vessel under the guidance of professional fire fighter trainers.

From: NTSB
To: Disney Cruise Line
Date: 5/24/2002
Response: On January 23, 2002, Safety Recommendation M-01-8 was classified "Open--Acceptable Response," because Disney had indicated that its ships had smoke detectors on their aft mooring decks and that the company is in the process of installing sprinkler systems. Because Disney now reports that it has completed installation of the sprinkler system on the mooring decks of its vessels as requested, Safety Recommendation M-01-8 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Disney Cruise Line
To: NTSB
Date: 3/6/2002
Response: Please be advised that sprinkler systems have been installed on the aft mooring decks of Disney Magic and Disney Wonder- in accordance with NTSB recommendation M-03 -8, which was issued as a result of the Ecstasy fire investigation

From: NTSB
To: Disney Cruise Line
Date: 2/4/2002
Response: The Safety Board is pleased to learn of Disney Cruise Line's actions in response to this recommendation. Because Disney Cruise Line has taken action as requested, Safety Recommendation M-01-18 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Disney Cruise Line
To: NTSB
Date: 11/8/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 11/13/2001 10:32:30 AM MC# 2010895 Disney Cruise Line has reviewed the findings of the NTSB investigation, in particular, the unauthorized use of electrical appliances by the crew, and the company's smoke control management policies and procedures. In addition to reviewing existing published crew cabin policies, new Fleet Instructions have been issued in the Safety Management System regarding the approval and inspection process for all electrical devices used in crew cabins. All such approved devices are to be tagged by the ship's electricians, and those found without proper tag during weekly cabin inspection will be removed, to be returned to the crewmember at the end of their contract. Guidance on smoke control is contained in the Contingency Manual and SOLAS Training Manuals of the Company's Safety Management System. These procedures are followed in regular scheduled fire drills and have been the subject of a ship/shore exercise. We appreciate your sharing the lessons learned from this incident and the opportunity to review our policies and procedures in light of these lessons.

From: NTSB
To: Norwegian Cruise Line
Date: 9/13/2002
Response: Your letter indicated that the Group has established a comprehensive Safety and Environmental Management System, whereby both the Crown Odyssey and Marco Polo are covered by an automated fire alarm and detection system, which is monitored on a 24-hour basis. Your letter also indicated that the use of unauthorized electrical appliances by the crew is prohibited, and a process for crew accommodation inspections is in place to verify compliance. Further, your letter stated that a comprehensive training program is employed in conjunction with on board drills to familiarize the crew, fire fighting teams and operational command to the different aspects of on board fire emergencies and to establish high standards of awareness and proficiency. The Group also developed an emergency plan manual for its vessels to prevent and mitigate incidents. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-18 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Norwegian Cruise Line
To: NTSB
Date: 5/30/2002
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 06/26/2002 3:24:36 PM MC# 2020625 Lines on August 8, 2001, as a result of the Safety Boards investigation of the fire onboard the passenger ship Nieuw Amsterdam in Glacier Bay, Alaska, on May 23, 2000. I would like to update you on the status of the Safety Recommendation issued to (Norwegian and) Orient Norwegian Cruise Line and Orient Lines the GROUP have establish a comprehensive SEMS (Safety and Environmental Management System). Both the Crown Odyssey and Marco Polo are covered by an automated fire alarm and detection system, which is monitored on a twenty-four hour basis. The use of unauthorized electrical appliances by the crew is prohibited, and a process of crew accommodation inspections is in place to verify compliance. As required by the STCW 95 convention our crew undergoes the required training. Based on the rank and onboard responsibilities, this training varies from advance firefighting courses to basic fire fighting and safety aspects. Apart of that, every crewmember undergoes an initial safety familiarization upon signing on. Further more, onboard drills are exercised to familiarize the fire fighting teams and operational command to the different aspects of onboard fire emergencies and establish the highest possible standards of awareness and proficiency. It will become apparent from the attached documents, which are extracts of the GROUPS safety system, that every effort has been taken not only to mitigate an incident but also to prevent an occurrence in it's route. Comprehensive procedures, inspections and exercises have been put in place not only as a response to the Safety Boards recommendations but also as a tribute to the Company's approach to Safety. Enclosed please find extracts from the system.

From: NTSB
To: Norwegian Cruise Line
Date: 4/25/2002
Response: To date, the Safety Board has not received a response from Norwegian Cruise Line regarding this safety recommendation and would appreciate learning what action has been taken or planned to be taken to implement the recommendation. The Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure the public the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. Enclosed is a copy of the Board's August 8, 2001, letter for your reference. Please address your response to Ms. Marion C. Blakey, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendation by number in your response.

From: NTSB
To: Princess Cruise Lines
Date: 6/14/2002
Response: The Safety Board notes that Princess Cruises has reviewed the circumstances of this accident. Princess Cruises' fleet prohibitions against cooking appliances that are not fitted with automatic cutoffs, and its regular inspections of crew cabins with attention to electrical appliances, satisfy the recommendation. Additionally, Princess Cruises has reviewed its smoke control policy and procedures, and conducts weekly practice fire and rescue drills in smoke filled environments. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-18 is classified "Closed-Acceptable Action."

From: Princess Cruise Lines
To: NTSB
Date: 10/30/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 01/29/2002 5:13:46 PM MC# 2020095 Our Fleet Regulations prohibit all cooking appliances in crew cabins with the exception of electric kettles/jugs, or coffeemakers fitted with automatic cutoffs. We conduct weekly rounds of crew accommodation in accordance with our UK flag state requirements, and give specific instructions to officers conducting crew rounds to pay particular attention to electrical appliances in cabins. Our initial response to an alarm is different to that described in your report. We call out an Assessment Party consisting of a key group of Officers to investigate, who have clear guidelines and training on incident containment, including ventilation and fire boundaries. Simultaneously the fire parties are alerted and prepare. Our policy is to evacuate all passengers in accommodation to the Muster Stations if there is smoke in the passenger accommodation. We practice this in weekly drills, when we regularly simulate smoke spread' if fire screen doors are not shut or ventilation does not control smoke spread properly. We also regularly practice the rescue of people from smoke filled environments.