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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-97-105
Details
Synopsis: ON 11/19/96, AT 1701 CENTRAL STANDARD TIME, UNITED EXPRESS FLIGHT 5925, A BEECHCRAFT 1900C, N87GL, COLLIDED WITH A BEECHCRAFT KING AIR A90, N1127D, AT QUINCY MUNICIPAL AIRPORT, NEAR QUINCY, ILLINOIS. FLIGHT 5925 WAS COMPLETING ITS LANDING ROLL ON RUNWAY 13, AND THE KING AIR WAS IN ITS TAKEOFF ROLL ON RUNWAY 04. A THIRD AIRPLANE, A PIPER CHEROKEE, WAS POSITIONED FOR PLANNED TAKEOFF ON RUNWAY 04 BEHIND THE KING AIR. THE COLLISION OCCURRED AT THE INTERSECTION OF THE TWO RUNWAYS. ALL 10 PASSENGERS AND TWO CREWMEMBERS ABOARD FLIGHT 5925 AND THE TWO OCCUPANTS ABOARD THE KING AIR WERE KILLED. FLIGHT 5925 WAS A SCHEDULED PASSENGER FLIGHT OPERATING UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 14 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR) PARAT 135. THE FLIGHT WAS OPERATED BY GREAT LAKES AVIATION, LTD., DOING BUSINESS AS UNITED EXPRESS. THE KING AIR WAS OPERATING UNDER 14 CFR PART 91.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAA: CONSIDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 11/19/96, QUINCY ILLINOIS, ACCIDENT WHEN DEVELOPING METHODS FOR SHOWING COMPLIANCE WITH FREEDOM FROM JAMMING REQUIREMENTS, & DETERMINE WHETHER IT IS FEASIBLE TO REQUIRE THAT DOORS BE SHOWN TO BE FREE FROM JAMMING AFTER AN IMPACT OF SIMILAR SEVERITY.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Reconsidered
Mode: Aviation
Location: QUINCY, IL, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA97MA009AB
Accident Reports: Runway Collision United Express Flight 5925 and Beechcraft King Air A90 Quincy Municipal Airport
Report #: AAR-97-04
Accident Date: 11/19/1996
Issue Date: 9/12/1997
Date Closed: 9/5/2000
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Reconsidered)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 9/6/2000
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 09/11/2000 2:53:56 PM MC# 2001260: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has completed its action in response to these safety recommendations and on June 23, 1998, provided the Board with a detailed outline of its position in response to each safety recommendation. The FAA considered its action to be completed and planned no further action. On December 1, 1998, the Board classified these safety recommendations in an "open acceptable" status pending evaluation of Raytheon's May 1998 petition for reconsideration of the Board's final report on the Quincy accident. The Board stated that its review and disposition of the petition would address in detail the issues in these safety recommendations. On April 13, 1999, the Board sent another letter to the FAA stating that its review of the Raytheon petition for reconsideration of the findings and probable cause of the accident at Quincy indicates that the issues raised in the petition are directly related to Safety Recommendations A-97-103 through -105. The Board further stated that a modification of the accident report may impact its consideration of the FAA's actions in response to these recommendations. The Safety Board anticipated completing action on Raytheon's petition in fall 1999. I am requesting a status from the Board on its response to Raytheon's petition so that we can come to closure on these safety issues. It has been almost 2 years since the FAA informed the Board of its final position in response to these safety recommendations. The FAA has reviewed the Raytheon petition and does not believe that this document impacts the FAA's position outlined in its letter dated June 23, 1998. Consequently, I ask that the Board expedite its evaluation of Raytheon's petition.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 9/5/2000
Response: IN ITS 6/23/98, LETTER, THE FAA STATED THAT IT WAS NOT FEASIBLE TO SHOW FREEDOM FROM JAMMING FOR THE 1900C DOOR BECAUSE OF THE IMPACT FORCES THAT WERE PRESENT IN THIS ACCIDENT. THE SAFETY BOARD'S REEVALUATION OF THE FACTUAL EVIDENCE IN THIS ACCIDENT CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THAT THE IMPACT FORCES FROM THE ACCIDENT WERE SURVIVABLE AND THAT THE 1900C OCCUPANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OPEN THE CABIN DOOR AND ESCAPE FROM THE AIRPLANE. THE SAFETY BOARD REMAINS CONCERNED THAT, IN THIS SURVIVABLE ACCIDENT, NONE OF THE 1900C AIRPLANE OCCUPANTS SURVIVED; ALL SUCCUMBED TO SMOKE INHALATION AND THERMAL INJURIES BECAUSE THEY WERE UNABLE TO EXIT THE AIRPLANE. HOWEVER, AS INDICATED IN THE RESPONSE TO A-97-104, THE BOARD WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT PREVENTED THE OCCUPANTS FROM EVACUATING THE AIRPLANE. BECAUSE THE INVESTIGATION DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THAT THE AIR STAIR DOOR HAD JAMMED, A-97-105 IS CLASSIFIED "CLOSED--RECONSIDERED

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 4/13/1999
Response: The FAA stated that it has completed its action in response to these safety recommendations and provided the Safety Board with a detailed outline of its position on each recommendation on June 23, 1998. The FAA stated that it planned no further action. The FAA cited the Board's December 1, 1998, letter in which these recommendations were all classified "Open-Acceptable Response" pending the Board's evaluation of Raytheon's petition for reconsideration. The FAA reported that it has reviewed the Raytheon petition and does not believe that it impacts the FAA's position as outlined in its June 23, 1998, letter. Therefore, the FAA is requesting that the Safety Board expedite its evaluation of Raytheon's petition so that these recommendations can be closed. The Safety Board's review of the Raytheon petition for reconsideration of the findings and probable cause of the accident at Quincy indicates that the issues raised in the petition are directly related to Safety Recommendations A-97-103 through -105. As such, a modification of the accident report may impact the Safety Board's consideration of the FAA's actions in response to these recommendations. The Safety Board intends to complete action on Raytheon's petition in fall 1999. Therefore, Safety Recommendations A-97-103 through -105 remain classified "Open- Acceptable Action."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 2/1/1999
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 2/5/99 3:19:38 PM MC# 9901028: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has completed its action in response to these safety recommendations and on June 23, 1998, provided the Board with a detailed outline of its position in response to each safety recommendation. The FAA considered its action to be completed and planned no further action. On December 1, 1998, the Board classified these safety recommendations in an "open acceptable" status pending evaluation of Raytheon's May 1998 petition for reconsideration of the Board's final report on the Quincy accident. However, the Board did not provide the FAA with a timeframe for completing its evaluation. The FAA has reviewed the Raytheon petition and does not believe that this document impacts the FAA's position as outlined in its letter dated June 23, 1998. Consequently, I urge the Board to expedite its evaluation of Raytheon's petition so that we can come to closure on these safety issues.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 12/1/1998
Response: The FAA stated that it evaluated the Beech 1900C door/frame system and the freedom- from-jamming certification requirements in response to Safety Recommendations A-97- 103 and A-97-104. In addition, the FAA considered the circumstances of the Quincy accident and supplemental information provided to the Safety Board by Raytheon on May 6, 1998. Using all of the factual data, the FAA determined that it is not feasible to show freedom from jamming for the door of the airplane involved in the accident because of the severity of the impact forces that were present. The Safety Board is currently reexamining the input loads of the accident as part of its evaluation of Raytheon's petition for reconsideration. Pending completion of this evaluation, Safety Recommendation A-97-105 is classified "Open-Acceptable Response."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 6/23/1998
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 6/29/98 3:44:00 PM MC# 980824: The FAA has evaluated the Beech 1900C door/frame system and the freedom from jamming certification requirements in response to Safety Recommendations A-97-103 and -104. The FAA has also considered the circumstances of the subject accident and the supplemental information provided to the Board by the Raytheon Aircraft Company on May 6, 1998. Based on the evaluation of all factual data, the FAA has determined that it is not feasible to show freedom from jamming for the door of the accident airplane because of the severity of the impact forces that were present in the subject accident. I believe that the FAA has met the full intent of this safety recommendation. I consider the FAA's action to be completed, and I plan no further action on this safety recommendation.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 11/24/1997
Response: The FAA will consider this recommendation as it develops methods for showing compliance to the freedom from jamming requirement as outlined in response to Safety Recommendation A-97-104. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on this safety recommendation.