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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-97-104
Details
Synopsis: ON 11/19/96, AT 1701 CENTRAL STANDARD TIME, UNITED EXPRESS FLIGHT 5925, A BEECHCRAFT 1900C, N87GL, COLLIDED WITH A BEECHCRAFT KING AIR A90, N1127D, AT QUINCY MUNICIPAL AIRPORT, NEAR QUINCY, ILLINOIS. FLIGHT 5925 WAS COMPLETING ITS LANDING ROLL ON RUNWAY 13, AND THE KING AIR WAS IN ITS TAKEOFF ROLL ON RUNWAY 04. A THIRD AIRPLANE, A PIPER CHEROKEE, WAS POSITIONED FOR PLANNED TAKEOFF ON RUNWAY 04 BEHIND THE KING AIR. THE COLLISION OCCURRED AT THE INTERSECTION OF THE TWO RUNWAYS. ALL 10 PASSENGERS AND TWO CREWMEMBERS ABOARD FLIGHT 5925 AND THE TWO OCCUPANTS ABOARD THE KING AIR WERE KILLED. FLIGHT 5925 WAS A SCHEDULED PASSENGER FLIGHT OPERATING UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 14 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR) PARAT 135. THE FLIGHT WAS OPERATED BY GREAT LAKES AVIATION, LTD., DOING BUSINESS AS UNITED EXPRESS. THE KING AIR WAS OPERATING UNDER 14 CFR PART 91.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAA: ESTABLISH CLEAR & SPECIFIC METHODS FOR SHOWING COMPLIANCE WITH THE FREEDOM FROM JAMMING CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Reconsidered
Mode: Aviation
Location: QUINCY, IL, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA97MA009AB
Accident Reports: Runway Collision United Express Flight 5925 and Beechcraft King Air A90 Quincy Municipal Airport
Report #: AAR-97-04
Accident Date: 11/19/1996
Issue Date: 9/12/1997
Date Closed: 9/5/2000
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Reconsidered)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 9/6/2000
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 09/11/2000 2:53:56 PM MC# 2001260: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has completed its action in response to these safety recommendations and on June 23, 1998, provided the Board with a detailed outline of its position in response to each safety recommendation. The FAA considered its action to be completed and planned no further action. On December 1, 1998, the Board classified these safety recommendations in an "open acceptable" status pending evaluation of Raytheon's May 1998 petition for reconsideration of the Board's final report on the Quincy accident. The Board stated that its review and disposition of the petition would address in detail the issues in these safety recommendations. On April 13, 1999, the Board sent another letter to the FAA stating that its review of the Raytheon petition for reconsideration of the findings and probable cause of the accident at Quincy indicates that the issues raised in the petition are directly related to Safety Recommendations A-97-103 through -105. The Board further stated that a modification of the accident report may impact its consideration of the FAA's Data Source: NTSB Recommendations to FAA and FAA Responses actions in response to these recommendations. The Safety Board anticipated completing action on Raytheon's petition in fall 1999. I am requesting a status from the Board on its response to Raytheon's petition so that we can come to closure on these safety issues. It has been almost 2 years since the FAA informed the Board of its final position in response to these safety recommendations. The FAA has reviewed the Raytheon petition and does not believe that this document impacts the FAA's position outlined in its letter dated June 23, 1998. Consequently, I ask that the Board expedite its evaluation of Raytheon's petition.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 9/5/2000
Response: AS PART OF ITS REVIEW OF RAYTHEON'S PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION, THE SAFETY BOARD REEVALUATED THE FACTUAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE INABILITY OF THE FLIGHT CREW AND PASSENGERS OF THE 1900C TO EXIT THE AIRPLANE AFTER ITS COLLISION WITH THE KING AIR A90. THE BOARD NOTES THAT EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT THE AIRPLANE'S OCCUPANTS DID NOT RECEIVE TRAUMATIC INJURIES FROM THE IMPACT AND WERE ABLE TO MOVE INSIDE THE CABIN AFTER THE ACCIDENT. HOWEVER, THE BOARD WAS NOT ABLE TO DETERMINE THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT PREVENTED THE OCCUPANTS FROM EVACUATING THE AIRPLANE. BECAUSE THE INVESTIGATION DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC EVIDENCE THAT THE 1900C'S DOOR HAD JAMMED, A-97-104 IS CLASSIFIED "CLOSED--RECONSIDERED."

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 4/13/1999
Response: The FAA stated that it has completed its action in response to these safety recommendations and provided the Safety Board with a detailed outline of its position on each recommendation on June 23, 1998. The FAA stated that it planned no further action. The FAA cited the Board's December 1, 1998, letter in which these recommendations were all classified "Open-Acceptable Response" pending the Board's evaluation of Raytheon's petition for reconsideration. The FAA reported that it has reviewed the Raytheon petition and does not believe that it impacts the FAA's position as outlined in its June 23, 1998, letter. Therefore, the FAA is requesting that the Safety Board expedite its evaluation of Raytheon's petition so that these recommendations can be closed. The Safety Board's review of the Raytheon petition for reconsideration of the findings and probable cause of the accident at Quincy indicates that the issues raised in the petition are directly related to Safety Recommendations A-97-103 through -105. As such, a modification of the accident report may impact the Safety Board's consideration of the FAA's actions in response to these recommendations. The Safety Board intends to complete action on Raytheon's petition in fall 1999. Therefore, Safety Recommendations A-97-103 through -105 remain classified "Open- Acceptable Action."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 2/1/1999
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 2/5/99 3:19:38 PM MC# 990102: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has completed its action in response to these safety recommendations and on June 23, 1998, provided the Board with a detailed outline of its position in response to each safety recommendation. The FAA considered its action to be completed and planned no further action. On December 1, 1998, the Board classified these safety recommendations in an "open acceptable" status pending evaluation of Raytheon's May 1998 petition for reconsideration of the Board's final report on the Quincy accident. However, the Board did not provide the FAA with a timeframe for completing its evaluation. The FAA has reviewed the Raytheon petition and does not believe that this document impacts the FAA's position as outlined in its letter dated June 23, 1998. Consequently, I urge the Board to expedite its evaluation of Raytheon's petition so that we can come to closure on these safety issues.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 12/1/1998
Response: The FAA stated that it conducted a thorough review of the preamble narrative; policy letters; background material; advisory circulars (ACs); and Notices of Proposed Rulemaking for Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 41A and C, doors (14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Section 23.783) and emergency exits (14 CFR Section 25.783-1). The specific guidance material related to the freedom-from-jamming requirements and the door design was contained in AC 25.783-1, and the Beech 1900C was certificated under 14 CFR Part 23 and SFAR 41C. The methods of compliance contained in AC 25.783-1 were incorporated into the Beech 1900C door design during the certification process. The FAA stated that those methods were adequate for verifying that the door design provides reasonable provisions against jamming. The FAA also stated that Raytheon proposed a new airworthiness standard for a fuselage door in 14 CFR Section 23.783(c)(5) but that the FAA's review of the proposal determined that it would provide no new substantial standards. However, the FAA is converting Raytheon's proposal into policy guidance for use by aircraft certification offices in future certification projects, and that information will appear in the forthcoming Systems Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes. The proposed text is as follows: The door and emergency exit should be free from jamming and operate properly after fuselage deformation resulting from the ultimate load factors of 14 CFR 23.561(b)(2) and the requirements of 14 CFR 23.307(a). It should also be demonstrated by tests that each door and emergency exit can be opened after exposure to each critical loading condition. Those conditions should include at least the following: the ultimate static tests loads that result from 14 CFR 23.321 through 14 CFR 23.341, and 14 CFR 23.365(a)(b); or ultimate landing design load requirements of 14 CFR 23.365(a)(c), and 14 CFR 23.471 through 14 CFR 23.485, provided they are equal to or exceed the ultimate load requirements of 14 CFR 23.561(b)(2). The Safety Board remains concerned that the guidance contained in AC 25.783-1, other current FAA documents, and the proposed wording change for the Systems Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes may not be adequate to prevent jamming of the Beech 1900C door assembly. The Safety Board staff plans to address this issue further in its review of Raytheon's petition for reconsideration. Pending completion of this review, Safety Recommendation A-97-104 is classified "Open- Acceptable Response."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 6/23/1998
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 6/29/98 3:44:00 PM MC# 980824: The FAA conducted a thorough review of the preamble narrative, policy letters and background material, advisory circulars, and Notices of Proposed Rulemaking for Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 41A and C, doors (14 CFR 23.783) and emergency exits (14 CFR 25.783-1). The specific guidance material related to the freedom from jamming requirements and the door design was contained in Advisory Circular 25.783-1. The Beech 1900C was certificated under 14 CFR Part 23 and SFAR 41C. The methods of compliance contained in AC 25.783-1 were incorporated into the Beech 1900C door design during the certification process. The FAA has determined those methods are adequate for verifying that the door design provides reasonable provisions against jamming. Raytheon Aircraft Company did propose the text of a new airworthiness standard for a fuselage door for 14 CFR 23.783(c)(5). The FAA reviewed the proposal and has determined that it would provide no new substantial airworthiness standards beyond what is contained in existing guidance. However, the FAA has determined that the Data Source: NTSB Recommendations to FAA and FAA Responses proposal provides excellent policy material and is converting the Raytheon proposal into policy guidance for use by aircraft certification offices in future certification projects. The same information will appear as guidance information in the forthcoming Systems Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes. The proposed text is as follows: The door and emergency exit should be free from jamming and operate properly after fuselage deformation resulting from the ultimate load factors of 14 CFR 23.561(b)(2) and the requirements of 14 CFR 23.307(a). It should also be demonstrated by tests that each door and emergency exit can be opened after exposure to each critical loading condition. Those conditions should include at least the following: the ultimate static tests loads that result from 14 CFR 23.321 through 14 CFR 23.341, and 14 CFR 23.365(a)(b); or ultimate landing design load requirements of 14 CFR 23.365(a)(c), and 14 CFR 23.471 through 14 CFR 23.485, provided they are equal to or exceed the ultimate load requirements of 14 CFR 23.561(b)(2). I believe that the FAA has addressed the full intent of this safety recommendation, and I plan no further action.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 11/24/1997
Response: The freedom from jamming certification requirement in Special Federal Aviation Regulation 41, Landing Section, paragraphs (c) and (g), was developed from 14 CFR 23.807 and before that, Civil Aviation Regulation 03-0, Section 03.812, Exits. As the Board noted in its letter dated September 12, 1997, the freedom from jamming requirement is predicated on the demonstration of "reasonable provisions" within a design criteria to prevent jamming by fuselage deformation. The FAA believes that the "reasonable provisions" requirement is the most effective method to demonstrate compliance with the freedom from jamming certification requirements. The FAA will review its policy material related to the freedom from jamming requirement, appropriate type certification data, and data from FAA's crashworthiness research program to determine if the material available to manufacturers provides sufficient guidance for the freedom from jamming certification requirements. Based on this review, the FAA will make appropriate changes to the guidance on this certification requirement. It is anticipated that this review will be completed by June 1998. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on this safety recommendation.