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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-97-103
Details
Synopsis: ON 11/19/96, AT 1701 CENTRAL STANDARD TIME, UNITED EXPRESS FLIGHT 5925, A BEECHCRAFT 1900C, N87GL, COLLIDED WITH A BEECHCRAFT KING AIR A90, N1127D, AT QUINCY MUNICIPAL AIRPORT, NEAR QUINCY, ILLINOIS. FLIGHT 5925 WAS COMPLETING ITS LANDING ROLL ON RUNWAY 13, AND THE KING AIR WAS IN ITS TAKEOFF ROLL ON RUNWAY 04. A THIRD AIRPLANE, A PIPER CHEROKEE, WAS POSITIONED FOR PLANNED TAKEOFF ON RUNWAY 04 BEHIND THE KING AIR. THE COLLISION OCCURRED AT THE INTERSECTION OF THE TWO RUNWAYS. ALL 10 PASSENGERS AND TWO CREWMEMBERS ABOARD FLIGHT 5925 AND THE TWO OCCUPANTS ABOARD THE KING AIR WERE KILLED. FLIGHT 5925 WAS A SCHEDULED PASSENGER FLIGHT OPERATING UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 14 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR) PARAT 135. THE FLIGHT WAS OPERATED BY GREAT LAKES AVIATION, LTD., DOING BUSINESS AS UNITED EXPRESS. THE KING AIR WAS OPERATING UNDER 14 CFR PART 91.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAA: EVALUATE THE OF BEECH 1900C DOOR/FRAME SYSTEM TO JAM WHEN IT SUSTAINS MINIMAL PERMANENT DOOR DEFORMATION &, BASED ON THE RESULTS OF THAT EVALUATION, REQUIRE APPROPRIATE DESIGN CHANGES.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: QUINCY, IL, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA97MA009AB
Accident Reports: Runway Collision United Express Flight 5925 and Beechcraft King Air A90 Quincy Municipal Airport
Report #: AAR-97-04
Accident Date: 11/19/1996
Issue Date: 9/12/1997
Date Closed: 9/5/2000
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 9/6/2000
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 09/11/2000 2:53:56 PM MC# 2001260: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has completed its action in response to these safety recommendations and on June 23, 1998, provided the Board with a detailed outline of its position in response to each safety recommendation. The FAA considered its action to be completed and planned no further action. On December 1, 1998, the Board classified these safety recommendations in an "open acceptable" status pending evaluation of Raytheon's May 1998 petition for reconsideration of the Board's final report on the Quincy accident. The Board stated that its review and disposition of the petition would address in detail the issues in these safety recommendations. On April 13, 1999, the Board sent another letter to the FAA stating that its review of the Raytheon petition for reconsideration of the findings and probable cause of the accident at Quincy indicates that the issues raised in the petition are directly related to Safety Recommendations A-97-103 through -105. The Board further stated that a modification of the accident report may impact its consideration of the FAA's actions in response to these recommendations. The Safety Board anticipated completing action on Raytheon's petition in fall 1999. I am requesting a status from the Board on its response to Raytheon's petition so that we can come to closure on these safety issues. It has been almost 2 years since the FAA informed the Board of its final position in response to these safety recommendations. The FAA has reviewed the Raytheon petition and does not believe that this document impacts the FAA's position outlined in its letter dated June 23, 1998. Consequently, I ask that the Board expedite its evaluation of Raytheon's petition.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 9/5/2000
Response: THE SAFETY BOARD NOTES THAT THE FAA PERFORMED AN EVALUATION OF THE DESIGN AND SERVICE HISTORY OF THE BEECH 1900C CABIN DOOR AND DETERMINED THAT THE DOOR DOES NOT HAVE A PROPENSITY TO JAM AND, THEREFORE, THAT NO DESIGN CHANGES WERE WARRANTED. BECAUSE THE FAA'S ACTION MEETS THE INTENT OF A-97-103, IT IS CLASSIFIED "CLOSED--ACCEPTABLE ACTION."

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 4/13/1999
Response: The FAA stated that it has completed its action in response to these safety recommendations and provided the Safety Board with a detailed outline of its position on each recommendation on June 23, 1998. The FAA stated that it planned no further action. The FAA cited the Board's December 1, 1998, letter in which these recommendations were all classified "Open-Acceptable Response" pending the Board's evaluation of Raytheon's petition for reconsideration. The FAA reported that it has reviewed the Raytheon petition and does not believe that it impacts the FAA's position as outlined in its June 23, 1998, letter. Therefore, the FAA is requesting that the Safety Board expedite its evaluation of Raytheon's petition so that these recommendations can be closed. The Safety Board's review of the Raytheon petition for reconsideration of the findings and probable cause of the accident at Quincy indicates that the issues raised in the petition are directly related to Safety Recommendations A-97-103 through -105. As such, a modification of the accident report may impact the Safety Board's consideration of the FAA's actions in response to these recommendations. The Safety Board intends to complete action on Raytheon's petition in fall 1999. Therefore, Safety Recommendations A-97-103 through -105 remain classified "Open- Acceptable Action."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 2/1/1999
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 2/5/99 3:19:38 PM MC# 990102: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has completed its action in response to these safety recommendations and on June 23, 1998, provided the Board with a detailed outline of its position in response to each safety recommendation. The FAA considered its action to be completed and planned no further action. On December 1, 1998, the Board classified these safety recommendations in an "open acceptable" status pending evaluation of Raytheon's May 1998 petition for reconsideration of the Board's final report on the Quincy accident. However, the Board did not provide the FAA with a timeframe for completing its evaluation. The FAA has reviewed the Raytheon petition and does not believe that this document impacts the FAA's position as outlined in its letter dated June 23, 1998. Consequently, I urge the Board to expedite its evaluation of Raytheon's petition so that we can come to closure on these safety issues.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 12/1/1998
Response: The FAA stated that it evaluated the design and service history of the Beech 1900C door/frame system to determine if design changes were necessary to eliminate door jamming. According to the FAA, tests conducted by Raytheon Aircraft Company demonstrated that slack cables in the door mechanism do not impair operation of the door. Also, service difficulty reports since January 1985 indicated no history of problems with door jamming on Beech 1900C airplanes. Also, 25 different certification tests conducted to determine structural integrity of the Beech 1900C fuselage did not deform the door/frame to the point at which jamming occurred. Raytheon submitted a petition for reconsideration of the Safety Board's final report on the Quincy accident. The Safety Board is currently evaluating this petition for reconsideration. Our review and disposition of the petition will address in detail the issues in this safety recommendation. Pending the completion of this review, Safety Recommendation A-97-103 is classified "Open-Acceptable Response."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 6/23/1998
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 6/29/98 3:44:00 PM MC# 980824: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has evaluated the design and service history of the Beech 1900C door/frame system to determine if design changes are necessary to eliminate possible door jamming due to deformation. The results of the evaluation are as follows: * Tests conducted by Raytheon have demonstrated that slack cables in the door opening mechanism do not impair the mechanism operation. * Service difficulty reports since January 1985 indicate that there is no history of reported problems with door jamming on in-service Beech 1900C airplanes. * Extensive certification tests for structural integrity of the Beech 1900C fuselage did not deform the door/frame to the point where there was a jamming condition evident. Approximately 25 different certification tests were conducted. The Beech 1900C door also doubles as the step-ladder in boarding and deplaning passengers. Since the Beech 1900C is predominately used in regional airline service, the entry door is subject to many cycles-per-day. Based on the evaluation, the FAA has determined that the Beech 1900C cabin door does not have a propensity to jam, and that no design changes are warranted. I consider the FAA's action to be completed, and I plan no further action on this safety recommendation.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 11/24/1997
Response: The FAA is evaluating the certification requirements and documentation related to the Beech 1900C door/frame system to determine if design changes are warranted. On October 30, 1997, Raytheon Aircraft Company provided extensive information on this subject to both the FAA and the Safety Board. The FAA will also consider the Raytheon input as part of its evaluation. I will update the Board on this project by April 1998. The purpose of the evaluation of the Beech 1900C door/frame system is to determine whether design changes are warranted. It should be noted, however, that the operational history of the Beech 1900C has not demonstrated a propensity of the door/frame system to jam. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA progress on this safety recommendation.