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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-97-092
Details
Synopsis: About 1638 eastern daylight time, on 10/19/96, a McDonnell Douglas MD-88, N914dl, operated by Delta Airlines, Inc., as Flight 554, struck the approach light structure and the end of the runway deck during the approach to land on runway 13 at the LaGuardia airport, in Flushing, New York. Flight 554 was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121, as a scheduled, domestic passenger flight from Atlanta, Georgia, to Flushing. The flight departed the Williams B. Hartsfield International Airport in Atlanta Georgia, about 1441, with two flightcrew members, three flight attendants, and 58 passengers on board. Three passengers reported minor injuries; no injuries were reported by the remaining 60 occupants. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the lower fuselage, wings (including slats and flaps), main landing gear, and both engines. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the approach to runway 13; flight 554 was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Expedite the development and publication specific criteria and conditions for the classification of special airports; the resultant publication should include specific remarks detailing the reason(s) an airport is determined to be a special airport, and procedures for adding and removing airports from special airport.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: FLUSHING, NY, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: NYC97MA005
Accident Reports: Descent Below Visual Glidepath and Collision with Terrain Delta Air Lines Flight 554 McDonnell Douglas MD-88, N914DL
Report #: AAR-97-03
Accident Date: 10/19/1996
Issue Date: 8/29/1997
Date Closed: 1/11/2011
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 7/15/2011
Response: Notation 8106A: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) titled "Qualification, Service, and Use of Crewmembers and Aircraft Dispatchers," published at 76 Federal Register 29336-29526 on May 20, 2011. The notice proposes to amend the regulations for flight and cabin crewmember and aircraft dispatcher training programs in domestic, flag, and supplemental operations. The proposed regulations are intended to contribute significantly to reducing aviation accidents by requiring the use of flight simulation training devices (FSTD) for flight crewmembers and including additional training and evaluation requirements for all crewmembers and aircraft dispatchers in areas that are critical to safety. The proposal also reorganizes and revises the qualification, training, and evaluation requirements. The SNPRM is based on the FAA's review of comments submitted in response to the January 12, 2009, notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on these issues and its determination that the NPRM did not adequately address or clarify some topics; it is also based on provisions of the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010. The NTSB notes that the SNPRM proposes that pilots-in-command (PIC) and seconds-in-command be required to undergo the same training and be subject to the same requirements for special airports, in contrast to the current rule requiring special airport training for PICs. The NTSB stated in its response to the January 2009 NPRM that a final rule including this proposed revision would likely constitute an acceptable action to close this recommendation. However, the NTSB now questions the potential safety benefit of the revision given the FAA's stance concerning Safety Recommendation A-97-92, which addressed the development and publication of criteria for designating special airports.1 During meetings with the NTSB about this recommendation, the FAA stated that the specification of criteria and conditions for the classification of special airports was problematic because the need to designate an airport as special might be specific to aircraft operating into that airport or to a particular airline operating into the airport. As a result, the FAA created a new "special pilot-in-command" classification for airports requiring flight crew familiarity. Because the SNPRM does not address "special pilot-in-command" airports within the revised pilot training requirements, the NTSB is uncertain whether the proposed revision adequately addresses Safety Recommendation A-94-107.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 1/11/2011
Response: On October 16, 2003, the FAA issued Handbook Bulletin for Air Transportation (HBAT) 03-07, “Special Pilot-in-Command Airport Qualification, OpSpec Paragraph C050,” and on December 8, 2003, the FAA issued HBAT 03-09, “Special Airport Authorizations, Provisions, and Limitations and Selected Practices Applicable to OpSpec C067.” FAA and NTSB staff met several times throughout 2004 to discuss this recommendation, and, during these meetings, the FAA stated its belief that the specification of criteria and conditions for the classification of special airports was problematic because the need to designate an airport as special may be specific to aircraft operating into that airport or to a particular airline operating into the airport. The FAA believed the intent of this recommendation was to ensure heightened awareness on the part of airline crews operating into these airports; therefore, the FAA created a new “special pilot-in-command” classification for airports requiring flight crew familiarity. The HBATs contain the procedures to be used by a principal operations inspector (POI) together with an affected airline to determine whether an airport should be classified as a special pilot-in-command airport. HBAT 03-07 also included an airport assessment aid to provide guidance to the POI in making this determination. On December 15, 2004, the NTSB indicated that we had reviewed HBATs 03-07 and 03-09, including the airport assessment aid. Although these documents were improvements to previously available guidance on special airports, they did not fully address the intent of Safety Recommendation A-97-92 because they did not include specific criteria and conditions for the classification of special airports, such as a set of standards that could be applied uniformly to all airports. The airport assessment aid contained a set of questions to use in evaluating an airport, addressing such issues as the proximity of terrain to the airport; however, no guidance defined specifically or quantitatively how the answers to these questions should be used to determine whether an airport should be designated as a special airport. At that time, the NTSB classified Safety Recommendation A-97-92 “Open—Unacceptable Response” because of these weaknesses. When the FAA and the NTSB met on October 14, 2010, extensive discussion took place regarding these issues. The airport assessment aid developed in 2003 is still being used, unchanged. The FAA stated that all determinations related to special pilot-in-command airports are reviewed by staff from the FAA’s Flight Standards Service at FAA headquarters. This review is conducted regarding all decisions concerning special pilot-in-command airports; however, if a POI determines that it is not necessary to evaluate an airport as a special pilot-in-command airport, there is no review of his or her decision. The FAA continues to believe that a decision to evaluate an airport is best left to the judgment of the POI and that specific criteria are neither necessary nor advisable. The NTSB continues to believe that POIs need specific criteria and conditions to consider when making these determinations. Consequently, Safety Recommendation A-97-92 is classified CLOSED -- UNACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 5/7/2009
Response: Notation 8106A: The National Transportation Safety Board has reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled, “Qualification, Service, and Use of Crewmembers and Aircraft Dispatchers,” which was published in 74 Federal Register 1280 on January 12, 2009. The notice proposes to amend the regulations for flight and cabin crewmembers and dispatcher training programs in domestic, flag, and supplemental operations. Proposed changes include requiring the use of flight simulation training devices (FSTD) in traditional flight crewmember training programs and adding training requirements in safety-critical areas. In addition, the proposal reorganizes qualifications and training requirements in the existing rule by moving several sections of advisory information to the regulatory section. The NPRM also addresses issues raised in numerous safety recommendations issued to the FAA by the Safety Board; 13 of these recommendations remain open. The Safety Board generally supports the proposed rule changes. However, the Board suggests additional requirements, including substantive changes that improve or enhance crew and dispatcher procedures, qualifications, and training and the replacement of advisory circulars and other recommended guidance with regulatory changes requiring compliance. At an April 7, 2009, presentation on the NPRM, the Safety Board learned that the FAA principle regarding training is “Train like you fly and fly like you train.” The Board agrees with this principle and with several initiatives that are especially appropriate for flight operations in today’s environment. For example, the Board supports the NPRM’s proposals for adding a continuous analysis process and FSTDs in training programs, requiring special hazards and environment training, and establishing qualifications for training centers and other 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 119 facilities. The Board also concurs with the FAA that it is important for flight crewmembers to be trained and evaluated in a complete flight crew environment, which means that, during training for pilot flying and pilot monitoring roles, crewmembers should occupy the seats for—and perform the duties of—the position for which they are being trained. The Safety Board is aware that, in the past, some considered upset recovery training to be inappropriate due to limitations in aerodynamic model fidelity; however, unusual attitudes do not equate to being outside the angle of attack and sideslip range of the aerodynamic model. Many, if not most, upsets occur well within this envelope. Therefore, the Board concurs with the FAA’s “Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid” referenced in the NPRM and believes that training could be further improved by feedback to the pilot from the simulator. The training aid suggests that, in a scenario in which the pilot has maneuvered the simulator to an extremely high angle of attack or sideslip, there should be a change in the visual display when the aerodynamic envelope is exceeded; specifically, a color change would alert pilots that they are at an angle of attack or sideslip that should be avoided during recovery efforts. The Safety Board notes that some aircraft, such as the Saab 340 and Bombardier CRJ, have experienced upsets due to premature stall caused by icing. Because icing contamination can cause the critical angle of attack to be reduced considerably, these upsets can occur without warning. A stall roll-off departure from normal flight is often the flight crew’s first indication of an upset due to icing contamination; however, the Board has found that flight crews often do not apply decisive and timely recovery controls when this occurs, which results in prolonged upsets that increase the probability of ground impact. For aircraft that have experienced upsets due to icing contamination, the Board suggests that upset recovery training should include recognition of these excursions from normal flight attitudes and prompt application of proper recovery procedures. Although the NPRM continues to encourage the traditional training approach to stall recovery (recovery from stick shaker), the Safety Board is concerned that flight crews are not recognizing stalls and are not applying aggressive recovery procedures, as indicated by several aviation events. Among these events is the October 14, 2004, accident in which a Bombardier CL-600-2B19 crashed in Jefferson City, Missouri, when the flight crew was unable to recover after both engines flamed out as the result of a pilot-induced aerodynamic stall. Another example occurred during a December 22, 1996, accident in which a Douglas DC-8-63 experienced an uncontrolled flight into terrain in Narrows, Virginia, after the flying pilot applied inappropriate control inputs during a stall recovery attempt and the nonflying pilot failed to recognize, address, and correct these inappropriate control inputs. Because of examples like these, the Board advises that training in stall recovery should go beyond approach to stall to include training in recovery from a full stall condition. In addition, in cases when flight data are available (whether from flight test or accidents/incidents), these data should be used to model stall behavior to facilitate training beyond the initial stall warning. If the proposed rule becomes final, it would likely meet the intent of 5 of the 13 open safety recommendations related to crewmember training. The following is a list of the 13 recommendations and an explanation of whether or not the NPRM addresses each of them. A-93-46 Amend 14 CFR Parts 121, 125, and 129 to require Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System [TCAS] flight simulator training for flight crews during initial and recurrent training. This training should familiarize the flight crews with TCAS presentations and require maneuvering in response to TCAS visual and aural alerts. The NPRM contains requirements for TCAS training, as recommended. Therefore, the NPRM is responsive to the recommendation. If the NPRM (as currently presented) becomes a final rule, the Safety Board likely will consider it an acceptable action, and the recommendation will be closed. The Board notes that this is currently the oldest open aviation recommendation. A-94-107 Revise 14 CFR Section 121.445 to eliminate subparagraph (c), and require that all flight crewmembers meet the requirements for operation to or from a special airport, either by operating experience or pictorial means. The NPRM proposes the following language for 14 CFR 121.1235(c): “The Administrator may determine that certain airports (due to items such as surrounding terrain, obstructions, or complex approach or departure procedures) are special airports requiring special airport qualifications and that certain areas or routes require a special type of navigation qualification.” In addition, special routes, areas, and airports for special operations are among the subjects in the NPRM’s list of required training. Therefore, the NPRM is responsive to the recommendation. If the NPRM (as currently presented) becomes a final rule, the Safety Board likely will consider it an acceptable action, and this recommendation will be closed. A-94-199 Revise the certification standards for Part 25 and for Part 23 (commuter category) aircraft to require that a flight simulator, suitable for flight crew training under Appendix H of Part 121, be available concurrent with the certification of any new aircraft type. The NPRM proposes a requirement that a flight simulator be available for training. The Safety Board has previously indicated that such a requirement would be an acceptable alternative response to a design requirement for an aircraft. Therefore, if the proposed rule becomes final, the Safety Board likely will consider it an acceptable action in response to the recommendation. A-95-124 Require, by December 31, 1997, operators that conduct scheduled and nonscheduled services under 14 CFR Part 135 in Alaska to provide flight crews, during initial and recurrent training programs, aeronautical decision-making and, judgment training that is tailored to the company’s flight operations and Alaska's aviation environment, and provide similar training for Federal Aviation Administration principal operations inspectors [POI] who are assigned to commuter airlines and air taxis in Alaska, so as to facilitate the inspectors’ approval and surveillance of the operators’ training programs. The FAA has previously indicated to the Safety Board that the NPRM would include aeronautical decision-making and judgment in the crew resource management portion of the proposed training rule. However, Safety Recommendation A 95 124 is specific to Part 135 operations in Alaska, while the NPRM addresses Part 121 operations. Therefore, the FAA has not supplied a satisfactory response. Thus, the NPRM, as drafted, would not meet the intent of this recommendation, and the status would remain “Open—Unacceptable Response.” A-96-95 Develop a controlled flight into terrain training [CFIT] program that includes realistic simulator exercises comparable to the successful windshear and rejected takeoff training programs and make training in such a program mandatory for all pilots operating under 14 CFR Part 121. The NPRM proposes to require special hazards training, including methods for preventing CFIT and approach and landing accidents. Therefore, if this requirement is included in the final rule, the Safety Board likely will consider it an acceptable action, and the recommendation will be closed. A-96-120 Require 14 CFR Part 121 and 135 operators to provide training to flight crews in the recognition of and recovery from unusual attitudes and upset maneuvers, including upsets that occur while the aircraft is being controlled by automatic flight control systems, and unusual attitudes that result from flight control malfunctions and uncommanded flight control surface movements. The Safety Board is pleased that, in response to Safety Recommendation A-96-120, the NPRM includes training on recognizing and recovering from “special hazards,” which are sudden or unexpected aircraft upsets. The Board interprets that this proposal would also include a requirement that gives FAA POIs the authority to review and require changes to training programs that do not adequately address a special hazard. Lack of such authority was a concern identified during the Board’s investigation of a November 12, 2001, accident involving American Airlines flight 587, an Airbus Industrie A300 605R. During this investigation, the Board learned that the POI knew that aspects of American Airlines’ training program had undesirable effects; however, he lacked the authority to force American to change its program. In addition, a topic covered in the special hazards training section of the NPRM is recovery from loss of control due to airplane design, airplane malfunction, human performance, and atmospheric conditions. The “Upset Recognition and Recovery” section of the NPRM lists a number of items that should be covered, including catastrophic damage due to rapidly reversing controls and the use of light pedal forces and small pedal movements to obtain the maximum rudder deflection as speed increases. This recommendation is currently classified “Open—Unacceptable Response” because of the FAA’s delayed response. Although the NPRM proposes requirements for Part 121 operators, similar action for Part 135 operators will be needed before Safety Recommendation A-96-120 can be closed. A-98-102 Require air carriers to adopt the operating procedure contained in the manufacturer’s airplane flight manual and subsequent approved revisions or provide written justification that an equivalent safety level results from an alternative procedure. The FAA has previously indicated to the Safety Board that the NPRM would address the issues in this recommendation. However, the Board did not see any language in the NPRM that specifically addresses Safety Recommendation A-98-102, which is currently classified “Open—Acceptable Response” pending a requirement for the action recommended. A-01-85 Amend 14 [CFR] 121.417 to require participation in firefighting drills that involve actual or simulated fires during crewmember recurrent training and to require that those drills include realistic scenarios on recognizing potential signs of, locating, and fighting hidden fires. The NPRM addresses the substantive issues in this recommendation. Although the NPRM does not propose to revise 14 CFR 121.417, it contains training requirements on the actions to take in the event of fire or smoke in the aircraft, including realistic drills with emphasis on combating hidden fires. This training includes simulated locations of hidden fires, such as behind sidewall panels, in overhead areas and panels, or in air conditioning vents. The NPRM also contains firefighting training requirements for flight attendants, including operation of each type of installed hand fire extinguisher. This recommendation is currently classified “Open—Unacceptable Response” pending a requirement for the recommended action. If the requirements proposed in the NPRM are enacted in the final rule, the Safety Board likely will consider it an acceptable action, and this recommendation will be closed. A-05-30 Require all 14 [CFR] Part 121 and 135 air carriers to incorporate bounced landing recovery techniques in their flight manuals and to teach these techniques during initial and recurrent training. (A-05-30) Although the NPRM contains detailed requirements for training on landing, the Safety Board did not see anything in the NPRM related to bounced landing recovery techniques. This recommendation is currently classified “Open—Acceptable Alternate Response” pending the results of a survey indicating that all operators’ training programs include the recommendations in a Safety Alert for Operators. A-07-44 Require that all 14 [CFR] Part 91K, 121, and 135 operators establish procedures requiring all crewmembers on the flight deck to positively confirm and cross-check the airplane’s location at the assigned departure runway before crossing the hold short line for takeoff. This required guidance should be consistent with the guidance in Advisory Circular 120-74A and Safety Alert for Operators 06013 and 07003. The NPRM contains training requirements related to runway safety. Special hazards topics must include how to ensure that takeoff clearance is received and that the correct runway is being entered for takeoff before crossing the hold short line. This recommendation is currently classified “Open—Unacceptable Response” because of continuing delays in the issuance of this NPRM. If the NPRM becomes final, the proposed requirement is partly responsive to this recommendation because it addresses only Part 121 operators. Action will still be needed for Part 135 and Part 91 subpart K operators for this recommendation to be closed. A-07-96 Require air carriers to revise their cabin crew training manuals and programs to ensure that the manuals and programs state that a door must remain open while the air conditioning (A/C) cart is connected, advise that the A/C cart can pressurize the airplane on the ground if all doors are closed, and warn about the dangers of opening any door while the air conditioning cart is supplying conditioned (cooled or heated) air to the cabin. The NPRM proposes a requirement for training that will familiarize cabin crewmembers with each aircraft on which they will work. Among these aircraft familiarization requirements are cabin pressurization indicators and systems. However, the NPRM does not fully address the recommended action because it only addresses specific actions to take when the door remains open while the A/C cart is connected. This recommendation is currently classified, and would remain, “Open—Acceptable Response” pending timely and acceptable revisions to Notice 8400.35 and Order 8900.1. A-08-16 Require 14 [CFR] Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to include, in their initial, upgrade, transition, and recurrent simulator training for turbojet airplanes, (1) decision-making for rejected landings below 50 feet along with a rapid reduction in visual cues and (2) practice in executing this maneuver. The NPRM proposes a requirement to use a simulator for training on rejected landing maneuvers, including the initiation of a rejected landing between 30 and 50 feet above the runway. Thus, the NPRM addresses the second part of this recommendation “practice in executing this maneuver.” In addition, although the NPRM did not specifically address decision-making, this topic may be covered during training in the maneuver. Safety Recommendation A 08 16 is currently classified “Open—Response Received.” The NPRM partially responds to the recommendation because it addresses only Part 121—and not Part 135 or Part 91 subpart K—carriers. Action for Part 135 and Part 91 subpart K operators will still be needed for this recommendation to be closed. A-08-17 Require 14 [CFR] Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to include, in their initial, upgrade, transition, and recurrent simulator training for turbojet airplanes, practice for pilots in accomplishing maximum performance landings on contaminated runways. The Safety Board did not find any language describing how to accomplish maximum performance landings on contaminated runways. In addition, any proposed requirements associated with this NPRM would only apply to Part 121 carriers and not Part 135 or Part 91 subpart K operators. This recommendation is currently classified “Open—Response Received.” Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this NPRM.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 12/15/2004
Response: NMC# 102520: The Safety Board notes that on October 16, 2003, the FAA issued Handbook Bulletin for Air Transportation (HBAT) 03-07, "Special Pilot-in-Command Airport Qualification, OpSpec Paragraph C050," and on December 8, 2003, HBAT 03-09, "Special Airport Authorizations, Provisions, and Limitations and Selected Practices Applicable to OpSpec C067." During the meeting in April, the FAA indicated that the specification of criteria and conditions for the classification of special airports is problematic, because the need to designate an airport as special may be specific to aircraft operating into that airport, or a particular airline operating into the airport. The FAA believes the intent of these recommendations is to ensure heightened awareness on the part of airline crews operating into these airports; therefore, the FAA has created a new "special pilot-in-command" classification for airports requiring flight crew familiarity. The HBATs contain the procedures to be used by a principal operations inspector (POI) together with an affected airline to determine whether an airport should be classified as a special airport or a special pilot-in-command airport. The bulletins also include information for determining special runways and special approaches. HBAT 03-07 also includes an airport assessment aid to provide guidance to the POI in this determination. The Safety Board reviewed HBAT 03-07 and 03-09, including the airport assessment aid. Although these documents are improvements to previously available guidance on special airports, they do not fully address the intent of Safety Recommendation A-97-92. That recommendation asks for the development and publication of specific criteria and conditions for the classification of special airports, such as a set of standards that can be applied uniformly to all airports. The FAA has produced a set of questions to ask about an airport such as the proximity of terrain to the airport. However, there is no guidance that defines specifically and quantitatively how the answers to the questions in the airport assessment aid should be used to determine whether an airport should be designated as a special airport. The Board notes that, not only is there no guidance on how to interpret answers to questions in the airport assessment aid, but the designation of special pilot-in-command is also left to the discretion of an airline's POI, which may lead to inconsistent designations. The purpose of designating special airports is to alert flight crews about significant terrain, obstructions, or special procedural conditions at airports into which they may only infrequently operate. The FAA's response to date for Safety Recommendation A-97-92 is not acceptable. Pending the development and publication of specific criteria and conditions for the classification of special airports, Safety Recommendation A-97-92 remains classified OPEN -- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. If the FAA believes that its actions fully meet the intent of this recommendation and the FAA plans no further action, the Safety Board asks the FAA to indicate so in a letter so that we may close this recommendation. As Safety Recommendations A-97-93 and -94 are contingent on an acceptable response to A-97-92, pending the FAA's taking the recommended actions, Safety Recommendations A-97-93 and -94 remain classified OPEN -- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 4/26/2004
Response: SWAT Meetings, December 12, 2004, and April 6, 2004 Minutes of April 6, 2004 meeting attached. On April 26, 2004, staff from the Safety Board (Paul Misencik, Dave Tew, Jeff Marcus) met with the FAA for the briefing on special airports discussed at previous SWAT Meetings.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 10/7/2002
Response: The Safety Board is concerned about the length of time that it has taken for the FAA to respond to these recommendations. Almost 5 years after these recommendations were issued, and 2 1/2 years after the FAA believed the AC would be issued, the FAA has not completed this action. The Board further notes that the current version of AC 121.445, issued June 20, 1990, is outdated and incomplete. The Board urges the FAA to act promptly on these recommendations. Pending prompt issuance of an AC that will include specific criteria and conditions for the classification of special airports, criteria for special runways and/or special approaches, an updated list of all special airports, and revisions to Order 8400.10 to incorporate the changes, Safety Recommendations A-97-92 through -94 are classified OPEN -- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 6/4/2002
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 06/17/2002 4:01:12 PM MC# 2020602 - From Jane F. Garvey, Administrator: The FAA advised the Board that it agreed with the intent of these safety recommendations and was developing a flight standards handbook bulletin and revising Advisory Circular (AC) 121.445, Pilot-In-Command Qualifications for Special Area/Routes and Airports, Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Section 121.445. The handbook bulletin and the AC will address the issues outlined in these safety recommendations. This letter informs the Board that the FAA is still proceeding with the issuance of the AC; however, it is taking much longer than anticipated to resolve comments submitted during the coordination process. Additionally, the FAA has determined that it is not necessary to issue a handbook bulletin in addition to the AC. Once the AC is issued, the FAA will post the document on its web site and revise Order 8400.10 to incorporate these changes at the next revision cycle. I believe that the AC will address the full intent of these safety recommendations, and I will provide the Board with a copy of the AC as soon as it is issued.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 1/19/2000
Response: The FAA reports that it is developing a flight standards handbook bulletin and revising Advisory Circular (AC) 121.445, "Pilot-In-Command Qualifications for Special Area/Routes," and Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Section 121.445, "Airports," to address the issues outlined in these safety recommendations. The FAA states that the AC is presently undergoing internal FAA coordination and should be published in the Federal Register. As soon as the AC is completed, the FAA states that it will proceed with issuing the bulletin. The FAA states that it plans to have both documents issued by February 2000. Pending the development and issuance of a flight standards handbook bulletin and issuance of revisions to AC 121.445 and FAR Section 121.445, Safety Recommendations A-97-92 through -94 are classified OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 9/21/1999
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 9/24/99 3:03:29 PM MC# 991071: - From Jane F. Garvey, Administrator: The FAA agrees with the intent of these safety recommendations and is developing a flight standards handbook bulletin and revising Advisory Circular (AC) 121.445, Pilot-In-Command Qualifications for Special Area/Routes and Airports, Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Section 121.445. The handbook bulletin and the AC will address the issues outlined in these safety recommendations. The AC is presently undergoing internal FAA coordination and should be published in the Federal Register for comment by November 1999. As soon as the AC is completed, the FAA will proceed with issuing the flight standards handbook bulletin. The FAA plans to have both documents issued by February 2000. I will provide the Board with copies of these documents as soon as they are issued.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 8/17/1998
Response: The FAA has stated that it is developing a flight standards handbook bulletin and revising Advisory Circular (AC) 121.445, "Pilot-In-Command Qualifications for Special Area/Routes and Airports, Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Section 121.445." The bulletin and AC would address the issues outlined in these safety recommendations. Pending completion of these actions by the FAA, the Safety Board classifies Safety Recommendations A-97-92 through -94 OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 11/13/1997
Response: MC# 971529: - From Jane F. Garvey, Administrator: The FAA agrees with the intent of these safety recommendations and is developing a flight standards handbook bulletin and revising Advisory Circular (AC) 121.445, Pilot-In-Command Qualifications for Special Area/Routes and Airports, Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Section 121.445. The bulletin and AC will address the issues outlined in these safety recommendations. It is anticipated that these documents will be issued in April 1998. I will provide the Board with copies of these documents as soon as they are issued.