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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-96-028
Details
Synopsis: ON 5/11/96, ABOUT 1415 EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME, A MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-32 CRASHED INTO THE EVERGLADES SWAMP SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF FROM MIAMI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, MIAMI FLORIDA, THE AIRPLANE, N904VJ, WAS OPERATED BY VALUJET AIRLINES, INC., AS VALUJET FLIGHT FLIGHT 592. BOTH PILOTS, THE THREE FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, AND ALL 105 PASSENGERS WERE KILLED. BEFORE THE ACCIDENT, THE FLIGHTCREW REPORTED TO AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL THAT IT WAS EXPERIENCING SMOKE IN THE CABIN AND COCKPIT. VISUAL METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS EXISTED IN THE MIAMI AREA AT THE TIME OF THE TAKEOFF. THE DESTINATION OF THE FLIGHT WAS HARTSFIELD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, ATLANTA, GEORGIA. FLIGHT 592 WAS ON AN INSTRUMENT FLIGHT RULES FLIGHT PLAN.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAA: IN COOPERATION WITH RSPA, PROHIBIT THE TRANSPORTATION OF OXIDIZERS MATERIALS (E.G., NITRIC ACID) IN CARGO COMPARTMENTS THAT DO NOT HAVE FIRE OR SMOKE DETECTION SYSTEMS. (URGENT)
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: Miami, FL, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA96MA054
Accident Reports: In-Flight Fire and Impact With Terrain Valujet Airlines Flight 592 DC-9-32, N904VJ
Report #: AAR-97-06
Accident Date: 5/11/1996
Issue Date: 5/31/1996
Date Closed: 10/29/2001
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
Keyword(s): Hazmat

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 9/1/2004
Response: Notation 6704D: The National Transportation Safety Board has reviewed the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), “Hazardous Materials Regulations: Transportation of Compressed Oxygen, Other Oxidizing Gases and Chemical Oxygen Generators on Aircraft,” Docket No. RSPA-04-17664 (HM-224B), which was published at 69 Federal Register 88 on May 6, 2004. The Safety Board notes that RSPA previously issued regulations addressing the transportation of chemical oxidizers and compressed oxygen cylinders aboard aircraft on August 19, 1999, under docket HM-224A. Under that rulemaking, RSPA amended the Hazardous Materials Regulations by requiring that no more than a combined total of six compressed oxygen cylinders be stowed in inaccessible cargo compartments that were not equipped with fire or smoke detection systems and fire suppression systems. The amendments also required that no more than six compressed oxygen cylinders and one cylinder of medical-use compressed oxygen per passenger be carried in a crew-accessible cargo compartment equipped with a fire or smoke detection system but not a fire suppression system. Every compressed oxygen cylinder was also required to be placed in an overpack or outer packaging that met Air Transport Association (ATA) specifications for a 300 Type 1 container. According to RSPA, testing by the Federal Aviation Administration indicated that these shipping containers provided an “incremental” level of thermal protection. Finally, the amendments prohibited the transportation of any other package containing an oxidizing material in an inaccessible cargo compartment that did not have a fire or smoke detection system or fire suppression system. The Safety Board notes that, in this NPRM under docket HM-224B, RSPA proposes to require that overpacks or outer packaging for cylinders of compressed oxygen and chemical oxygen generators not only meet the specifications for an ATA 300 Type I container, but also meet the same flame penetration resistance standards that are required for cargo compartment sidewalls and ceiling panels in transport-category aircraft. The outer packaging must also provide certain thermal protection capabilities so as to retain its contents during an otherwise controllable cargo compartment fire. The Board also notes that if these new standards are adopted, RSPA would remove the present limitation on the number of cylinders of compressed oxygen that may be transported in cargo compartments that are not equipped with a fire suppression system. The Safety Board has reviewed the flame penetration resistance standards and believes that overpacks meeting these standards will provide an improved level of protection for compressed oxygen cylinders. However, the Board believes that RSPA should not remove the present limits on the number of compressed oxygen cylinders that may be transported until sufficient data on the performance and durability of the new overpacks are collected, analyzed, and proved to provide adequate protection with regular use. The Safety Board also notes that RSPA is proposing to revise requirements for pressure relief devices on compressed oxygen cylinders to reduce the release of oxygen when the cylinder is exposed to fire, and to prohibit the transportation of all other oxidizing gases aboard cargo and passenger aircraft. The Safety Board notes that RSPA is also proposing new standards that would require chemical oxygen generators without any packaging to withstand a drop test without actuation or loss of contents, and to have one of four designated features to prevent inadvertent activation. RSPA also proposes to require chemical oxygen generator overpacks that meet the same flame and thermal resistance standards as would be required for compressed oxygen cylinders overpacks. The Safety Board believes that these proposed amendments would enhance the safe transportation of hazardous materials by air and therefore supports the rulemaking as noted. The Safety Board appreciates the opportunity to comment on this proposed rulemaking. If additional clarification or information is needed regarding our comments, please feel free to contact us.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 10/29/2001
Response: Elimination of Class D cargo compartments is an acceptable alternative approach to address this recommendation. Therefore, Safety Recommendation A-96-28 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Alternate Action."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 6/25/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 06/28/2001 9:04:34 AM MC# 2010535: On February 12, 1998, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a final rule to upgrade the fire safety standards for cargo or baggage compartments in certain transport-category airplanes by eliminating Class D compartments as an option for future type certification. Compartments that can no longer be designated as Class D must meet the standards for Class C or Class E compartments, as applicable. The FAA has granted an exemption to this rule to two airlines (Pacific Island Air and Freedom Air) with a total of four airplanes. With the exception of these two airlines, all operators are in compliance with the final rule. I have enclosed a copy of the final rule for the Board's information. This final rule meets the full intent of this safety recommendation, and I consider the FAA's action to be completed on this safety recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 4/5/2001
Response: The Safety Board agrees with the FAA that RSPA is the agency responsible for developing a regulatory change to prohibit the transportation of materials with oxidizing properties. However, the Board believes that the hazardous materials not prohibited by RSPA’s August 11, 1999, rule represent a threat to aviation safety and that it is unacceptable for the FAA to decline to address this threat. The FAA should do everything possible to encourage RSPA to address the deficiencies in RSPA’s August 11, 1999, final rule that the Board has identified to the FAA and RSPA in letters dated March 8, 2000. The Safety Board is aware of a recent Department of Transportation (DOT) initiative, which is part of the One DOT Program, to address intermodal hazardous materials issues. A copy of this letter is being mailed to the Director of the Office of Intermodal Hazardous Materials Programs. The Safety Board urges the FAA to bring the safety issues associated with RSPA’s August 11, 1999, final rule to the attention of this program. Pending the FAA’s effort to encourage RSPA to address the deficiencies in its August 11, 1999, final rule and to bring this issue to the attention of the One DOT Program concerned with intermodal hazardous materials issues, Safety Recommendation A?96?28 is classified "Open--Unacceptable Response."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 7/26/2000
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 07/28/2000 2:19:41 PM MC# 2000964 The Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) is the responsible agency for promulgating rulemaking on this issue. On August 11, 1999, the RSPA, in consultation with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), issued a final rule to prohibit the carriage of chemical oxidizers in inaccessible aircraft cargo compartments that do not have a fire or smoke detection and fire suppression system. A copy of the final rule was provided to the Board on September 1, 1999. On March 8, 2000, the Board responded to the FAA that although the final rule appeared to meet the intent of this safety recommendation, the Board is concerned about oxidizing materials that are not classified as an oxidizer and, therefore, not required to meet the prohibition of the final rule. The Board stated that pending issuance of a regulation that prohibits carrying oxidizing materials not classified as oxidizers and compressed oxygen cylinders in cargo compartments that do not have fire and smoke detection systems, this safety recommendation remains classified "open acceptable." The FAA has reviewed the Board's concern about the need for further rulemaking and believes that this concern should be addressed by the agency responsible for promulgating a rulemaking effort. In this particular case, RSPA is the agency responsible for developing a regulatory change to prohibit the transportation of materials with oxidizing properties in cargo compartments that do not have fire or smoke detection systems. If RSPA decides to proceed with a regulatory effort on this subject, the FAA would provide assistance as necessary. However, I do not believe it is appropriate for the FAA to respond to an RSPA effort. Based on the above, I ask that the Board classify this safety recommendation to the FAA in a "closed" status and obtain additional updates on this regulatory effort directly from RSPA.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 3/8/2000
Response: ALTHOUGH THIS ACTION APPEARS TO MEET THE INTENT OF THE SAFETY RECOMMENDATION, THE SAFETY BOARD IS CONCERNED ABOUT OXIDIZING MATERIALS NOT COVERED BY THE FINAL RULE. A-96-28 INCLUDED THE PROHIBITION OF OXIDIZING MATERIALS, (FOR EXAMPLE, NITRIC ACID) NOT CLASSIFIED AS A DIVISION 5.1 "OXIDIZER." HOWEVER, THE FINAL RULE ONLY AFFECTS THE TRANSPORTATION OF DIVISION 5.1 MATERIALS. ON 10/17/97, IN COMMENTS SUBMITTED TO RSPA IN RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING, DOCKET NO. HM-224A (WHICH WAS PART OF THE REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS FOR THE 8/19/99, FINAL RULE), THE SAFETY BOARD NOTED ITS CONCERNS ON OXIDIZING MATERIALS NOT CLASSIFIED AS AN OXIDIZER. THE SAFETY BOARD'S CONCERNS INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING: *NITRIC ACID. LESS THAN CONCENTRATED OR FUMING NITRIC ACID IS PERMITTED ON CARGO-ONLY AIRCRAFT. *DICUMYL PEROXIDE. THE PREAMBLE OF THE FINAL RULE INDICATES THAT ORGANIC PEROXIDES ARE OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF THIS RULEMAKING. HOWEVEVER, ORGANIC PEROXIDES ARE A SUBGROUP WITHIN CLASS 5 "OXIDIZING SUBSTANCES." *OXIDIZERS SHIPPED AS CONSUMER COMMODITIES, ORM-D. THE PREAMBLE INDICATES THAT THESE OXIDIZERS WILL NOT BE PROHIBITED BECAUSE RSPA BELIEVES THAT THESE OXIDIZERS ARE OF A FORM AND QUANTITY THAT WILL NOT POSE AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK TO THE SAFETY OF AN AIRCRAFT, EVEN IN CARGO COMPARTMENTS THAT LACK A FIRE AND SMOKE DETECTION SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH THE PREAMBLE TO THE FINAL RULE NOTES THE BOARD'S CONCERNS WITH REGARD TO OXIDIZING MATERIALS AND INDICATES THAT RSPA DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE EXCEPTIONS IN THE RULE REPRESENT A SAFETY HAZARD, NO ANALYSIS IS PRESENTED TO JUSTIFY THIS BELIEF. THE 8/19/99, FINAL RULE ALSO PROVIDES EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROHIBITION OF CYLINDERS CONTAINING COMPRESSED OXYGEN, SUBJECT TO NEW PACKAGING AND STOWAGE REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITS ON THE NUMBER OF CYLINDERS. THE RULE REQUIRES OXYGEN CYLINDERS TO BE PLACED IN AN OVERPACK MEETING THE PERFORMANCE CRITERIA IN AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION SPECIFICATION 300 BEFORE TRANSPORTING THESE CYLINDERS IN CARGO COMPARTMENTS THAT DO NOT HAVE FIRE OR SMOKE DETECTION SYSTEMS. THE PREAMBLE OF THE FINAL RULE DISCUSSES TESTING PERFORMED THAT INDICATES THAT THE OVERPACKS PROVIDE SUFFICIENT THERMAL PROTECTION TO THESE CYLINDERS TO DELAY THE OPENING OF THEIR PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICES FOR AT LEAST 1 HOUR. THE RULE FAILS TO JUSTIFY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS 1 HOUR TIME PERIOD AS IT RELATES TO A CARGO COMPARTMENT THAT DOES NOT HAVE FIRE OR SMOKE DETECTION SYSTEMS. PENDING ISSUANCE OF A REGULATION THAT PROHIBITS CARRYING OXIDIZING MATERIALS (LIKE THE TYPES DESCRIBED ABOVE) IN CARGO COMPARTMENTS OF AIRCRAFT THAT DO NOT HAVE FIRE AND SMOKE DETECTION SYSTEM AND COMPRESSED OXYGEN CYLINDERS IN CARGO COMPARTMENTS OF AIRCRAFT THAT DO NOT HAVE FIRE AND SMOKE DETECTION SYSTEMS, OR A JUSTIFICATION THAT 1 HOUR IS A SUITABLE PERIOD OF THERMAL PROTECTION FOR OXYGEN CYLINDERS, A-96-28 IS CLASSIFIED "OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 9/1/1999
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 9/7/99 2:46:50 PM MC# 991001 RSPA IS THE RESPONSIBLE AGENCY FOR PROMULGATING RULEMAKING ON THIS ISSUE. ON 8/11/99, THE RSPA, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE FAA , ISSUED A FINAL RULE TO PROHIBIT THE CARRIAGE OF CHEMICAL OXIDIZERS IN INACCESSIBLE AIRCRAFT CARGO COMPARTMENTS THAT DO NOT HAVE A FIRE OR SMOKE DETECTION AND FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM. I HAVE ENCLOSED A COPY OF THE FINAL RULE FOR THE BOARD'S INFORMATION. I CONSIDER THE FAA'S ACTION TO BE COMPLETED, AND I PLAN NO FURTHER ACTION IN RESPONSE TO THIS RECOMMENDATION.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 8/1/1997
Response: THE BOARD IS AWARE OF RSPA'S 12/30/96, NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING TO PROHIBIT THE TRANSPORTATION OF OXIDIZERS IN CLASS D COMPARTMENTS IN PASSENGER-CARRYING AIRCRAFT AND CARGO AIRCRAFT AND HAS PROVIDED COMMENTS TO RSPA SUPPORTING THIS NPRM. PENDING ISSUANCE OF THE FINAL RULE, WHICH ADDRESSES THE INTENT OF THIS RECOMMENDATION, A-96-28 REMAINS CLASSIFIED "OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 3/24/1997
Response: ON 12/30/96, RSPA PUBLISHED A NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (NPRM) PROPOSING TO PROHIBIT THE TRANSPORTATION OF OXIDIZERS IN CLASS D COMPARTMENTS IN PASSENGER-CARRYING AIRCRAFT & CARGO AIRCRAFT. THE EFFECT OF THIS PROHIBITION WOULD BE TO ALLOW OXIDIZERS IN ACCESSIBLE LOCATIONS ON CARGO AIRCRAFT. RSPA IS ALSO EXAMINING THE CURRENT REGULATIONS AUTHORIZING USE OF OTHER CLASSES OF COMPARTMENTS & AUTHORIZING OTHER CLASSES OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ABOARD AIRCRAFT. THE FAA HAS INITIATED A SEPARATE RULEMAKING PROJECT TO REQUIRE AIR CARRIERS TO LABEL CARGO COMPARTMENTS CLEARLY AS CLASS C OR D. THE FAA WILL KEEP BOARD APPRISED OF THE PROGRESS ON THESE PROJECTS.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 2/28/1997
Response: Notation 6818: The National Transportation Safety Board has reviewed your Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), Docket No. HM-224A, Prohibition of Oxidizers Aboard Aircraft, published on December 30, 1996. The notice proposes prohibiting the carriage of oxidizers, including compressed oxygen, in Class D compartments of passenger-carrying and cargo aircraft. The notice further proposes eliminating an exception for the transportation of personal chemical oxygen generators as checked baggage, creating a shipping name that specifically identifies chemical oxygen generators, requiring special approval for chemical oxygen generators, and initiating a study to assess the risks associated with the transportation of hazardous materials, other than oxidizers, in aircraft cargo compartments. The Safety Board has expressed concern about the inadequacies of Class D cargo compartments for some time. On August 8, 1984, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking, Notice 84-11, that addressed the problem of fire containment in cargo compartments by specifying a new test method for determining the flame penetration resistance of compartment liners. When the Safety Board provided comments on this rulemaking on October 9, 1984, it advised the FAA that although proposed flame penetration tests were more stringent than previous ones, a fire should not be allowed to persist in any state of intensity in an airplane without the flight crew's knowledge, and that a fire detection system should be required in Class D cargo compartments. While the final rule issued on May 16, 1986, required improved flame penetration resistance for compartment liners, it did not require fire detection systems. On October 24, 1988, as a result of a February 3, 1988, in-flight tire involving a hydrogen peroxide solution (an oxidizer) aboard an American Airlines DC-9-83 (flight 132) en route to Nashville Metropolitan Airport, Nashville, Tennessee, the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendation A-88-122, which urged the FAA to require fire/smoke detection systems for all Class D cargo compartments. The Safety Board stated that because the cargo compartment on flight 132 was not equipped with fire or smoke dctection systems, the cockpit crew had no way of detecting the safety threat to the airplane until smoke and fumes reached the passenger cabin. Further, after the smoke was detected in the passenger cabin, the cockpit crew had no means of identifying the fire's location. On August 10, 1993, the FAA responded to Safety Recommendation A-88-l22 by stating that it did not believe that fire/smoke detection and fire extinguishment systems would provide a significant degree of protection to airplane occupants and that it had terminated its rulemaking action to require such systems. On October 14, 1993, Safety Recommendation A-88-122 was classified "Closed--Unacceptable Action." The Safety Board has investigated at least two other incidents where oxidizers or oxidizing materials, transported as cargo, were believed to have started in-flight fires. One inflight fire occurred aboard a Pan American World Airways Boeing 707-32lC after nitric acid (a corrosive and oxidizing material) leaked from a shipment. Smoke filled the cockpit and the plane crashed on approach to Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts, on November 3, 1973. In the other incident, an in-flight fire occurred on July 16, 1986, aboard a Federal Express Boeing 727-1 OOA after nitric acid leaked. When smoke was detected, the aircraft diverted and landed safely in Cincinnati, Ohio. On May 31, 1996, Safety Recommendations A-96-28 and -30 were issued as a result of the Safety Board's investigation of the accident involving an in-flight fire on ValuJet flight 592 in the Everglades near Miami, Florida, on May 11, 1996. Preliminary evidence indicated that five cardboard boxes of chemical oxygen generators, most with unexpended oxidizer cores, were loaded on this aircraft in a Class D cargo compartment. The parallel recommendations urged the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to permanently prohibit the transportation of oxidizers and oxidizing materials (for example, nitric acid) in cargo compartments that do not have fire or smoke detection systems. RSPA and the FAA agreed with these recommendations and on August 19, 1996, Safety Recommendations A-96-28 and -30 were classified "Open--Acceptable Response" pending completion of a final rule. Class D cargo compartments have not been required to have smoke and fire detection systems because they were designed to contain fire damage by use of flame-resistant compartment liners and to suppress a fire involving combustibles by limiting the oxygen available to support combustion. Oxidizers and certain other hazardous materials, however, can neutralize the latter design safeguard by generating their own oxygen. A leaking cylinder filled with compressed oxygen could also provide an oxygen source for a fire. Further, the pressure relief device on a cylinder of compressed oxygen can open when exposed to sufficient heat from a fire. The Safety Board supports prohibiting the carriage of oxidizers, including compressed oxygen, in Class D compartments in passenger-carrying and cargo aircraft because these compartments do not have smoke and fire detection systems and because oxidizers, including compressed oxygen, can provide a source of oxygen that will neutralize the compartment's design feature to suppress a fire by limiting the oxygen available to support combustion. The NPRM also proposes eliminating the exception provided for personal oxygen generators that meet the conditions of Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Section 175.1 0(a)(24) to be carried on aircraft as checked baggage. Like the chemical oxygen generators installed in aircraft, these personal oxygen generators contain oxidizers that, when actuated, produce oxygen. This exception currently permits placement of oxidizers in cargo compartments that do not have fire or smoke detection systems and that are designed to suppress a fire by limiting the oxygen available to support combustion. Therefore, the Safety Board supports eliminating this exception. The Safety Board is concerned that the rulemaking does not include the prohibition of the limited quantities of oxidizers that are shipped as consumer commodities. l For example, section 173.152 allows the shipment of inner packages that contain over 2 Y:, times the net quantity of sodium chlorate contained in each of the chemical oxygen generators that were loaded on ValuJet flight 592, provided they meet the definition of a consumer commodity. Section 172.101 permits loading a gross weight of 30 kilograms per package of consumer commodities in both passenger and cargo aircraft. Further, the consumer commodity exception allows these materials to be shipped without an oxidizer label on the package to warn air carrier personnel that the package contains an oxidizer. This exception currently permits the placement of oxidizers in cargo compartments that do not have fire or smoke detection systems and are designed to suppress a fire by limiting the oxygen available to support combustion. The Safety Board therefore believes that the consumer commodity exception for oxidizers should also be eliminated. RSPA proposes the creation of a new shipping description for chemical oxygen generators that more accurately describes the generators. The current shipping name used for the generators, "Oxidizing solid, N.O.S.," does not address the explosives contained in many types of actuators or the hazards posed by a device capable of initiating and sustaining a reaction that generates both heat and oxygen. The Safety Board supports development of a specific shipping description for chemical oxygen generators that more accurately describes the product shipped and its hazard characteristics. Given the hazards posed by shipping an oxidizer with its actuator attached, RSPA proposes requiring special approval for chemical oxygen generators. 'This approval will require the Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials to determine the hazard classifications of chemical oxygen generators submitted for approval. To obtain approval, the generator must have at least two safety features that will prevent its unintentional activation, and it must be contained in a packaging prepared and originally offered for transportation by the approval holder when transported by air. The Safety Board understands that Title 49 CFR currently requires chemical oxygen generators to have a RSPA approval, or a previously authorized Bureau of Explosives approval, to be transported because the generators contain explosives in the actuator. The two current domestic manufacturers of chemical oxygen generators have stated that they hold previously authorized Bureau of Explosives approvals for the generators they manufacture. The Board understands, however, that neither RSPA, the Bureau of Explosives, nor the two manufacturers have any records of approved designs, testing, or packaging requirements for the chemical oxygen generators transported under approvals issued several years ago by the Bureau of Explosives. Therefore, the Safety Board supports RSPA's proposal to require a special approval for chemical oxygen generators to determine if these generators, which have actuators attached, can be safely packaged to prevent initiation during shipping, and to establish a standard for compliance. The Safety Board notes that the NPRM also states that RSPA, in coordination with FAA, has initiated a study to assess the risks associated with the transportation of hazardous materials in aircraft cargo compartments. Based on the outcome of this study, RSPA may propose the banning from air transportation of additional hazardous materials. The Safety Board has been concerned for some time about the risks associated with the transportation of hazardous materials in aircraft cargo compartments. On October 24, 1988, as a result of the investigation of the in-flight tire on American Airlines flight 132, the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendation A-88-127, which urged the FAA to consider the effects of authorized hazardous materials cargo in fires for all types of cargo compartments, and require appropriate safety systems to protect the aircraft and occupants. On April 19, 1993, when no response had been received by the Safety Board to a final follow-up letter to the FAA, Safety Recommendation A-88-127 was classified "Closed-Unacceptable Action." The Safety Board encourages RSPA to complete this study of the effects of authorized hazardous materials in cargo compartment fires and to require appropriate safety systems to protect aircraft and their occupants.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 8/19/1996
Response: THE BOARD NOTES THAT RSPA, WITH ADVICE FROM THE FAA, HAS INITIATED A RULEMAKING PROJECT TO PROHIBIT THE TRANSPORTATION OF OXIDIZERS IN CLASS D CARGO COMPARTMENTS ON BOTH PASSENGER & CARGO AIRCRAFT. THIS PROJECT ADDRESSES THE INTENT OF THE RECOMMENDATION & PENDING COMPLETION OF THE FINAL RULE, A-96-28 IS CLASSIFIED "OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 7/16/1996
Response: THE HAZARDOUS MATERIALS REGULATIONS CURRENTLY FORBID THE AIR TRANSPORTATION OF THE HIGHEST RISK OXIDIZING MATERIALS (INCLUDING NITRIC ACID) ON BOARD PASSENGER CARRYING AIRCRAFT. RSPA HAS IN PLACE EXTENSIVE REGULATIONS WHICH LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF PERMISSIBLE OXIDIZING MATERIALS THAT MAY BE CARRIED IN AIR TRANSPORTATION & WHICH SET REQUIREMENTS FOR LABELING, PACKAGING, & HANDLING OF THESE MATERIALS. THIS REGULATORY SCHEME GREATLY REDUCES THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE TRANSPORTATION OF THESE MATERIALS. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE ISSUES RAISED CONCERNING THE TRANSPORTATION OF OXIDIZERS BY AIR, RSPA, WITH ADVICE FROM THE FAA, HAS INITIATED A RULEMAKING PROJECT TO PROPOSE A PROHIBITION OF THE TRANSPORTATION OF OXIDIZERS IN CLASS D CARGO COMPARTMENTS ON BOTH PASSENGER & CARGO AIRCRAFT. ADDITIONALLY, THE FAA WILL INITIATE A SEPARATE RULEMAKING PROJECT TO REQUIRE AIR CARRIERS TO CLEARLY LABEL THE CARGO COMPARTMENTS AS CLASS C OR D. IT IS ANTICIPATED THE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING WILL BE PUBLISHED BY OCTOBER 1996. WE ARE ALSO EXAMINING THE CURRENT REGULATIONS AUTHORIZING OTHER CLASSES OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AIRCRAFT. WE WILL KEEP THE BOARD APPRISED OF THE PROGRESS ON THESE PROJECTS.