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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-95-051
Details
Synopsis: On 7/2/94, about 1843 eastern daylight time, a Douglas DC-9-31, N954VJ, operated by USAIR, Inc., as flight 1016, collided with trees and a private residence near the Charlotte/ Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina, shortly after the flightcrew executed a missed approach from the instrument landing system approach to runway 18R. The captain, first officer, one flight attendant, and one passenger received minor injuries. Two flight attendants and 14 passengers sustained serious injuries. The remaining 37 passengers received fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, and an instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed. Flight 1016 was being conducted under 14 code of federal regulations part 121 as a regularly scheduled passenger flight from Columbia, South Carolina, to Charlotte.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Revise 14 Code of Federal Regulations part 91, 135, and 121 to require that all occupants be restrained during takeoff, landing, and turbulent conditions, and that all infants and small children be restrained in a manner appropriate to their size. (Supersedes Safety Recommendation A-90-078)
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: CHARLOTTE, NC, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA94MA065
Accident Reports: Flight into Terrain during Missed Approach USAir 1016, DC-9-31, N954VJ
Report #: AAR-95-03
Accident Date: 7/2/1994
Issue Date: 5/16/1995
Date Closed: 12/13/2006
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Child Restraint Systems,Restraint Systems

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 12/13/2006
Response: As a result of the Charlotte accident, a 9-month-old infant who had been held on her mother’s lap sustained fatal injuries. The child’s mother was unable to maintain a secure hold on the child during the impact sequence, and the child struck several seats. The Safety Board believes that if the child had been properly restrained in a child restraint system, she might not have sustained fatal injuries. The Safety Board therefore issued Safety Recommendation A-95-51, asking that small children be restrained in age-appropriate restraint systems. The FAA’s initial response was to urge the Safety Board to reconsider its recommendation for regulatory action to mandate the use of child restraints in favor of non-regulatory measures. The FAA based its response on a two-volume report to Congress entitled Child Restraint Systems. The Safety Board recognized that the FAA had expended considerable time and resources to develop the report, which concluded that mandating child restraint systems (CRS) on air carrier flights could result in some passenger diversions to automobiles, resulting in a net decrease in safety. However, we believe this was a flawed study that drew the wrong conclusions from the data used. The scenarios proposed by the FAA that result in passenger diversions to automobiles and a net safety reduction are based on the premise that substantially higher air fares for families traveling with children will create those diversions. The Board responded that it believed that conclusion was based upon incomplete analysis. In May 1999, the FAA completed an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) gathering information related to the issue of requiring the restraint of all passengers during takeoff, landing, and turbulent conditions in flight. A review of the comments was to take place immediately and a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) was to follow in a short time. At a December 1999 roundtable on child passenger safety on aircraft, sponsored by the Safety Board, the FAA Administrator made a commitment to establish rulemaking that would provide one level of safety for passengers of all ages. Although an NPRM was scheduled to be issued by April 2000, and then by the end of that year, no NPRM was issued. In January 2004, the FAA briefed the Safety Board on its planned actions in response to this recommendation. The FAA indicated that because of continuing concerns about diversion, it would not be issuing regulations mandating the use of child restraints. The Board was also briefed by the American Academy of Pediatrics and the Association of Flight Attendants, which remain strongly committed to the need for child restraints on aircraft. In July 2004, the Board analyzed data from the preceding 24 years regarding road fatalities and injuries compared to the numbers of passenger aircraft enplanements. The analysis found that, although during this period there had been three periods of reduced enplanements, the number of automotive vehicle miles traveled increased every year. This indicates that diversion to automobiles occurred for reasons other than mandating child restraints. Despite these diversions, fatalities in automobiles continued to decline, calling into question the validity of diversion as a basis for not mandating child restraints. In conjunction with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the FAA reviewed the Safety Board’s recent analysis of the effects of diversion observed from events other than the use of child restraints. Both NHTSA and the FAA believe the Board’s analysis is not appropriate because of the relative volumes of auto travel and airplane travel. Board staff continues to believe that the analysis was appropriate and correct. In a letter dated October 20, 2005, the FAA reiterated that it will not require the use of child restraints on aircraft. The FAA supplied copies of two recently published papers that found that highway deaths and injuries increased due to diversions from air travel to highway travel in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Board staff reviewed these studies and does not believe they contradict the findings of the Board’s 2004 analysis. Board staff believes the studies sent by the FAA to refute the Board’s analysis actually support the Board’s analysis and conclusions. On August 26, 2005, the FAA published a notice withdrawing the ANPRM, and indicating that it would not pursue any rulemaking to mandate the use of child restraints on aircraft. Although the FAA has maintained that it has and will conduct an aggressive public education campaign seeking to increase child restraint usage on aircraft, that effort has amounted to little more than the creation of a page on the FAA’s Web site. The FAA’s education campaign includes no evaluation effort, nor is an evaluation component being considered. The Board is unaware of any media campaign that seeks to provide public education about the need for child restraints when flying. Within the past year, the FAA has developed standards to certify CRS designs for aircraft only, and has certified one device. However, the FAA remains opposed to mandating use of CRS on aircraft. Since this recommendation was issued almost 12 years ago, the FAA has consistently disagreed with the Safety Board on the appropriate action to take. Despite extensive efforts of both the FAA and the Safety Board to convince the other of their position on this issue, neither side has changed its opinions. The Safety Board has reluctantly concluded that it cannot convince the FAA to take the action recommended. Consequently, on November 14, 2006, Safety Recommendation A-95-51 was classified Closed Unacceptable Action.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 3/29/2006
Response: The Safety Board notes that on August 26, 2005, the FAA published a notice that it was withdrawing a previously published advanced notice of proposed rulemaking concerning the use of child restraint systems (CRS) on aircraft. Although the FAA has always acknowledged the safety benefits of CRS usage on aircraft, the FAA has disagreed with this recommendation since its issuance out of concern that it could lead to an unintended consequence known as "diversion" (the likelihood that many families will choose to drive rather than fly as a consequence of being required to purchase a ticket for children under age 2). According to the FAA, because driving is more dangerous than flying, the result of a CRS requirement, which would necessitate the extra ticket expense, would be increased fatalities and injuries. Because of the concern over possible diversion, the FAA has taken no action to mandate the use of CRS; the August 26, 2005, notice indicated that the FAA does not plan to develop such a requirement. The Safety Board has disagreed with the FAA that diversion is as simple and inevitable an effect as the FAA has maintained. In August 2004, the Safety Board released an analysis titled "Analysis of Diversion to Automobiles in Regard to the Disposition of Safety Recommendation A-95-51." This analysis analyzed the safety consequences of diversions over the past 25 years caused by circumstances other than a CRS requirement. The Safety Board believes that its 2004 analysis provides further evidence refuting the inevitability and simplicity of diversion. In its October 20, 2005, letter the FAA included copies of two studies that concluded that highway fatalities had risen as a result of diversion following September 11, 2001. The FAA believes that these two studies refute the Safety Board's findings in its 2004 analysis, and the FAA continues to strongly believe that negative effects of diversion are an undeniable consequence of mandating CRS usage on aircraft. The Safety Board carefully reviewed these two papers, and does not believe that they support the FAA's position, nor do they specifically address the traveling population of interest. Rather, they confirm the Safety Board's analysis that diversion is a complex effect. The Safety Board is aware that the FAA's August 26, 2005, notice indicates that the FAA will pursue other options that will mitigate the risk of child injuries and fatalities in aircraft. Since this recommendation was issued 10 years ago, the FAA has indicated that it would pursue a vigorous public information campaign to educate the public. In January 2004, the FAA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration briefed the Board on planned activities in response to this recommendation. At that time, the FAA indicated that it would launch a public education campaign featuring extensive media advertising and an evaluation component to measure how effective the campaign had been. The Board notes that, to date, the FAA's campaign continues to be considerably less than described in January 2004, consisting of little more than a page on the FAA's Web site. The effort includes no media advertising and no evaluation component, and it will be effective only for motivated parents who know of, and take the effort to find, the Web page. In addition, the Board remains concerned that a one-time media campaign will only have short-lived effects. Several years after the campaign ends, current parents of under-2-year-old children will likely not have been exposed to the public education campaign. The Safety Board continues to believe that restraining infants on aircraft is important to ensure their safety. At its November 15, 2005, meeting on the list of Most Wanted safety improvements for Federal agencies, the Safety Board voted to keep this issue on the list, and to maintain the classification of Safety Recommendation A-95-51 as "Open-Unacceptable Response."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 3/1/2006
Response: In its 3/1/2006 annual report to Congress, Regulatory Status of the National Transportation Safety Board's "Most Wanted" Recommendations to the Department of Transportation, the DOT wrote: The DOT believes that mandating the use of child restraints on aircraft will cause passengers to divert to other means of transportation. Because of aviation's low accident rate, the diversion of passengers will result in an increase in fatalities across the transportation modes. Previous analyses by DOT have confirmed this concern. Last year, the NTSB performed an analysis of the diversion issue and asked DOT to comment on its statistical study. On March 10 FAA Administrator Marion C. Blakey and NHTSA Administrator Jefferey W. Runge, M.D., signed a joint letter responding to the statistical study. The FAA has established a new website (www.faa.gov/passengers/childtips.cfm) as part of FAA's efforts to encourage parents to use safety seats when taking their children on an airplane. The website contains tips for choosing the correct child safety seat for air travel, as well as other helpful guidance to ensure that families are prepared for their flight. Parents may also download a new brochure and current child safety news. Print public service announcements, broadcast quality video, and radio public service announcements are available for use by airlines, retail and media outlets, as well as Webbased travel services. Since 1996, the FAA has partnered with airlines and businesses to distribute information about safe air travel for children. On August 25, the FAA withdrew its notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) proposing to mandate the use of child restraint systems on board airplanes. Two recent studies by respected university management and transportation departments indicate that intercity travelers can change their mode of transportation and, when they choose highway travel in place of air travel, total transportation fatalities increase significantly. The FAA and NHTSA believe that the full intent of this recommendation has been met with nationwide public education campaign on child restraint.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 10/20/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 10/20/2005 3:38:45 PM MC# 2050489 Marion C. Blakey, Administrator, FAA, 10/20/05 This is our final response to Safety Recommendation A-95-51 issued by the Board on May 16, 1995. The FAA fully supports the use of approved child restraints in aircraft, and has launched a public education campaign to raise public awareness about the importance of using child restraint systems. The FAA believes that requiring the use of a child restraint system, which would require all families traveling with children under 2 years of age to purchase tickets for those children, would significantly raise the net price of travel for those families. Consistent with basic economic principles, and supported by numerous studies that have been previously discussed with the Board's staff, the FAA concludes that such price increases would divert some family travel from the air transportation system to the highway system. Consequently, the proposed rule would expose entire families to far higher fatality rates, which would produce a net increase in overall transportation fatalities. Based on these conclusions, which have the concurrence of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the FAA has withdrawn its notice of proposed rulemaking proposing to require the use of child restraint systems. The Board has rejected the concept that net price increases would divert families to other modes of transportation. To support its position, the Board recently added that even an event as severe as September 11 produced no measurable change in highway use or highway fatality rates. We have recently been made aware of two recent studics (copies enclosed) by respected university management and transportation departments, which attributed significant increases in highway fatalities explicitly to the events of September 11. These studies indicate that intercity travelers can change their mode of transportation and, when they choose highway travel in place of air travel, total transportation fatalities increase significantly. The studies are: "The Impact of 9/11 on Driving Fatalities: The Other Lives Lost to Terrorism," Garrick Blalock, Vrinda Kadiyali, and Daniel Simon (Cornell University). The authors concluded that the modal transfer from airlines to highways following September 1I caused 242 additional fatalities per month through December 2001, and a total of 1,200 additional fatalities through 2002. "Consequences for Road Fatalities of the Reduction in Flying Following September 11, 2001," Michael Flannagan and Michael Sivak, University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute. The authors concluded that the modal transfer from airlines to highways following September 11 caused 1,018 additional road fatalities in just 3 months following the events of September 11. We believe that the full intent of this recommendation has been met with the public education campaign on child restraints. We will continue to do all we can to encourage the use of child restraints in air transportation. We plan no further action in response to this safety recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 9/13/2005
Response: Although the FAA has always acknowledged the safety benefits of child restraint system (CRS) usage in aircraft, the FAA has disagreed with this recommendation since its issuance out of concern that it could lead to an unintended consequence known as "diversion." The FAA and NHTSA believe that because of the expense of having to purchase an additional airplane seat to hold a CRS for an under-2-year-old child, some families will drive rather than fly (diversion). According to the FAA, because driving is more dangerous than flying, the result of a CRS requirement would be increased fatalities and injuries. Because of this perceived potential effect, the FAA has taken no action to mandate the use of CRS and does not plan to develop such a requirement. As an alternative, the FAA has begun a nationwide public education campaign to promote the use of CRS and enhance the safety of infants and small children on airplanes. Since this recommendation was issued, the Safety Board has believed that a public education campaign could never be an acceptable alternative for mandating the use of CRS. In January 2004, the FAA and NHTSA briefed the Board on the FAA's proposed public education campaign. During that briefing, the FAA indicated that the campaign would feature extensive media advertising seeking to inform parents of the benefits of using CRS in aircraft. The FAA also indicated that this campaign would feature an evaluation component to determine how effectively the message was being delivered and retained by the public. The Board notes that, to date, the FAA's campaign is considerably less than described in January 2004, consisting of little more than a page on the FAA's Web site. This effort includes no media advertising and no evaluation component, and it will be effective only for motivated parents who know of and take the effort to find the Web page. In the 10 years since this recommendation was issued, the FAA has remained steadfast in its position to not mandate CRS use and has taken limited action in response to the recommendation. The Safety Board continues to believe that restraining infants on aircraft is important to ensure their safety. Our accident investigations have confirmed this. Consequently, Safety Recommendation A-95-51 to the FAA is classified "Open--Unacceptable Response."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 3/10/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 3/16/2005 10:42:46 AM MC# 2050108 This is in response to your letter dated November 24, 2004, about child restraints on aircraft. The Federal Aviation Administration and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration are very interested in the safety of children traveling on board airplanes. The following is our response to three specific questions you have asked us to address: · How soon will the FAA get the education campaign up and running? The FAA has launched an extensive nationwide public education campaign to raise public awareness about the importance of using child restraint systems and seat belts. The new website (www.faa.gov/passengers/childtips.cfm) is designed to help parents learn more about the use of child safety seats on airplanes. Since 1996, the FAA has partnered with airlines and businesses to distribute information about safe air travel for children. The Web site contains tips for choosing the correct child safety seat for air travel and other helpful guidance to ensure that families are prepared for their flights. Parents may also download a new brochure and current child safety news. Print public service announcements, broadcast quality video, and radio public service announcements are available for use by airlines, retail and media outlets, as well as Web-based travel services. The following tips are among the advice found online: · Make sure your child safety seat has the following statement on it, "This restraint is certified for use in motor vehicles and aircraft." · The FAA strongly recommends that a child weighing: - less than 20 pounds use a rear-facing child safety seat; - from 20 to 40 pounds use a forward-facing child safety seat; or - more than 40 pounds use an airplane seat belt. · Ask your airline for a discounted fare. Many airlines offer discounts of up to 50 percent for children less than two years of age occupying a seat. · If you cannot purchase a ticket for your child. ask if your airline will allow you to use an empty seat. · While booster seats and harness vests enhance safety in motor vehicles, the FAA prohibits passengers from bringing these types of devices on airplanes for use during taxi, takeoff. and landing because they do not provide as much protection as a child safety seat. They should be checked as baggage. · "Belly belts," which attach to lap belts, are banned for use on U.S. airplanes. Enclosed for the Board's information is a joint FAA/NHTSA response to the Board's study entitled "Analysis of Diversion to Automobiles in Regard to the Disposition of Safety Recommendation A-95-51." We also offer the following response to the specific questions you asked us to examine: · Do the FAA and NHTSA agree that the current data tell a different story about diversion to auto than the 1990/1995 data did? No. As you will see in our response to the Board's paper, the level of diversion that we anticipate, as well as the increased number of fatalities, is too small to impact the highway statistics. While the Board used data from more recent years, the core finding remains that this safety recommendation would cost additional lives rather than save lives. · Do the FAA and NHTSA have scientific data to determine under what circumstances a family will divert? Such scientific data does not exist. FAA and NHTSA rely on well-tested principles of market theory and market research--first, price matters and second, consumers will respond to substantial price increases. Our response to the Board's paper establishes that if less than one percent of the targeted population (families traveling by air with infants) were to divert to highways in response to substantial changes in price, the net effect of the Board's recommendation would be to increase net transportation fatalities. In summary, we believe that the full intent of Safety Recommendation A-95-51 has been met with the nationwide public education campaign on child restraint, and we encourage the Board to classify this recommendation in a "closed acceptable alternate" status.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 2/1/2005
Response: In its 2/1/2005 annual report to Congress, Regulatory Status of the National Transportation Safety Board's "Most Wanted" Recommendations to the Department of Transportation, the DOT wrote: The Administrators of FAA and NHTSA and the Assistant Secretary for Policy met with the NTSB Chairman in January 2004 and the NTSB held a Board meeting in August 2004 to discuss the status of the recommendation. The NTSB asked NHTSA and FAA to comment on its statistical study on the diversion issue (moving from plane to motor vehicle) completed by the NTSB. The FAA received the formal letter from the Board on December 22,2004, asking for comment. FAA and NHTSA are developing a joint response. The FAA has established a new website (www.faa.pov/oasseneers/chlldtlDs.cfm) as part of FAA's efforts to encourage parents to use safety seats when taking their children on an airplane. The website contains tips for choosing the correct child safety seat for air travel, as well as other helpful guidance to ensure that families are prepared for their flight.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 11/24/2004
Response: On June 7, 1995, the FAA indicated that it had prepared a report to Congress on the use of child restraint systems (CRS) on commercial airplanes. The report found that the cost to parents of having to purchase an additional seat to place their under-2-year-old child in a CRS would result in some families' driving rather than flying. According to the FAA, because driving is more dangerous than flying, the result of a CRS requirement would be increased fatalities and injuries. Because of this effect, generally called "diversion," the FAA did not plan to mandate the use of CRS, but did plan a nationwide public education campaign to promote the use of CRS and enhance the safety of infants and small children on airplanes. On October 20, 1995, the Safety Board responded to the FAA that the Board believed that the effects attributed to diversion were based on incomplete analysis and classified Safety Recommendation A-95-51 "Open--Unacceptable Response." Following issuance by the FAA of an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) in February 1998, the Board reclassified Safety Recommendation A-95-51 "Open--Acceptable Response." The recommendation has remained in the "Open--Acceptable Response" status pending completion of rulemaking as requested. During the January 21, 2004, briefing to the Safety Board, the FAA and NHTSA indicated that diversion was supported by three major analyses: the 1995 report to Congress; a 1999 analysis of diversion performed by the Department of Transportation (DOT); and a 2003 paper, written by physicians not associated with the DOT or the FAA, which appeared in Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine. All three studies estimated the potential benefits of mandating the use of CRS in airplanes to be very small, and found that the result of such a requirement would increase fatalities and injuries through diversion. The FAA advised the Board that it did not plan to issue the notice of proposed rulemaking, and proposed a public education campaign to increase the use of CRS on airplanes. During the briefing, NHTSA also noted that a number of improvements to CRS used in automobiles would make CRS less compatible with airplanes. After the January meeting with the FAA and NHTSA, the Board received briefings from the Association of Flight Attendants and the American Association of Pediatrics. In addition, Safety Board staff recently completed an initial analysis of travel activity and associated fatalities that called into question the FAA's claim that the diversion of travelers from air to highway as a result of mandated child restraint use by children under age 2 would result in increased deaths and injuries due to the greater risk of highway accidents. Enclosed is a copy of this study, titled "Analysis of Diversion to Automobiles in Regard to the Disposition of Safety Recommendation A-95-51." This report analyzed 22 years of data and determined that, although highway travel has increased each year, during three periods, air travel decreased from year to year. During each of these three periods when diversion occurred, highway fatalities and injuries declined among children under 5 years old. The Safety Board continues to believe that restraining infants on aircraft is important to ensure their safety. Our accident investigations have confirmed this. We are disappointed that the FAA has not taken steps to require infant restraint, nor has the FAA initiated the education campaign, which was supposed to begin in the spring of 2004. Consequently, on August 3, 2004, Safety Recommendation A-95-51 was classified "Open--Unacceptable Response;" it will remain on the Board's Most Wanted list for the next year. We suggest that the FAA and NHTSA examine the enclosed NTSB staff study, and address the following questions: 1. Do the FAA and NHTSA agree that the current data tell a different story about diversion to auto than the 1990/1995 data did? 2. Do the FAA and NHTSA have scientific data to determine under what circumstances a family will divert? 3. How soon will the FAA get the education campaign up and running?

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 8/3/2004
Response: At the Board's 8/3/2004 Board Meeting, this recommendation was classified "Open--Unacceptable Action." Justification to follow.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 1/21/2004
Response: On January 21, 2004, the FAA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) briefed the Board Members and staff on their position regarding child restraints on aircraft. On February 26, 2004, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) and the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA) briefed the Board Members and staff on their positions related to child restraints on aircraft. During the January 21, 2004, briefing of the Board, NHTSA repeated CAMI's findings that no forward-facing child-restraint devices (CRDs) used in aircraft were able to provide adequate protection from head impacts. NHTSA noted that a number of improvements to CRDs used in automobiles would make the CRDs less compatible with aircraft. Among these was further development of the LATCH system; aircraft seats do not currently have LATCH attachments. In addition, CRD designs are moving in the direction of requiring the use of top tethers to improve head impact protection performance of CRDs. Top tethers are not currently available in aircraft seats. However, top tethers significantly increase the protection offered by CRDs in automobiles, where many children are injured. In addition, NHTSA is investigating adding side impact protection to CRDs. The addition of side impact protection will likely make the CRD wider than current designs. Current designs are already at the width limits for aircraft seats, and some current CRDs are wider than the space available in aircraft seats. Thus, NHTSA is concerned that the result of their desire to increase frontal head impact protection and side impact protection in the CRDs used in automobiles will be that automobile CRDs will be entirely incompatible for use in aircraft. Although not all CRDs are compatible for use in aircraft, the FAA has stated that it plans a public education campaign to advocate the voluntary use of CRDs on aircraft. The campaign will focus on the safety benefits of CRDs in preventing turbulence injuries. The new campaign will be modeled after the 1996 "Turbulence Happens" campaign. That program featured a national media event, partnership development, and a child safety brochure. Print, radio, and television public service announcements were produced in both English and Spanish, and were distributed to hundreds of media outlets. The value of donated airtime amounted to $2.3 million for television, and $710,000 for radio. The new campaign would be launched in the spring of 2004, and include the development of a new FAA Web site dedicated to informing passengers about seat belt use and child restraints. A new brochure on CRD usage will also be developed.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 2/25/2003
Response: The last update received from the FAA on this recommendation, which is on the Safety Board's List of Most Wanted Safety Improvements, was dated April 18, 2001. At that time, the FAA stated that it was continuing its efforts to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to require that all occupants of aircraft, including children, be properly restrained during movement on the surface, during takeoff, during landing when the seatbelt sign is illuminated, and when instructed by a crewmember. During the development of the NPRM, the FAA encountered some technical and operational issues that needed to be addressed before the NPRM was published. On July 6, 2001, the Safety Board urged the FAA to resolve these issues as quickly as possible. Pending resolution of the technical issues and issuance of the NPRM and a final rule, Safety Recommendation A-95-51 remained classified "Open--Acceptable Response." The Board would appreciate receiving an update on FAA activities being taken or completed in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 7/6/2001
Response: The Safety Board urges the FAA to resolve the technical issues in the NPRM as quickly as possible and notes that this recommendation, which is now 6 years old, is on our list of Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements. Pending swift resolution of the technical issues and issuance of the NPRM and a final rule, Safety Recommendation A-95-51 remains classified "Open-Acceptable Response."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 4/18/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 04/26/2001 4:07:00 PM MC# 2010358 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is continuing its efforts to issue the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), which proposes to require that all occupants of aircraft, including children, be properly restrained during movement on the surface, during takeoff, during landing when the seatbelt sign is illuminated, and when instructed by a crewmember. During the development of the NPRM, the FAA encountered some technical and operational issues that need to be addressed before the NPRM can be published. It was anticipated that these issues would be resolved and the NPRM published in the Federal Register by the end of 2000. The FAA submitted a draft NPRM for executive review in early January 2001. During this review technical issues surfaced, particularly regarding related automobile safety standards, which must be resolved in coordination with other Department of Transportation organizations before the NPRM can be issued. I will provide the Board with a copy of the NPRM as soon as it is issued.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 8/17/2000
Response: THE SAFETY BOARD IS PLEASED THAT THE FAA IS NOW TAKING ACTION ON THIS ISSUE, WHICH IS ON OUR MOST WANTED TRANSPORTATION SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS LIST. PENDING ISSUANCE OF THE NPRM BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR AND A FINAL RULE SUBSEQUENTLY BEING ISSUED, A-95-51 REMAINS CLASSIFIED "OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 7/7/2000
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 07/12/2000 9:44:09 AM MC# 2000877 THE FAA IS CONTINUING ITS EFFORTS TO ISSUE THE NPRM, WHICH PROPOSES TO REQUIRE THAT ALL OCCUPANTS OF AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING CHILDREN, BE PROPERLY RESTRAINED DURING MOVEMENT ON THE SURFACE, TAKEOFF, LANDING, WHEN THE SEATBELT SIGN IS ILLUMINATED, AND WHEN INSTRUCTED BY A CREWMEMBER. DURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS NPRM, THE FAA ENCOUNTERED SOME TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE ADDRESSED BEFORE THE NPRM CAN BE PUBLISHED. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THESE ISSUES WILL BE RESOLVED SOON AND THE NPRM PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. I WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH A COPY OF THE NPRM AS SOON AS IT IS PUBLISHED. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THIS IS ONE OF MY TOP PRIORITY ITEMS, AND I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF THE FAA'S PROGRESS ON THIS REGULATORY EFFORT.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 6/16/1999
Response: A-95-51 ASKED THE FAA TO REVISE 14 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS PARTS 91, 135, AND 121 TO REQUIRE THAT ALL OCCUPANTS BE RESTRAINED DURING TAKEOFF, LANDING, AND TURBULENT CONDITIONS, AND THAT ALL INFANTS AND SMALL CHILDREN BE RESTRAINED IN A MANNER APPROPRIATE TO THEIR SIZE. THE SAFETY BOARD APPRECIATES THE PROGRESS THE FAA HAS MADE ON THIS ISSUE. PENDING ISSUANCE OF THE FINAL RULE, A-95-51 IS CLASSIFIED "OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 5/14/1999
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 5/18/99 3:14:06 PM MC# 990530 ON 2/11/98, THE FAA ISSUED AN ADVANCED NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (ANPRM) SEEKING COMMENTS ON ISSUES RELATED TO THE USE OF CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEMS IN AIRCRAFT DURING ALL PHASES OF FLIGHT (I.E., TAXI, TAKEOFF, LANDING, OR ANY OTHER TIME THE SEAT BELT SIGN IS ILLUMINATED). SPECIFICALLY, THE FAA WAS SEEKING CRASH PERFORMANCE AND EASE-OF-USE INFORMATION ABOUT EXISTING AND NEW AUTOMOTIVE CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEMS WHEN USED IN AIRCRAFT, AS WELL AS THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANY OTHER NEW OR IMPROVED CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEM DESIGNED EXCLUSIVELY FOR AIRCRAFT USE. THE ANPRM WAS ALSO SEEKING COMMENTS, DATA, AND ANALYSES TO DETERMINE THE BEST APPROACH TO MAINTAIN AND ENHANCE SAFETY OF CHILDREN WHO ARE PASSENGERS IN AIRCRAFT. THE FAA HAS COMPLETED ITS ANALYSIS OF THE COMMENTS RECEIVED IN RESPONSE TO THE ANPRM. CONSEQUENTLY, THE FAA IS DEVELOPING A NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (NPRM) PROPOSING TO REQUIRE THAT ALL OCCUPANTS OF AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING CHILDREN, BE PROPERLY RESTRAINED DURING MOVEMENT ON THE SURFACE, TAKEOFF, LANDING, WHEN THE SEATBELT SIGN IS ILLUMINATED, AND WHEN INSTRUCTED BY A CREWMEMBER. I WILL PROVIDE THE BOARD WITH A COPY OF THE NPRM AS SOON AS IT IS ISSUED.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 5/11/1999
Response: At the May 11, 1999 Board meeting addressing the NTSB’s Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements (MWL), the Board voted to place Safety Recommendation A-95-51 on the Federal MWL under the issue category “Child/ Youth Safety in Transportation.”

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 11/17/1998
Response: THE BOARD CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT ALL AIRCRAFT OCCUPANTS, INCLUDING YOUNG CHILDREN, SHOULD BE RESTRAINED. THE LACK OF A REQUIREMENT FOR RESTRAINT USE FOR CHILDREN LESS THAN 2 YEARS OLD IS INCONSISTENT WITH A RECENT POLICY BY SEVERAL AIRLINES THAT SEATED OCCUPANTS SHOULD BE RESTRAINED AT ALL TIMES DURING A FLIGHT TO ENSURE THEIR SAFETY. THE BOARD REMAINS CONCERNED THAT UNRESTRAINED SMALL CHILDREN NOT ONLY HAVE AN INCREASED RISK OF INJURY TO THEMSELVES BUT POSE A HAZARD TO OTHER OCCUPANTS WHO MAY BE STRUCK BY THE UNRESTRAINED CHILD DURING AN ACCIDENT IMPACT SEQUENCE. ANY ANALYSIS OF THE BENEFITS OF CHILD RESTRAINT DEVICES SHOULD INCLUDE THE POTENTIAL RISK OF OTHER PASSENGERS BEING STRUCK BY UNRESTRAINED CHILDREN. THE BOARD STRONGLY URGES THE FAA TO ADDRESS THIS CRITICAL SFETY ISSUE AS RAPIDLY & EFFECTIVELY AS POSSIBLE. PENDING THE RESULTS OF THE ANPRM, & ANY SUBSEQUENT FAA RULE-MAKING ACTION, A-95-51 IS CLASSIFIED "OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RSPONSE."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 4/24/1998
Response: (Letter Mail Controlled 4/29/98 2:48:26 PM MC# 980548) ON 2/11/98, THE FAA ISSUED AN ADVANCED NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (ANPRM) SEEKING COMMENTS ON ISSUES RELATED TO THE USE OF CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEMS IN AIRCRAFT DURING ALL PHASES OF FLIGHT (I.E., TAXI, TAKEOFF, LANDING, OR ANY OTHER TIME THE SEAT BELT SIGN IS ILLUMINATED). SPECIFICALLY, THE FAA SEEKING CRASH PERFORMANCE & EASE-OF-USE INFO ABOUT EXISTING & NEW AUTOMOTIVE CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEMS WHEN USED IN AIRCRAFT, AS WELL AS THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANY OTHER NEW OR IMPROVED CHILD RESTRINT SYSTEM DESIGNED EXCLUSIVELY FOR AIRCRAFT USE. THE ANPRM SEEKS COMMENTS, DATA, & ANALYSES TO DETERMINE THE BEST APPROACH TO MAINTAIN & ENHANCE SAFETY OF CHILDREN WHO ARE PASSENGERS IN AIRCRAFT. AFTER REVIEWING THE COMMENTS, THE FAA MAY ISSUE A NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING WITH SPECIFIC REGULATORY PROPOSALS REGARDING THE USE OF CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEMS.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 10/20/1995
Response: THE BOARD NOTES THAT THE FAA SHARES THE BOARD'S STRONG COMMITMENT TO THE SAFETY OF CHILDREN TRAVELING IN AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER, BASED ON STUDIES CITED BY THE FAA IN ITS LETTER, THE FAA HAS URGED THE THE SAFETY BOARD TO RECONSIDER ITS RECOMMENDATION FOR REGULATORY ACTION TO MANDATE THE USE OF CHILD RESTRAINTS IN FAVOR OF NONREGULATORY MEASURES. THE SAFETY BOARD RECOGNIZES THAT THE FAA EXPENDED CONSIDERABLE TIME & RESOURCES TO DEVELOP THIS REPORT, WHICH CONCLUDED THAT MANDATING CRS ON AIR CARRIER FLIGHTS COULD RESULT IN SOME PASSENGER DIVERSIONS TO AUTOMOBILES, RESULTING IN A NET DECREASE IN SAFETY. THE BOARD BELIEVES THAT IF AIRLINES WERE TO CHARGE A SUBSTANTIAL FARE FOR INFANTS WHO CURRENTLY ARE TRAVELING FREE, THE INITIAL REDUCTION IN AIR TRAVEL BY FAMILIES WOULD RESULT IN A SUBSTANTIAL REVENUE LOSS FOR AIRLINES, CAUSING THEM TO INCUR THE FAA STUDY'S REVENUE LOSS ESTIMATE OF UP TO $6 BILLION OVER A 10 YEAR PERIOD. HOWEVER, THE BOARD IS CERTAIN THAT THE AIRLINES WILL NOT $6 BILLION WORTH OF PRICE-SENSITIVE TRAVELERS SHIFT TO THE AUTOMOBILE WITHOUT A COMPETITIVE RESPONSE. THE BOARD NOTES THAT THE FAA STUDY SELECTED WHAT IT LABELED "SCENARIO NUMBER 4" AS THE CRS OPTION THAT PREVENTED THE MOST INJURIES & FATALITIES, WITH THE LEAST ECONOMIC IMPACT TO AIR CARRIERS. THE STUDY DESCRIBES THIS SCENARIO AS ONE IN WHICH A FAMILY COULD RESERVE A SEAT FOR AN INFANT TRAVELER ON A SPACE AVAILABLE BASIS, PROVIDING THEIR OWN CRS. THE BOARD OBSERVES THAT THIS SCENARIO IS FUNCTIONALLY IDENTICAL TO THE CURRENT SITUATION, IN WHICH AIRLINES PERMIT FAMILIES TO SECURE CRS ON EMPTY SEATS, WHEN AVAILABLE. THUS, SCENARIO 4 WOULD RESULT IN NOT NET SAFETY IMPROVEMENT. CONSEQUENTLY, THE BOARD BELIEVES THAT THE FAA'S PROJECTED COSTS TO AIR TRAVELERS, REVENUE LOSSES TO AIRLINES, & PASSENGER DIVERSIONS TO AUTOMOBILES AS A RESULT OF MANDATED CRS FOR INFANTS ARE BASED UPON INCOMPLETE ANALYSIS. THE BOARD ALSO NOTES THE FAA'S INTENTION TO DEVELOP A NATIONWIDE PUBLIC EDUCATION CAMPAIGN TO PROMOTE THE USE OF CHILD RESTRAINTS. THE BOARD BELIEVES THAT THIS CAMPAIGN IS APPROPRIATE. THE BOARD DOES NOT, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT EDUCATION ALONE WILL RESULT IN THE PROTECTION OF INFANTS & SMALL CHILDREN ON AIRPLANES. EDUCATION ALONE DID NOT RESULT IN HIGH USAGE OF CRS IN AUTOMOBILES; CONSEQUENTLY, ALL 50 STATES & THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA NOW HAVE MANDATORY AUTOMBILE CHILD RESTRAINT LAWS. THE BOARD IS PLEASED TO LEARN THAT SECRETARY PENA HAS WRITTEN TO AIR CARRIERS ASKING THAT THEY ESTABLISH INCENTIVES THAT ENCOURGE PARENTS TO FLY WITH PROPERLY RESTRAINED CHILDREN, THE DISCOUNT FARES OFFERED BY SOUTHWEST AIRLINES TO CHILDREN WHO USE CRS ARE CONSISTENT WITH SUCH EFFORTS. THE BOARD & ITS STAFF LOOK FORWARD TO A BRIEFING BY YOUR SENIOR STAFF TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF CRS. PLEASE HAVE YOUR STAFF CONTACT MR. RONALD SCHLEEDE, ACTING DEPUTY DIRCTOR, OFFICE OF AVIATION SAFETY, AT (202) 382-6610 TO SCHEDULE THE BRIEFING. PENDING THE MEETING OF OUR STAFF TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE, A-95-51 WILL REMAIN CLASSIFIED "OPEN--UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 6/7/1995
Response: THE FAA IS RELEASING A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEMS. I HAVE ENCLOSED A COPY OF THIS REPORT FOR THE BOARD'S INFO. THE REPORT CONTAINS SEVERAL CONCLUSION WHICH ADDRESS THE ISSUE. OF MANDATORY USE OF CRS'S. A FEDERAL RULE MANDATING THE USE OF EFFECTIVE CRS'S WOULD PREVENT A MAXIMUM OF FIVE INFANT AIR ACCIDENT FATALITIES OVER THE NEXT 10 YEARS. IF CRS'S ARE MANDATED, THE AVERAGE ADDITIONAL COSTS WOULD BE ABOUT $200 PER FAMILY TRIP. IF FAMILIES TRAVELING WITH INFANTS ARE CHARGED FULL AIRFARE, 27 PERCENT WOULD CONTINUE TRAVELING BY AIR, 53 PERCENT WOULD FOREGO THE TRIP, & 20 PERCENT WOULD DIVERT TO OTHER MODES. THIS SHIFT TO OTHER TRANSPORTATION MODES WOULD RESULT IN A NET INCREASE OF 82 INFANT & ADULT FATALITIES OVER 10 YEAR EVEN IF AIR CARRIERS CHARGE ONLY 25 PERCENT OF FULL FARES, DIVERSION WOULD STILL OCCUR. TO THIS END THE FAA IS DEVELOPING A NATIONWIDE PUBLIC EDUCATION CAMPAIGN TO PROMOTE THE USE OF CHILD RESTRAINTS & TO ADVACATE PROGRAMS THAT HELP ACHIEVE THE MUTUAL GOAL OF ENHANCING THE SAFETY OF INFANTS & SMALL CHILDREN. THE FAA HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN SEVERAL ACTIVITIES WHICH WILL ENHANCE THE LEVEL OF PROTECTION PROVIDED BY CRS'S IN AIRCRAFT.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date:
Response: At the May 11, 1999 Board meeting addressing the NTSB’s Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements (MWL), the Board voted to place Safety Recommendation A-95-51 on the MWL under the issue category “Require Restraint Systems for Children Under Two.” This issue category was removed from the MWL in 2006.