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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-95-020
Details
Synopsis: ON 3/2/94, ABOUT 1759:46 EASTERN STANDARD TIME CONTINENTAL AIRLINES FLIGHT 795 (COA FLIGHT 795), A MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD-82, REGISTRATION N18835, SUSTAINED SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE WHEN THE CAPTAIN REJECTED THE TAKEOFF FROM RUNWAY 13 AT LAGUARDIA AIRPORT, FLUSHING, NEW YORK. THE AIRPLANE CONTINUED BEYOND THE TAKEOFF END OF RUNWAY 13 & CAME TO REST ON THE MAIN GEAR WHEELS WITH THE NOSE PITCHED DOWNWARD, SO THAT THE FUSELAGE WAS BALANCED ON TOP OF A DIKE. THE UNDERSIDE OF THE NOSE LAY ON A TIDAL MUD FLAT OF FLUSHING BAY. THERE WERE 110 PASSENGERS, 2 FLIGHTCREW MEMBERS & 4 FLIGHT ATTENDANTS ABOARD THE AIRPLANE. THERE WERE NO FATALITIES, & NO SERIOUS INJURIES WERE REPORTED. THERE WERE 29 MINOR INJURIES TO PASSENGERS, ALL OF WHICH WERE SUSTAINED DURING THE EVACUATION, AND 1 MINOR INJURY TO A FLIGHTCREW MEMBER. THERE WAS NO POSTCRASH FIRE.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAA: REQUIRE THAT AIR CARRIER REJECTED TAKEOFF TRAINING INCLUDE ELAPSED TIME TO TARGET SPEED TAKEOFF PERORMANCE DATA.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: FLUSHING, NY, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA94MA038
Accident Reports: Runway Overrun Following Rejected Takeoff, Continental Airlines Flight 795 McDonnell Douglas MD-82, N18835
Report #: AAR-95-01
Accident Date: 3/2/1994
Issue Date: 3/6/1995
Date Closed: 5/14/1996
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Flightcrew, Rejected Takeoff, Training and Education

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 5/14/1996
Response: THE BOARD NOTES THAT ALTHOUGH THE FAA AGREES WITH THE NEED TO HAVE FLIGHTCREW TRAINING & PROCEDURES TO MAXIMIZE TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE, IT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT ELAPSED TIME TO TARGET SPEED WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE. INSTEAD, IT CITED ALTERNATE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE FAA & THE AVIATION INDUSTRY THAT IT BELIEVES COMPLETELY ADDRESS THIS RECOMMENDATION. THE BOARD DOES NOT AGREE. THE BOARD AGAIN NOTES THAT THESE PREVIOUSLY CITED TRAINING MATERIALS DO NOT ADDRESS THE USE OF ELAPSED TIME/SPEED CHECKS AS A MEANS TO ENHANCE THE SAFETY OF TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE. THE BOARD CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT FLIGHTCREW TRAINING OF ELAPSED TIME/SPEED CHECKS WOULD ADD AN ADDITIONAL LEVEL OF AWARENESS FOR A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLIGHT. THEREFORE, THE BOARD CLASSIFIES A-95-20 "CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 2/28/1996
Response: THE FAA HAS REVIEWED ITS PREVIOUS POSITION IN RESPONSE TO THESE RECOMMENDATIONS, & CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT REQUIRING A TIME/SPEED CHECK DURING TAKEOFF MAY RESULT IN UNNECESSARY & POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS REJECTED TAKEOFFS & INCREASE FLIGHTCREW WORKLOAD BY ADDING ANOTHER MONITORING TASK DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLIGHT. ADDITIONALLY, IT WOULD CREATE A POTENTIAL FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY FOR PROBLEMS THAT MAY DEVELOP AFTER THE TIME/SPEED CHECK HAS BEEN COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY. THE FAA CONTENDS THAT OTHER ACTION BY IT & THE AVIATION INDUSTRY WILL IMPROVE THE ABILITY OF PILOTS TO ACCOMPLISH EFFECTIVE REJECTED TAKEOFF-RELATED PROCEDURES. IT PLANS NO FURTHER ACTION ON THESE RECOMMENDATIONS.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 11/7/1995
Response: THE BOARD NOTES THAT THE FAA HAS PROVIDED A COPY OF ITS TAKEOFF TRAINING SAFETY AID TO SUPPLEMENT INFO PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO THIS RECOMMENDATION. HOWEVER, THE BOARD NOTES THAT ELAPSED TIME/SPEED CHECKS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE MANUAL. THE BOARD BELIEVES THAT FLIGHTCREW TRAINING OF A ELAPSED TIME/SPEED CHECKS WOULD ADD AN ADDITIONAL LEVEL OF AWARENESS FOR A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLIGHT. THEREFORE, THE BOARD REITERATES THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS RECOMMENDATION & URGES THE FAA TO INCLUDE ELAPSED TIME/SPEED CHECKS, BOTH IN REJECTED TAKEOFF TRAINING & IN THE TAKEOFF TRAINING SAFETY AID. PENDING FURTHER ACTION BY THE FAA, THE BOARD CLASSIFIES A-95-20 "OPEN--UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 5/15/1995
Response: THE FAA AGREES WITH THE NEED TO HAVE FLIGHTCREW TRAINING & PROCEDURES TO MAXIMIZE TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE. HOWEVER, THE FAA DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT LAPSED TIME TO TARGET SPEED IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE. THE FAA, AIRFRAME MANUFACTURERS, AIRLINES, PILOT GROUPS, & OTHER GOVERNMENT & REGULATORY AGENCIES HAVE DEVELOPED SEVERAL TOOLS TO ENHANCE REJECTED TAKEOFF TRAINING PACKAGE ENTITLED "TAKEOFF TRAINING SAFETY AID" WHICH AIRLINES AN PRESENT TO THEIR CREWS IN A COMBINATION OF CLASSROOM & SIMULATOR PROGRAMS. THIS TRAINING AID PROVIDES INSTRUCTORS WITH TECHNICAL INFO ON TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE FOR SPECIFIC AIRPLANES IN AN OPERATOR'S FLEET.