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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-95-019
Details
Synopsis: ON 3/2/94, ABOUT 1759:46 EASTERN STANDARD TIME CONTINENTAL AIRLINES FLIGHT 795 (COA FLIGHT 795), A MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD-82, REGISTRATION N18835, SUSTAINED SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE WHEN THE CAPTAIN REJECTED THE TAKEOFF FROM RUNWAY 13 AT LAGUARDIA AIRPORT, FLUSHING, NEW YORK. THE AIRPLANE CONTINUED BEYOND THE TAKEOFF END OF RUNWAY 13 & CAME TO REST ON THE MAIN GEAR WHEELS WITH THE NOSE PITCHED DOWNWARD, SO THAT THE FUSELAGE WAS BALANCED ON TOP OF A DIKE. THE UNDERSIDE OF THE NOSE LAY ON A TIDAL MUD FLAT OF FLUSHING BAY. THERE WERE 110 PASSENGERS, 2 FLIGHTCREW MEMBERS & 4 FLIGHT ATTENDANTS ABOARD THE AIRPLANE. THERE WERE NO FATALITIES, & NO SERIOUS INJURIES WERE REPORTED. THERE WERE 29 MINOR INJURIES TO PASSENGERS, ALL OF WHICH WERE SUSTAINED DURING THE EVACUATION, AND 1 MINOR INJURY TO A FLIGHTCREW MEMBER. THERE WAS NO POSTCRASH FIRE.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAA: REQUIRE THAT THE ELAPSED TIMES TO TARGET SPEEDS BE INCORPORATED AS PART OF THE TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE DATA AVAILABLE TO AIR CARRIER FLIGHTCREWS.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: FLUSHING, NY, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA94MA038
Accident Reports: Runway Overrun Following Rejected Takeoff, Continental Airlines Flight 795 McDonnell Douglas MD-82, N18835
Report #: AAR-95-01
Accident Date: 3/2/1994
Issue Date: 3/6/1995
Date Closed: 5/14/1996
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 5/14/1996
Response: THE BOARD NOTES THAT THE FAA MAINTAINS THAT REQUIRING A TIME/SPEED CHECK DURING TAKEOFF MAY RESULT IN UNNECESSARY & POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS REJECTED TAKEOFFS & INCREASE FLIGHTCREW WORKLOAD BY ADDING ANOTHER MONITORING TASK DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLIGHT. THE FAA ALSO BELIEVES THAT IT COULD CREATE A POTENTIAL FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY FOR PROBLEMS THAT MAY DEVELOP AFTER THE TIME/SPEED CHECK HAS BEEN COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY. THE BOARD CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT UNTIL A TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE SYSTEM IS DEVELOPED, THES USE OF TIME/SPEED CHECKS WOULD ADD AN ADDITIONAL LEVEL OF SAFETY TO TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE WITHOUT ADDING ADDITIONAL MONITORING BURDENS TO FLIGHTCREWS. THEREFORE A-95-18 & -19 CLASSIFIED "CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 2/28/1996
Response: THE FAA HAS REVIEWED ITS PREVIOUS POSITION IN RESPONSE TO THESE RECOMMENDATIONS, & CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT REQUIRING A TIME/SPEED CHECK DURING TAKEOFF MAY RESULT IN UNNECESSARY & POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS REJECTED TAKEOFFS & INCREASE FLIGHTCREW WORKLOAD BY ADDING ANOTHER MONITORING TASK DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLIGHT. ADDITIONALLY, IT WOULD CREATE A POTENTIAL FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY FOR PROBLEMS THAT MAY DEVELOP AFTER THE TIME/SPEED CHECK HAS BEEN COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY. THE FAA CONTENDS THAT OTHER ACTION BY IT & THE AVIATION INDUSTRY WILL IMPROVE THE ABILITY OF PILOTS TO ACCOMPLISH EFFECTIVE REJECTED TAKEOFF-RELATED PROCEDURES. IT PLANS NO FURTHER ACTION ON THESE RECOMMENDATIONS.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 11/7/1995
Response: THE BOARD BELIEVES THAT UNTIL A TAKEOFF PERFORMANCES MONITORING SYSTEM IS DEVELOPED, THE USE OF TIME/SPEED CHECKS WOULD ADD AN ADDITIONAL LEVEL OF SAFETY TO TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE WITHOUT ADDING ADDITIONAL MONITORING BURDENS TO FLIGHTCREWS. TO THAT END, THE BOARD ASKS THE FAA TO RECONSIDER THESE RECOMMENDATIONS & REVISE ITS POSITION. PENDING FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE, RECOMMENDATIONS A-95-18 & -19 ARE CLASSIFIED "OPEN--UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 5/15/1995
Response: THE FAA HAS EVALUATED THE CONCEPT OF TIME/SPEED CHECK DURING TAKEOFF AS OUTLINED BY THIS SAFETY RECOMMENDATION. THIS CONCEPT HAS BEEN EVALUATED MANY TIMES IN THE PAST, & THE FAA BELIEVES THAT REQUIRING A TIME/SPEED CHECK DURING TAKEOFF MAY RESULT IN UNNECESSARY & POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS REJECTED TAKEOFFS & INCREASED FLIGHTCREW WORKLOAD BY ADDING ANOTHER MONITORING TASK DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLIGHT. ADDITIONALLY, IT COULD CREATE A POTENTIAL FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY FOR PROBLEMS THAT MAY DEVELOP AFTER THE TIME/SPEED CHECK HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED.