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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-93-014
Details
Synopsis: ON APRIL 22, 1992, ABOUT 1553 HAWAIIAN STANDARD TIME, SCENIC AIR TOURS (SAT) FLIGHT 22, A BEECH MODEL E18S (BE-18), N342E, COLLIDED WITH MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN ON THE ISLAND OF MAUI, HAWAII, WHILE ON AN AIR TOUR FLIGHT FROM HILO, HAWAII, TO HONOLULU, HAWAII. THE FLIGHT WAS CONDUCTED AS AN ON-DEMAND AIR TAXI OPERATION UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 14 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR) PART 135 AND UNDER VISUAL FLIGHT RULES (VFR). AS A RESULT OF THE ACCIDENT, THE PILOT AND EIGHT PASSENGERS ON BOARD SUSTAINED FATAL INJURIES. THE AIRPLANE WAS DESTROYED BY IMPACT FORCES AND A POSTCRASH FIRE.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: REQUIRE COMMERCIAL OPERATORS TO CONDUCT SUBSTANTIVE BACKGROUND CHECKS OF PILOT APPLICANTS, WHICH INCLUDE VERIFICATION OF PERSONAL FLIGHT RECORDS AND EXAMINATION OF TRAINING, PERFORMANCE, AND DISCIPLINARY AND OTHER RECORDS OF PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS, THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION SAFETY AND ENFORCEMENT RECORDS, AND THE NATIONAL DRIVER REGISTER.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: MOUNT HALEAKALA, HI, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: LAX92MA184
Accident Reports: Tomy International, Inc. d/b/a Scenic Air Tours Flight 22, Beech Model E18S, N342E In-Flight Collision with Terrain
Report #: AAR-93-01
Accident Date: 4/22/1992
Issue Date: 2/19/1993
Date Closed: 2/22/1994
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Training and Education, Records

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 2/22/1994
Response: THE BOARD NOTES THAT THE FAA BELIEVES THAT IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AIRLINES TO VERIFY THE VALIDITY OF A PILOT'S CERTIFICATE. THE FAA ISSUED ACOB 8-92-2 ON MAY 21, 1992. THIS ACOB PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR OBTAINING INFORMATION IN THE FAA AIRMAN DATA BASES AND ENCOURAGE CARRIERS TO USE THIS INFORMATION TO VERIFY THE VALIDITY OF THEIR PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYEE'S AIRMEN CERTIFICATES AND SAFETY HISTORY. THE BOARD BELIEVES THAT THE FAA SHOULD REQUIRE COMMERCIAL OPERATORS TO CONDUCT SUBSTANTIVE BACKGROUND CHECKS INTO THOSE ITEMS LISTED IN RECOMMENDATION A-93-14. THE BOARD URGES THE FAA TO TAKE POSITIVE ACTION TO REQUIRE COMMERCIAL OPERATORS TO IMPLEMENT A PROGRAM THAT REQUIRES SUBSTANTIVE PREEMPLOYMENT SCREENING. HOWEVER, BASED ON THE FAA'S POSITION CONCERNING THIS RECOMMENDATION, THE BOARD CLASSIFIES RECOMMENDATION A-93-14 "CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 4/29/1993
Response: THE FAA DOES NOT AGREE WITH THIS RECOMMENDATION. THE FAA BELIEVES THAT IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF AIRLINES TO VERIFY THE VALIDITY OF A PILOT'S CERIFICATE. ON MAY 21, 1992, THE FAA ISSUED AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS BULLETIN (ACOB) 8-92-2, CERTIFICATED AIRMEN PREEMPLOYMENT SAFETY VERIFICATION. THIS ACOB PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR OBTAINING INFORMATION IN THE FAA AIRMEN DATA BASES AND ENCOURAGES CARRIERS TO USE THE INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THESE DATA BASES TO VERIFY THE VALIDITY OF THEIR PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYEES' AIRMEN CERTIFICATES AND SAFETY HISTORY. PRINCIPAL INSPECTORS WERE DIRECTED TO ADVISE THEIR RESPECTIVE OPERATORS THAT THE FAA EXPECTS THEM TO VERIFY THE CERTIFICATION OF ANY AIRMEN IT EMPLOYS, INCLUDING FLIGHT ENGINEERS, AIRCRAFT DISPATCHERS, REPAIRMEN, AND MECHANICS. I BELIEVE THAT THIS ACOB ADDRESSES THE INTENT OF THIS RECOMMENDATION. I PLAN NO FURTHER ACTION ON THIS RECOMMENDATION.