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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-89-129
Details
Synopsis: ABOUT 0901 CENTRAL DAYLIGHT TIME ON AUGUST 31, 1988, DELTA AIR LINES, INC., FLIGHT 1141, CRASHED SHORTLY AFTER LIFTING OFF FROM RUNWAY 18L AT THE DALLAS-FORTH WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (DFW), TEXAS. THE AIRPLANE, A BOEING 727-232, U.S. REGISTRY N473DA, WAS A REGULARLY SCHEDULED PASSENGER FLIGHT AND WAS EN ROUTE TO SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: DIRECT PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTORS TO INSPECT THEIR AIR CARRIERS OPERATING UNDER 14 CFR PARTS 121 OR SCHEDULED 135 AS TO PROCEDURES FOR REFUELING WITH AN INOPERATIVE FUEL QUANTITY GAUGE AND REQUIRE, AS NECESSARY, THAT THESE AIR CARRIERS MODIFY THEIR REFUELING PROCEDURES TO REQUIRE DIPSTICKING, DRIPSTICKING, OR HAVE OTHER APPROPRIATE MEASUREMENTS OF FUEL QUANTITY TAKEN, WITH CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO THE LEVEL OF THE AIRPLANE.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: DALLAS/FT WORTH, TX, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA88MA072
Accident Reports: Delta Air Lines, Inc., Boeing 727-232, N473DA
Report #: AAR-89-04
Accident Date: 8/31/1988
Issue Date: 1/9/1990
Date Closed: 12/11/1991
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 12/11/1991
Response: The Safety Board notes that on July 17, 1990, the FAA issued Action Notice 8300.84, Alternate Fueling Methods Accomplished in Accordance with Approved Minimum Equipment Lists. This action notice meets the intent of Safety Recommendation A-89-129, and the Safety Board classifies it as "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 6/17/1991
Response: ON 7/17/90 THE FAA ISSUED ACTION NOTICE 8300.84, ALTERNATE FUELING METHODS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE APPROVED MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LISTS (MEL). THIS NOTICE DIRECTS PRINCIPAL INSPECTORS TO ENSURE THAT THEIR ASSIGNED OPERATORS HAVE ADAEQUATE PROCEDURES FOR ALTERNATE MEANS OF DETERMINING FUEL QUANTITY.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 10/22/1990
Response: Regarding Safety Recommendation A-89-129, as noted in the Safety Board's report, current refueling procedures are not adequate because there is no requirement to recheck the fuel quantities held in each tank after refueling when a fuel gauge is inoperative. The Safety Board is concerned that, without rechecking the quantity in each tank after refueling, an imbalance situation may occur that would go unnoticed by the crew because the fuel gauge(s) did not work. Pending further information on this issue, this safety recommendation is classified as "Open--Unacceptable Response."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 4/12/1990
Response: "--APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES ARE REQUIRED TO BE PUBLISHED AS PART OF THE OPERATOR'S PROCEDURES MANUAL OR MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST (MEL) AND MUST BE APPROVED BY THE FAA PRINCIPAL OPERATORS INSPECTOR. THESE PROCEDURES ARE CONTINUALLY REVIEWED AND APPROVED WHEN THE MMEL IS REVISED OR WHEN THE OPERATOR PROPOSES CHANGES TO THE MEL. IN ADDITION TO THE CONTINUOUS SCRUTINY BY PRINCIPAL INSPECTORS, THE FAA PERIODICALLY REVIEWS MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES THROUGH FIELD EVALUATIONS. THESE EVALUATIONS HAVE NOT REVEALED ANY PROBLEMS WITH FUELING PROCEDURES ASSOCIATED WITH AN INOPERABLE FUEL GUAGE. HOWEVER, THE FAA WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE EXISTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES CONCERNING REFUELING PROCEDURES WITH AN INOPERABLE FUEL QUANTITY GAUGE. I CONSIDER THE FAA'S ACTION TO BE COMPLETED.--"