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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-89-124
Details
Synopsis: ABOUT 0901 CENTRAL DAYLIGHT TIME ON AUGUST 31, 1988, DELTA AIR LINES, INC., FLIGHT 1141, CRASHED SHORTLY AFTER LIFTING OFF FROM RUNWAY 18L AT THE DALLAS-FORTH WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (DFW), TEXAS. THE AIRPLANE, A BOEING 727-232, U.S. REGISTRY N473DA, WAS A REGULARLY SCHEDULED PASSENGER FLIGHT AND WAS EN ROUTE TO SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require 14 CFR Part 121 operators to develop and use cockpit resource management programs in their training methodology by a specified date. (Superseded by A-94-2)
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action/Superseded
Mode: Aviation
Location: DALLAS/FT WORTH, TX, United States
Is Reiterated: Yes
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA88MA072
Accident Reports: Delta Air Lines, Inc., Boeing 727-232, N473DA
Report #: AAR-89-04
Accident Date: 8/31/1988
Issue Date: 1/9/1990
Date Closed: 2/3/1994
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Acceptable Action/Superseded)
Keyword(s): Crew Resource Management, Training and Education

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 3/13/1995
Response: Notation 6532: The National Transportation Safety Board has reviewed your Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), "Air Carrier and Commercial Operator Training Programs," which was published in Volume 59, Federal Register 64272 on December 13, 1994. The notice, affecting 14 CFR Parts 121 and 135, proposes to revise the training and qualification requirements for certain air carriers and commercial operators by: (1) Requiring certain certificate holders operating under part 135, and permitting certain others, to comply with part 121 training, checking, and qualification requirements, and (2) mandating Crew Resource Management (CRM) training requirements for part 121 and certain part 135 operators. The Safety Board strongly supports this NPRM. Air carrier accident investigation experience has shown repeatedly that shortcomings in flight crew performance have been cited in the majority of commuter and major air carrier accidents. And, human factors research and operating experience have led to significant advances in knowledge about the significance of human performance factors (e.g. communication, decisionmaking, leadership, management) in safe flight operations. Based on this information, the Safety Board has issued numerous safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) advocating the upgrading of air carrier pilot training, checking, and qualification requirements; mandating CRM training requirements; and fostering greater use of aircraft flight simulator devices in training programs. Specifically, the proposed rulemaking is responsive to Safety Recommendations A-94-191, -192, -195, and -196, contained in the recently adopted "Commuter Airline Safety study," as well as several earlier recommendations that advocated upgrading part 135 training, checking and qualification requirements to make them comparable/equivalent to those of part 121. (A-86-101, A-86-108, A-88-126, A-90-128, and A-94-24.) The proposed rule also is responsive to Safety Recommendations A-88-69, A-88-71, A-89-124, A-90-135, A-93-37, and A-94-2 addressed to the FAA, that advocated CRM training for flightcrews of part 121 and part 135 operators. The proposed rule also is responsive to Safety Recommendations A-86-103 and A-93-72 that advocated greater use of aircraft flight simulator devices in the training programs of part 135 operators. Finally, the proposed rule also is responsive to Safety Recommendations A-86-l07, A-88-l37, A-90-l07, and A-90-l08, to the FAA, that advocated upgrading existing pilot operating experience requirements for scheduled part 121 and 135 operations. The Safety Board believes that adoption of this proposed rule would contribute significantly toward improving the level of safety in commuter airline operations, as well as in major air carrier operations. The Safety Board appreciates the opportunity, to comment on this proposed rule.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 2/3/1994
Response: (PER GREEN SHEET A-94-1 THRU -5) The Safety Board notes that the FAA makes the following statement in the AC, based on research conducted by NASA and the FAA: "...when there is no effective reinforcement of CRM concepts by way of recurrent training, improvements in attitudes observed after initial indoctrination tend to disappear, and individuals' attitudes tend to revert to former levels." The three components of CRM, as described in AC 120-51A, form a comprehensive CRM program, and the Safety Board concurs with the FAA that flightcrews should receive all three components to improve their crew resource management performance. Further, because of the patterns of errors observed in this safety study, the Board concludes that comprehensive CRM training should be mandatory. Therefore, the Safety Board urges the FAA to require U.S. air carriers operating under 14 CFR Part 121 to provide, for flightcrews not covered by the Advanced Qualification Program, a comprehensive crew resource management training program as described in Advisory Circular 120-51A. The Board also classifies Safety Recommendation A-89-124 "Closed--Acceptable Response/Superseded" by the new recommendation issued as a result of this study. A-89-124 is superseded by A-94-2.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 12/11/1991
Response: Safety Recommendation A-89-124 states that the FAA should require 14 CFR Part 121 operators to develop and use Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) programs in their training methodology by a specified date. The Safety Board notes that the FAA issued Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) No. 58, Advanced Qualification Program on October 2, 1990. Although voluntary, this alternative method for CRM training is being used by the majority of airlines subject to the training and qualification requirements of 14 CFR Part 121. We also understand that the FAA is considering the issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that would require that certificate holders provide CRM training to their crewmembers and certain operations personnel. Pending the issuance of an NPRM, the Safety Board classifies Safety Recommendation A-89-124 as "Open--Acceptable Response."

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 10/22/1991
Response: From the report of the runway collision of USAir flight 1493, Boeing 737 and Sky West flight 5569 Fairchild Metroliner, Los Angeles International Airport in Los Angeles, California on February 1, 1991. The Board adopted this report on 10/22/1991. Also, as a result of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board reiterates the following recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration: A-89-124 and A-90-135.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 6/17/1991
Response: ON 10/2/90 THE FAA ISSUED SFAR NO. 58, ADVANCED QUALIFICATION PROGRAM. THIS SFAR ESTABLISHES A VOLUNTARY, ALTERNATIVE METHOD FOR THE TRAINING, EVALUATION, CERTIFICATION, AND QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF FLIGHT CREWMEMBERS, FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AIRCRAFT DISPATCHERS, INSTRUCTORS, EVALUATORS AND OTHER OPERATIONS PERSONNEL SUBJECT TO THE TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF 14 CFR PART 121.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 10/22/1990
Response: Based on the FAA's plans to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), Safety Recommendation A-89-124 is classified as "Open--Acceptable Response," pending our review and comment on the NPRM.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 4/12/1990
Response: "THE FAA IS CONSIDERING THE ISSUE OF A NPRM TO REQUIRE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS TO PROVIDE CRM TRAINING TO THEIR CREW MEMBERS AND CERTAIN OPERATIONS PERSONNEL. I WILL PROVIDE THE BOARD WITH A COPY OF ANY DOCUMENT THAT MAY BE ISSUED."