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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-89-123
Details
Synopsis: ABOUT 0901 CENTRAL DAYLIGHT TIME ON AUGUST 31, 1988, DELTA AIR LINES, INC., FLIGHT 1141, CRASHED SHORTLY AFTER LIFTING OFF FROM RUNWAY 18L AT THE DALLAS-FORTH WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (DFW), TEXAS. THE AIRPLANE, A BOEING 727-232, U.S. REGISTRY N473DA, WAS A REGULARLY SCHEDULED PASSENGER FLIGHT AND WAS EN ROUTE TO SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: MODIFY NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTION PROGRAM INSPECTION PROCEDURES TO ENSURE THAT FOLLOWING SAFETY INSPECTIONS OF PART 121 AIR CARRIERS, DEFICIENCIES ARE CORRECTED EXPEDITIOUSLY AND THAT THE LEADER OF THE INSPECTION TEAM IS MADE PART OF THE EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED ACTIONS.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: DALLAS/FT WORTH, TX, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA88MA072
Accident Reports: Delta Air Lines, Inc., Boeing 727-232, N473DA
Report #: AAR-89-04
Accident Date: 8/31/1988
Issue Date: 1/9/1990
Date Closed: 12/11/1991
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 1/28/1992
Response: The Safety Board staff met with members of the FAA staff on June 13, 1991, and as a result of that meeting, the FAA agreed to provide each team leader with a copy of the initial closeout actions taken to resolve National Aviation Safety Inspection Program findings. While this action does not ensure the team leader's impact on the evaluation process, it will allow the team leaders the opportunity to comment on the proposed closeout actions if they desire. Based on this action, the Safety Board classifies Safety Recommendation A-89-123 as "Closed--Acceptable Alternate Action."

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 12/11/1991
Response: Regarding Safety Recommendation A-89-123, the Safety Board notes that the FAA believes the National Aviation Safety Inspection Program (NASIP) is functioning as designed within the overall management system of flight standards. The FAA's regional offices oversee the actions of the certificate-holding district offices and track the resolution of the findings. The operations branch provides oversight and serves as a final check and balance. On June 13, 1991, the FAA met with Safety Board staff and agreed to provide each team leader with a copy of the initial closeout actions taken to resolve NASIP findings. The process will allow the team leaders the opportunity to comment on the actions if they desire. Based on the above information, the Safety Board classifies A-89-123 as "Closed--Acceptable Alternate Action." During its investigation of accidents the Safety Board will continue to review the deficiencies identified during NASIP inspections and the resulting corrective actions.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 8/16/1991
Response: ON JUNE 13, 1991, THE FAA MET WITH THE SAFETY BOARD TO DISCUSS THIS SAFETY RECOMMENDATION. AS RESULT OF THIS MEETING, THE FAA WILL PROVIDE EACH TEAM LEADER WITH A COPY OF THE INITIAL CLOSEOUT ACTIONS TAKEN TO RESOLVE NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTION PROGRAM FINDINGS. THIS PROCESS WILL ALLOW THE TEAM LEADERS THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE ACTIONS IF THEY DESIRE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 6/17/1991
Response: THE FAA DOES NOT TOTALLY AGREE WITH THIS SAFETY RECOMMENDATION AND BELIEVES THE NASIP IS FUNCTIONING AS DESIGNED WITHIN THE OVERALL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF FLIGHT STANDARDS. THE FAAS REGIONAL OFFICES OVERSEE THE ACTIONS OF THE CERTIFICATE-HOLDING DISTRICT OFFICES AND TRACK THE RESOLUTION OF THE FINDINGS. THE OPERATIONS BRANCH PROVIDES OVERSIGHT AND SERVES AS A FINAL CHECK AND BALANCE. THE FAA BELIEVES THAT THE NASIP SYSTEM IS CAREFULLY DESIGNED AND FUNCTIONS EFFECTIVELY. IF ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS IS REQUIRED TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR NASIP FINDINGS, THE THE PROVIDES THAT EMPHASIS THROUGH MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND THE INTERNAL EVALUATION PROGRAM. ON JUNE 13, 1991, THE FAA MET WITH SAFETY BOARD STAFF MEMBERS AND AGREED TO PROVIDE EACH TEAM LEADER THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE ACTIONS IF THEY DESIRE.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 10/22/1990
Response: Regarding Safety Recommendation A-89-123, the investigation found that the absence of effective FAA management control of its inspector workforce, the lack of accountability of principal inspectors, and the shortcomings in the National Aviation Safety Inspection Program (NASIP) contributed to the cause of the accident. The Safety Board believes that the FAA's proposed action does not provide assurance that corrective actions taken by an air carrier after a NASIP inspection meet the intent of the NASIP team. Further, the FAA actions do not provide for a means of monitoring the Principal Operations Inspector's ability to surveil the carrier. Past experience indicates that headquarters personnel who are not actively involved in the inspection of the carrier may not have sufficient information upon which to evaluate the air carrier's corrective action. Therefore, the Safety Board continues to believe that the inclusion of the leader of the inspection team in the followup evaluation of the proposed corrective actions is necessary to ensure appropriate compliance with the teams' findings. Pending your further response, Safety Recommendation A-89-123 is classified "Open--Unacceptable Response."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 4/12/1990
Response: PLEASE SEE THE FAA'S RESPONSE. "--THE FAA'S FLIGHT STANDARD SERVICE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT ALL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE ACCOMPLISHED. BASED ON THE ORIGINAL NASIP FINDINGS, THE REGIONAL OFFICES REPORT ON THE CORRECTIVE ACTION. A SOFTWARE TRACKING MODULE IS BEING USED TO COLLECT ALL SIGNIFICANT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS SINCE THE INCEPTION OF OF THE NASIP. EACH CORRECT ACTION RESULTING FROM A NASIP FINDING IS MONITORED. ACTIONS WHICH APPEAR TO BE NON STANDARD WILL BE QUESTIONED BY FAA HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL BEFORE ANY ACTION IS TAKEN. ALSO, ONCE SIGNIFICANT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE IN PLACE, THE FAA REGIONAL OFFICE WILL VERIFY AND REPORT THAT THE PROBLEMS OBSERVED HAVE BEEN CORRECTED. FINALLY, AN ENTRY IS MADE INTO THE SOFTWARE TRACKING MODULE SYSTEM AT FAA HEADQUARTERS TO CLOSE OUT THE ITEM. I PLAN NO FURTHER ACTION ON THIS SAFETY RECOMMENDATION."