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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-88-155
Details
Synopsis: ON FEBRUARY 19, 1988, AN AVAIR INC. FAIRCHILD METRO III, N622AV, OPERATING AS AIR VIRGINIA (AVAIR) FLIGHT 3378, CRASHED IN CARY, NORTH CAROLINA, SHORTLY AFTER IT DEPARTED RUNWAY 23R AT RALEIGH DURHAM INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (RDU), MORRISVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, WITH 2 FLIGHTCREW MEMBERS AND 10 PASSENGERS ON BOARD. THE AIRPLANE STRUCK WATER WITHIN 100 FEET OF THE SHORELINE OF A RESERVOIR, ABOUT 5,100 FEET WEST OF THE MIDPOINT OF RUNWAY 23R. THE AIRPLANE WAS DESTROYED AND ALL 12 PERSONS ON BOARD WERE KILLED.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: PROVIDE PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTORS OF OPERATORS UNDER 14 CFR PARTS 135 AND 121 WITH SIMILAR INDICATORS OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND RAPID GROWTH WHICH SUGGEST WHEN INCREASED SURVEILLANCE OF THOSE OPERATORS IS WARRANTED.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: CARY, NC, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA88MA032
Accident Reports: Avair Inc. Flight 3378 Fairchild Metro III, SA227 AC, N622AV
Report #: AAR-88-10
Accident Date: 2/19/1988
Issue Date: 12/28/1988
Date Closed: 5/23/1989
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 5/23/1989
Response: Safety Recommendation A-88-153 is classified as "Open--Acceptable Action" pending completion of the FAA's ongoing review. In Safety Recommendation A-88-154 we asked the FAA to conduct a special airworthiness review because there was no evidence that flight tests were conducted on the Metro III to determine if a stall avoidance system (SAS) was needed. We believe that the requirement for the system was determined by the needs of the earlier Metro II and "grandfathered" in on the Metro III. In this regard please see page 60 of the Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR- 88/10. According to FAA's memo from its Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, to its Manager, Accident Investigation Division, dated July 27, 1988, "this system (SAS2) is not required on the SA227-AC since it is a "long-bodied" Fairchild, which exhibits greater aerodynamic longitudinal stability. The basic SAS system on the SA227-AC is essentially a carry-over from that certified on the SA226-TC with modifications." Therefore, according to the information supplied by the FAA we Data Source: NTSB Recommendations to FAA and FAA Responses stand by Safety Recommendation A-88-154, and, until we are informed that flight tests have been carried out, this recommendation is classified as "Open-- Unacceptable Action." Regarding Safety Recommendation A-88-155, we have reviewed Action Notice 1800.6, and the "National Aviation Safety Inspection Program-Special Inspection FAR 135 Commuter Air Carriers--1988," and we are satisfied that these documents are responsive to this recommendation which is classified as "Closed-- Acceptable Action."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 3/17/1989
Response: "ON AUGUST 4, 1988, THE FAA ISSUED ACTION NOTICE 1800.6 TO ALERT ALL PRINCIPAL INSPECTORS OF 14 CFR PARTS 121 AND 135 OPERATORS OF THE CHANGES IN CERTIFICATE HOLDER OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS THAT MAY AFFECT SAFETY AND REGULATORY COMPLIANCE. THE GUIDANCE MATERIAL CONTAINED IN THE ACTION NOTICE IS UPDATED ANNUALLY TO ENSURE THAT THE CONDITIONS WHICH MAY REQUIRE INCREASED SURVEILLANCE ARE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF PRINCIPAL INSPECTORS. I HAVE ENCLOSED A COPY OF THE ACTION NOTICE FOR THE BOARD'S INFORMATION." ALSO ATTACHED "NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTION PROGRAM (NASIP) SPECIAL INSPECTION FAR 135 COMMUTER AIR CARRIERS 1988."