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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-88-153
Details
Synopsis: ON FEBRUARY 19, 1988, AN AVAIR INC. FAIRCHILD METRO III, N622AV, OPERATING AS AIR VIRGINIA (AVAIR) FLIGHT 3378, CRASHED IN CARY, NORTH CAROLINA, SHORTLY AFTER IT DEPARTED RUNWAY 23R AT RALEIGH DURHAM INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (RDU), MORRISVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, WITH 2 FLIGHTCREW MEMBERS AND 10 PASSENGERS ON BOARD. THE AIRPLANE STRUCK WATER WITHIN 100 FEET OF THE SHORELINE OF A RESERVOIR, ABOUT 5,100 FEET WEST OF THE MIDPOINT OF RUNWAY 23R. THE AIRPLANE WAS DESTROYED AND ALL 12 PERSONS ON BOARD WERE KILLED.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: REVIEW THE APPROVED FLIGHT MANUAL OF THE FAIRCHILD METRO AIRPLANE WITH REGARD TO FLIGHTCREW RESPONSE TO AN ILLUMINATED STALL AVOIDANCE SYSTEM FAULT, AND REVISE IT, AS APPROPRIATE, TO REFLECT ITS CAUTIONARY NATURE.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: CARY, NC, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA88MA032
Accident Reports: Avair Inc. Flight 3378 Fairchild Metro III, SA227 AC, N622AV
Report #: AAR-88-10
Accident Date: 2/19/1988
Issue Date: 12/28/1988
Date Closed: 4/2/1991
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 4/2/1991
Response: Safety Recommendation A-88-153 states that the FAA should review the airplane flight manual (AFM) of the Fairchild Metro airplane with regard to flightcrew response to an illuminated stall avoidance system (SAS) fault and revise it, as appropriate, to reflect its cautionary nature. The Safety Board notes the FAA has completed its review of the flightcrew response to an illuminated SAS fault in the Fairchild Metro airplane and considers operation of the Fairchild Model SA226 and 227 airplanes (prior to the SA227-CC/DC Commuter Category airplanes) without an operative SAS system to be an emergency operation. The Board also notes the FAA discovered some variations in the AFM procedures in response to an illuminated SAS fault, and Fairchild has agreed to revise the affected AFM for all Conrac SAS-equipped Fairchild Model SA226 and 227 airplanes to reflect a consistent procedure for these situations. Based on the above information, Safety Recommendation A-88-153 is classified as "Closed--Acceptable Alternate Action."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 1/29/1991
Response: THE FAA HAS COMPLETED ITS REVIEW OF THE FLIGHTCREW RESPONSE TO AN ILLUMINATED STALL AVOIDANCE SYSTEM SAS FAULT AND CONSIDER THE OPERATION OF THE FAIRCHILD MODEL SA226 AND 227 AIRPLANES (PRIOR TO THE SA227-CC/DC COMMUTER CATEGORY AIRPLANES) WITHOUT AN OPERATIVE SAS SYSTEM TO BE AN EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND THE SAS MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES SHOULD REMAIN AS EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND THE SAS RED FAULT LIGHT WILL BE RETAINED AS AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF THE SYSTEM. SOME PROCEDURAL VARIATIONS WERE DISCOVERED DURING THE REVIEW OF THE APPROVED AFM PROCEDURES IN RESPONSE TO AN ILLUMINATED SAS FAULT AND FAIRCHILD HAS AGREED TO REVISE THE AFFECTED AFM FOR ALL CONRAC SAS-EQUIPPED FAIRCHILD MODEL SA226 AND 227 AIRPLANES TO REFLECT A CONSISTENT PROCEDURE FOR THESE SITUATIONS.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 6/12/1990
Response: In Safety Recommendation A-88-153, we asked the FAA to review the approved flight manual of the Fairchild Metro airplane with regard to flightcrew response to an illuminated stall avoidance system fault, and revise it, as appropriate, to reflect its cautionary nature. Pending the FAA's ongoing investigation of the cockpit indications during a stall avoidance system (SAS) fault light, this recommendation is classified as "Open--Acceptable Action."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 1/9/1990
Response: "FAA IS CONDUCTING A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF THE COCKPIT INDICATIONS DURING STALL AVOIDANCE SYSTEM (SAS) FAULT CONDITIONS ON THE SA227-AC (METRO III) AIRPLANE. ---A SUMMARY OF THE FAA'S EVALUATION TO DATE INDICATES THAT THE FAULT LIGHT SHOULD REMAIN RED AND BE TREATED AS AN EMERGENCY. THE AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL PROCEDURE MAY BE MODIFIED BY CHANGING THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS WHICH ARE TO BE DISCONNECTED AFTER TURNING OFF THE SAS CLUTCH/SERVO SWITCH. THE FAA WILL, HOWEVER, DETERMINE ITS COURSE OF ACTION TO ADDRESS THIS SAFETY RECOMMENDATION AS SOON AS IT HAS TESTED THE BENDIX SERVO-EQUIPPED AIRPLANE. --I WILL KEEP THE BOARD APPRISED."

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 5/23/1989
Response: Safety Recommendation A-88-153 is classified as "Open--Acceptable Action" pending completion of the FAA's ongoing review. In Safety Recommendation A-88-154 we asked the FAA to conduct a special airworthiness review because there was no evidence that flight tests were conducted on the Metro III to determine if a stall avoidance system (SAS) was needed. We believe that the requirement for the system was determined by the needs of the earlier Metro II and "grandfathered" in on the Metro III. In this regard please see page 60 of the Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR- 88/10. According to FAA's memo from its Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, to its Manager, Accident Investigation Division, dated July 27, 1988, "this system (SAS2) is not required on the SA227-AC since it is a "long-bodied" Fairchild, which exhibits greater aerodynamic longitudinal stability. The basic SAS system on the SA227-AC is essentially a carry-over from that certified on the SA226-TC with modifications." Therefore, according to the information supplied by the FAA we stand by Safety Recommendation A-88-154, and, until we are informed that flight tests have been carried out, this recommendation is classified as "Open-- Unacceptable Action." Regarding Safety Recommendation A-88-155, we have reviewed Action Notice 1800.6, and the "National Aviation Safety Inspection Program-Special Inspection FAR 135 Commuter Air Carriers--1988," and we are satisfied that these documents are responsive to this recommendation which is classified as "Closed-- Acceptable Action."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 3/17/1989
Response: The FAA is reviewing the procedural response to an illuminated stall avoidance system fault light. As soon as the review is completed, I will apprise the Board of the FAA's planned action to address this issue.