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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-88-141
Details
Synopsis: ON NOVEMBER 15, 1987, CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC., FLIGHT 1713, A MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-14, N626TX, WAS OPERATING AS A REGULARLY SCHEDULED, PASSENGER-CARRYING FLIGHT BETWEEN DENVER, COLORADO, AND BOISE, IDAHO. THE AIRPLANE WAS CLEARED TO TAKE OFF FOLLOWING A DELAY OF APPROXIMATELY 27 MINUTES AFTER DEICING. THE TAKEOFF ROLL WAS UNEVENTFUL, BUT FOLLOWING A RAPID ROTATION, THE AIRPLANE CRASHED OFF THE RIGHT SIDE OF RUNWAY 35 LEFT. BOTH PILOTS, 1 FLIGHT ATTENDANT, AND 25 PASSENGERS SUSTAINED FATAL INJURIES. TWO FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND 52 PASSENGERS SURVIVED.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require commercial operators to conduct substantive background checks of pilot applicants which include verification of personal flight records and examination of training, performance, and disciplinary records of previous employers and federal aviation administration safety and enforcement records. (Superseded by A-90-141)
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action/Superseded
Mode: Aviation
Location: DENVER, CO, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA88MA004
Accident Reports: Continental Airlines, Inc., Flight 1713 McDonnell Douglas DC-9-14, N626TX
Report #: AAR-88-09
Accident Date: 11/15/1987
Issue Date: 11/3/1988
Date Closed: 11/21/1990
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Unacceptable Action/Superseded)
Keyword(s): Records

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 11/21/1990
Response: The FAA agreed with the intent of the recommendation but did not believe that the benefits derived from such a regulatory change would outweigh the costs of promulgating and enforcing it. Therefore, the FAA placed the scope and standards for such screening entirely upon voluntary efforts of the operators. The Safety Board believes that the FAA's response to the recommendation is unacceptable and that the circumstances of the accident involving flight 1712 clearly emphasize the need for such a requirement. Therefore, the Safety Board now classifies Safety Recommendation A-88-141 as "Closed--Unacceptable Action/Superseded" by A-90-141.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 1/30/1989
Response: THE FAA AGREES WITH THE INTENT OF THIS RECOMMENDATION BUT THE FAA DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY BENEFITS DERIVED FROM SUCH A REGULATORY CHANGE WOULD OUTWEIGH THE COSTS OF PROMULGATING AND ENFORCING THE REGULATORY CHANGE. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AIRLINES TO VERIFY THE VALIDITY OF A PILOT'S CERTIFICATE. AIR CARRIERS ARE EXPECTED TO VERIFY THE VALIDITY OF AN EMPLOYEE'S CERTIFICATION PERIODICALLY DURING THE EMPLOYEE'S TENURE. UNDER EXISTING REGULATIONS, AIR CARRIERS MUST ENSURE THAT PILOTS, AS WELL AS OTHER FLIGHT CREWMEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES, ARE PROPERLY CERTIFICATED AND QUALIFIED FOR THE DUTIES THEY PERFORM. THE EMPLOYMENT OF INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT PROPERLY CERTIFICATED MAY RESULT IN A VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS. ON 11/30/88, THE FAA ISSUED ACTION NOTICE 8430.26 WHICH ADDRESSES, IN PART, THIS ISSUE. THIS ACTION NOTICE REQUESTS THAT PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTORS INCREASE THEIR SUR VEILLANCE OF CERTIFICATION RECORDS DURING ROUTINE REVIEW OF AIR CARRIER RECORDS. THIS NOTICE ALSO REQUESTS THAT PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTORS REMIND THE AIR CARRIERS OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS AREA AND INFORM THEM THAT VERIFICATION OF AIRMEN CERTIFICATION RECORDS AT THE AIRMEN REGISTRY WILL BE A PART OF FUTURE NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTION PROGRAM INSPECTIONS. THE ACTION NOTICE ALSO LISTS THE DATA BASES THAT ARE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST THE AIR CARRIERS IN VERIFYING THAT THEIR EMPLOYEES ARE PROPERLY CERTIFICATED AND QUALIFIED TO PERFORM THE DUTIES THEY ARE ASSIGNED. THE FAA HAS REQUESTED THAT EACH PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTOR PROVIDE A COPY OF THE ACTION NOTICE TO THEIR CERTIFICATE HOLDERS.